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ABSTRACT
My thesis is about the hypothesis that human cognitive
processes employ a language of thought--a system of mental
repesentation which supports syntactically complex mental
symbols, physically realized in brains. First, I offer a
formulation of this hypothesis which eliminates various
obscurities in standard formulations. With this in hand, I
suggest directions for empirical comparisons of classical
language-of-thought models (including many connectionist
models) and those connectionist models which do not implement
a language of thought. I argue that nonclassical
connectionist models are unlikely to succeed as general
accounts of cognition, but that they have promise as part of
an account of the (alleged) inferential processes guiding
skillful activity, which are unconscious, rapid, and
holistically sensitive to a vast range of potentially relevant
conditions. I show how representations in nonclassical
connectionist models, despite having no syntactic or semantic
structure, can realize genuinely propositional attitudes (and
can therefore undergo genuinely inferential processes).
Finally, I argue that classical models can themselves be
applied to holistically sensitive inference, in the face of
various objections which philosophers have advanced under the
name of the "frameý problem".
Thesis Supervisor: Ned Block
Title: Professor of Philosophy
PHILOSOPHY
(With apologies to Lewis Carroll)
'Twas brilliant, and the flighty tomes
Did guile and quibble in the libe;
All whimsy were the conundromes,
And the morass did gibe.
"Beware the Philosoph, my son!
The jaws that jaw, the claims that gript
Beware the Journal bird, and shun
The Voluminous Manuscript!"
He took his verbal sword in hand:
Long time the grue-some foe he sought--
So rested he by the Theorem tree,
And stood awhile in thought.
And, as in published thought he stood,
The Philosoph, with eyes of flame,
Came scoffing through the cogent word,
And babbled as it came!
One, twol One, two! And through and through
The verbal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went commencing back.
"And hast though slain the Philosoph?
Come to my arms, my thesis boy!
O factious day! Callooh! Callay!"
He chortled in his joy.
'Twas brilliant, and the flighty tomes
Did guile and quibble in the libe;
All whimsy were the conundromes,
And the morass did gibe.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements 6
Chapter 0: CLASSICAL AND CONNECTIONIST MODELS 7
0.1 The Classical Framework 8
0.1.1 Functionalism and Token Physicalism 8
0.1.2 Representationalism 11
0.1.3 The Language-of-Thought Hypothesis 20
0.2 The Connectionist Framework 28
0.2.1 What Is Connectionism? 28
0.2.2 Connectionism and Representationalism 32
0.2.3 Connectionism and Holistically Sensitive
Inference 35
0.3 Overview of the Thesis 37
0.3.1 A Syntactic Issue 38
0.3.2 A Semantic Issue 39
0.3.3 A Processing Issue 40
0.3.4 Summary 43
Chapter 1: CONNECTIONIST LANGUAGES OF THOUGHT 45
1.1 Ultralocal Connectionism and the LOT Hypothesis 46
1.1.1 What is a Language of Thought? 4$7
1.1.2 The LOT Hypothesis and Particular LOT Models 50
1.1.3 Ultralocal Connectionist Models 58
1.2 Distributed Connectionism and the LOT Hypothesis 64
1.2.1 The Limitations of Fodor and Pylyshyn's
Argument 65
1.2.2 Smolensky's Coffee Case 71
1.2.3 Nonconcatenative Complexity 82
1.2.4 A More General Perspective 91
Chapter 2: CONNECTIONIST CONTENT 102
2.1 Fine-Grained Content and Connectionism 104
2.1.1 Content and Reference 106
2.1.2 Semantic Structure 111
2.1.3 The Puzzle 122
2.2 Simple Propositions 130
2.2.1 Propositions and Concepts 132
2.2.2 Simple Propositions and De Re Attribution 137
2.2.3 Explicit Content 141
2.2.4 Summary 145
2.3 Toward a Naturalized Fine-Grained Theory 147
2.3.1 Contents as Set-Theoretic Objects 148
2.3.2 Some Metaphysical Worries 150
2.3.3 Contents as Properties 153
Chapter 3: FRAMING THE FRAME PROBLEM 156
3.1 Persistence and the Frame Problem 159
3.1.1 A Fable 159
3.1.2 Persistence and Sleeping Dogs 163
3.2 Relevance and the Frame Problem 168
3.2.1 The Relevance Problem 168
3.2.2 Relations to the Frame Problem of AI 172
3.2.3 The Role of Bidirectional Search 174
3.3 Holism and the Frame Problem 178
3.3.1 The Holism Problem 178
3.3.2 Relations to the Frame Problem of AI 181
3.3.3 The Role of Heuristic Search 185
3.3.4 summary 191
3.4 Kookiness and the Frame Problem 191
3.4.1 The Fridgeon Problem 191
3.4.2 Three Kinds of Memory 193
3.4.3 How to Rule Out Kooky Predicates 195





. . . to my thesis advisors, Ned Block, Jim Higginbotham,
and Bob Stalnaker, for providing substantive comments in good
cheer, while under serious time constraints.
6
Chapter 0
CLASSICAL AND CONNECTIONIST MODELS
Much of the philosophical interest of cognitive science
stems from its potential relevance to the mind/body problem.
The mind/body problem concerns whether both mental and
physical phenomena exist, and if so, whether they are
distinct. In this chapter I want to portray the classical and
connectionist frameworks in cognitive science as potential
sources of evidence for or against a particular strategy for
solving the mind/body problem. It is not my aim to offer a
full assessment of these two frameworks in this capacity.
Instead, in this thesis I will deal with three philosophical
issues which are (at best) preliminaries to such an
assessment: issues about the syntax, the semantics, and the
processing of the mental representations countenanced by
classical and connectionist models. I will characterize these
three issues in more detail at the end of the chapter.
0.1 The Classical Framework
0.1.1 Functionalism and Token Physicalism
From a highly abstract but useful perspective, cognitive
science is a kind of test for a particular philosophical
theory of mental phenomena, namely, functionalism (see the
related articles in Block, 1980). While functionalism can be
cast as a general claim about all mental phenomena, it is most
usefully introduced as an account of particular types of
mental states or events. What is it to be a functionalist
about a type of mental occurrence' M, such as thinking that
sugar is white, wishing that one's teeth were as white as
sugar, planning to eat more sugar, having a toothache, or
being in a bad mood? A functionalist identifies N with a
particular functional state or event type. Functional types
are those which are individuated solely by considerations of
causal relations. A state or event token f belongs to a
functional type F if and only if f participates in causal
relations of the sort which define F; in this case we may say
'I will usually use the term "occurrence" as a general term for
anything that occurs or happens, including events and states (and also
facts, situations, conditions, etc.). From the standpoint of
functionalism, the interesting feature cormon to all occurrences is that
they may enter into causal relations. I mean to abstract away from more
detailed claims about the individuation of these phenomena, e.g., that a
token event of stabbing Caesar can be identical to a token event of
killing Caesar, or that a token state of stabbing Caesar cannot be
identical to a token state of killing Caesar (for discussion, see
Davidson, 1969).
that f has an "F-role". This means that a functionalist about
a mental state or event N must specify the causal relations--
the N-role--taken to be necessary and sufficient for a state
or event token m to be of type M. This is standardly done by
specifying causal generalizations or laws which relate tokens
of type N (under certain conditions) to external occurrences
(e.g., through sensory or motor processes), and to other
internal occurrences (e.g., through inferential or
computational processes). Functionalists typically hope that
as cognitive science develops, they will be better able to
specify these generalizations and laws, and so will be able
to specify in greater detail which functional types are
identical with which mental types.
How can this be worked into a solution to the mind/body
problem (at least for those mental occurrences to which
functionalism is applied)? The standard hypothesis is that
there are physical state or event tokens which satisfy the
functionalist's causal generalizations and laws, and are
therefore tokens of mental types.' Given this hypothesis,
then, it is possible to adopt the pcsition known as "token
physicalism" (about M): each token mental state or event m of
'Unless otherwise mentioned, I 2oliow the standard practice of
construing "physical" broadly, to cover not only the entities nmentioned
in the theories of physics, but also any natural (as opposed to
supernatural), nonmental, spatiotenporal phenomena.
9
type N is identical to a token physical state or event b.A
The token physicalist answer to the mind/body problem, then,
is that both mental and physical phenomena exist, but that (at
least in certain cases) they are not distinct.
The functionalist and token physicalist approach to the
mind/body problem can only work if token physical states or
events can enter into the causal relations specified by
functionalism. This raises what might be called (not the
mind/body problem but) the "mental-body problem": how is it
possible for a physical system to implement the requisite
processes of sensation, motor control, inference, memory, and
so on?' To answer this question, we need to formulate
specific claims about the nature of the token physical
occurrences located by functionalism (e.g., b in the previous
paragraph).
'This position is distinguishable from (though corpatible with) "type
physicalism", which identifies N with some physical state or event type
B to which all tokens of M belong. For discussion, see the related
articles in Block, 1980.
'This should not be confused with the problem of "interaction": how
is it possible for physical states or events to enter into causal
relations with mrental states or events? Interaction is only a problem for
theories which, unlike token physicalism, treat token mental occurrences
as nonphysical. In short, the question is not about how it is possible
for a body to interact with the mental, but is instead about how it is
possible for a body to be rmental. Hence the name "mental-body problem"
(with a dash) rather than "mind/body problem" (with a slash). It bears
emphasis that the nental-body problem nust be solved in order for
functionalism and token-physicalism to work as a solution to the mind/body
problem.
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A useful way to highlight issues about mental
representations is to focus only on functionalist theories of
"propositional attitudes"--certain mental states, such as
thoughts, wishes, and plans, which have propositional
content.' It seems likely from a functionalist standpoint
that some inferential relations are components of
propositional-attitude-roles (although it is notoriously
difficult to specify these relations). To explain how
physical states can implement these inferential processes,
cognitive scientists have traditionally appealed to an analogy
with the ways computers implement algorithms. Several
philosophers have tried to extract from this analogy spcif ic,
substantive claims about the physical embodiments of
propositional attitude types. The two most important claims
for my purposes are representationalipm and the
language-of-thought (LOT) hypothesis, as formulated in a
number of works by Jerry Fodor. These claims characterize
what is common to classical models in cognitive science.
0.1.2 Representationalism
It is an intuitively obvious but theoretically striking
fact that a person can have many different attitudes with the
'I do not make the assurmption that all propositional attitudes are
familiar to common sense, since scientific psychology may well discover
new sorts.
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same propositional content. We can perceive that toothpaste
is white, believe (to various degrees) that it is, and
hypothesize, imagine, or desire (to various degrees) that it
is. Indeed, it seems that we never find people who are able
to have one of these attitudes toward a given proposition, but
are unable to have another one of these attitudes toward the
same content. Furthermore, there seem to be widespread,
regular, and important causal relations between different
attitudes to the same proposition: for example, perceiving
that p tends to cause believing that p, while doubting that
p tends to interact with wishing that p to generate action.
Whatever the ultimate details, these causal and
presuppositional relations are likely factors in any
functionalist account of propositional attitudcs. We can
therefore formulate a special case of the mental-body problem:
how is it possible for these special relations to be
implemented in a physical system?' This question is raised,
but not answered, by functionalism and token physicalism about
propositional attitudes. Representationalism seeks to supply
an answer to this question (among others--see Fodor, 1981).
Understandably, representationalism is sometimes simply put
as the claim that there are mental representations--entities
'It matters that the attitude-types listed above are such that we can
have a token of any one type without also having a token of another type.
By comparison, presumably there is no mystery as to how a physical system
which can know that p can also manage to believe that p.
12
with content mediating between sensation and motor control--
and that these representations are (by token physicalism)
physical. However, this formulation does not reveal any claim
stronger than token physicalism about propositional attitudes.
Any such token physicalism postulates physical states which,
as token mental states, mediate between sensation and motor
control, and which, as token attitudes with propositional
content, are representations. If representationalism is to
yield an explanation of how physical systems can implement
special relations among attitudes toward the same content, we
need a construal which specifies in more detail the nature of
token propositional attitudes.
The standard strategy is to treat propositional attitudes
as computational relations between thinkers and physical
representations. It will help to formulate this idea if we
consider an arbitrarily chosen propositional-attitude type,
say, the attitude A with the content that p. Also, let t be
a variable ranging over the thinkers (i.e., potential A-ers
that p) to which representationalism is applied (i.e.,
representationalism about A-ing that p). The claim (to be
modified shortly) is as follows:
(At least typically) t's A-ing that p is identical with
t's having a certain computational relation to a physical
representation r with the content that p.
Since (as explained in the previous paragraph) token
physicalism, even without representationalism, "already"
13
postulates physical representations that p, any extra force
of this claim must stem from its appeal to "a certain
computational relation".
Unfortunately, the notion of a computational relation is
typically left unclear, and the specification of which
relations are appropriate for which attitudes is typically
left to the development of cognitive science. This leads back
to the worry that the standard formulation of
representationalism fails to add any substance to
functionalism and token physicalism (about A-ing that p). By
functionalism, any token occurrence of A-ing that p has a
particular inferential role. It follows from this that any
such occurrence stands in some computational relation to its
thinker t.' Without specific constraints, then, t's A-ing
that p satisfies the requirements for r. As a result, the
current formulation of representationalism fails to require
7This inference depends on certain assumptions about what it is for
a thinker to stand in a computational relation to a representation, but
these assumptions are natural and (as far as I know) never called into
question by representationalists. To a near-enough approximation, we may
understand computation as a process of using representations as premises
or conclusions of inferential processes. In this way, it appears, we can
at least make sense of a representation's bearing a conputational relation
to other representations--namely, those for which it is used as a
(co)premise or (co)conclusion. By a slight extension, we may imagine that
representations also stand in computational relations to the inferential
processes which act upon them. But what is it for a representation to
stand in a conputational relation to a thinker? The only natural account
I can think of is that a thinker has a computational relation to a
representation if and only if that representation has a role in the
thinker's inferences. Given this, the inference in the text is correct.
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the posculation of any representations other than those
"already" postulated by functionalism and token physicalism.
To strengthen representationalism, we might simply add to
the formulation the clause that r is distinct from t's A-ing
that p. However, this is compatible with r's being identical
to some other propositional attitude, and zo this revision
would not insure that representationalism is stronger than
functionalism and token physicalism about propositional
attitudes in general. For this reason, I am inclined to take
representationalism as claiming that r is not a propositional
attitude at all. This may be puzzling at first, since r is
supposed to be a mental representation that p. How can
something be a mental representation that p without being a
propositional attitude that p? So far as I know, there is
only one way for this to happen: r must be a propositional
idea--an idea with the content that p.' So
"Strictly speaking, r can be the having-of-an-idea that p, i.e., a
certain kind of representational stah:e or event with the content that p.
I will use "idea" in a broad sense, namely, as being neutral with respect
to the object/occurrence distinction. It is sometimes suggested that
representationalism requires representations to be ordinary objects
(things that exist but do not happen) rather than occurrences (things that
do happen). For reasons given below, I want to reject this proposed
requirement. Although "idea" seens to be the best word for expressing
representationalism, it may misleadingly bias one towards the requirement.
thile I admit that it seems unnatural to say that ideas happen, I am
inclined to treat this as having minuscule ontological import. To take
an analogous case, it seems equally unnatural to say that representations
happen, although it is proper to say that representational occurrences
(e.g., an assertion that sugar is white) are representations.
The proposed requirement of representational objects has other,
nongramatical sources of support. First, it would be sufficient to
distinguish representationalism from token physicalism, since token
15
representationalism comes to the claim that propositional
attitudes that p are typically computational relations to
propositional ideas that p. It is incumbent upon the
representationalist, then, to give an account of the
difference between propositional ideas and propositional
attitudes.
Having an idea that p is akin (i.e., presumably identical)
to what philosophers sometimes call "grasping" the proposition
that p. Since representationalism is a species of
functionalism about attitudes, it seems natural for the
representationalist also to adopt a functionalist stance about
ideas. Given this, the task is to display the respects in
which the roles of ideas and attitudes differ. We can begin
physicalism about propositional attitudes is cormitted only to the
existence of representational physical states or events, and not to the
existence of representational physical objects. The requirement also
derives some plausibility from the claim that propositional attitudes are
realized as relations between thinkers and representations; it is most
natural to think of relations as holding between ordinary objects. An
analogy with natural language also lends support to the requirement, since
languages include representational objects such as sentences.
Nevertheless, the requirement is too strong. It is perfectly possible
for there to be corputational relations between thinkers and occurrences.
Just as a speaker can draw a conclusion from a sentence (a kind of
ordinary object), so can he draw a conclusion from an utterance (a kind
of occurrence). For analogous reasons, little of computational interest
seems to hang on whether mental representations are realized as, say,
neurons (objects) or as, say, the firings of neurons (occurrences).
Indeed, any apparent inrportance of the object/occurrence distinction
vanishes when we corpare treating an object as a representation with
treating the existence of the object as a representational state.
Finally, we can insure the distinction between representationalism and
token physicalism by sirply denying that ideas are propositional attitude
occurrences, without denying that they are occurrences of some other sort.
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with a few natural claims which, though strictly speaking
circular in this context, may bring out what is meant by
"idea". A token idea that p (i.e., a particular thinker's
idea that p) typically persists through changes in token
attitudes that p. One's idea that p (i.e,, one's grasp of the
proposition that p) doesn't vanish when one's belief or desire
that p vanishes, and indeed one can have an idea that p (and
not merely in a dispositional sense) without having any
attitudes that p. Second, a token idea that p is typically
involved in many different token attitudes that p.'
What can be said by way of giving a more principled
distinction between propositional attitudes and propositional
ideas? My suggestion is that propositional attitudes are
those mental representations which standardly function as
units of reasoning. Such representations have rationality
values, i.e., degrees of rationality or irrationality, which
can influence the rationality values of other representations
or actions, or at least be influenced by other representations
or perceptions. A belier that Paris is pretty--or a wish that
it were--has a rationality value. By contrast, a mere idea
of Paris' being pretty is neither rational nor irrational.
'As I will explain in a miroent, it is this claim, coupled with token
physicalism about ideas, which advances us toward 'he goal of solving the
special case of the mental-body problem with which we began this section,
namely, the problem of explaining how a physical system can implemrrent
systematic causal relations among different attitudes that p.
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Beyond drawing this connection between propositional attitudes
and rationality values, I have very little to say about the
proper conception of rationality values. I imagine that, at
a minimum, having rationality values is corequisite with
having a role as a (potential) premise or conclusion of
inference."
However the distinction between ideas and attitudes is
ultimately to be spelled out, another way to see the
theoretical bite of representationalism is to display its
promise as an explanation of how physical systems can
implement special causal relations among different attitudes
that p. The details of such an explanation vary according to
the nature of the physical realization of ideas. A
possibility at one extreme is that one's idea that p is
realized as a token physical structure which is part of the
physical structures realizing all of one's (specially related)
token attitudes that p. In such a case, I will say that all
of these token attitudes are relations to the same token
"symbol". The special relations between these attitudes might
then be explained by the fact that they literally share an
Ingredient, a token symbol that p. or exa••mple, if we
"'What is less clear is whether there is any way to distinguish
inferential relations from non-inferential relations among representations
(e.g., association of propositional ideas), short of appealing to the
rationality values of the representations. I will return to this point
in section 2.2.1, where I will also criticize alternative accounts of the
difference between attitudes and ideas.
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postulate that a thinker has the capacity to have beliefs and
desires at all, this explains why his ability to have beliefs
that p presupposes his ability to have desires that p. A
possibility at the opposite extreme is that one's idea that
p is realized as a mechanism which can reproduce physical
structures each of which is part of only one token attitude
that p. In this case, I will say that each token attitude is
a relation to a distinct token symbol of a single physical
kind (defined by reference to the reproduction mechanism).
Although the token symbols are distinct, if we postulate
processes which can match symbols of the given physical kind,
then we can also begin to understand how to implement the
special relations among attitudes with the same content."
"Since I will often employ the notion of symbols illustrated in this
paragraph, I would like to call attention to a few features of my use of
the word. Although there is a perfectly useful sense in which anything
with content is a symbol, I will usually subject this term to a number of
restrictions. First, unless otherwise clear from the context I will
usually reserve the word "symbol" for nental sybols--i . e., symbols which
help to realize propositional attitudes--rather than natural-linguistic
or other nonmental symbols. Furthermore, when there is a danger of
confusion between token attitudes and token ideas (and there usually is),
I will reserve the word "synbol" for physical structures related to the
latter (either by identity or by reproduction, as illustrated in the
text). Given this usage, although functionalism and token physicalism
about propositional attitudes are committed to the existence of mrental
representations, they are weaker than representationalism in not being
covnitted to the existence of mental symbols. (While this distinction can
be expressed in terms of ideas, "symbol" emphasizes the physical nature
of the structures involved, and also allows me to ignore differences
between the two sorts of physical realizations of ideas mentioned in the
text.) Finally, "symbol" (like "idea" and "representation") is neutral
with respect to the object/occurrence distinction (see footnote 8).
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0.1.3 The Language-of-Thought Hypothesis
Just as there appear to be special causal relations among
different attitudes with the same content, so there appear to
be special causal relations among attitudes of the same kind
with different contents. For a wide variety of things we can
think about (e.g., sugar, toothpaste, and teeth) thoughts that
such a thing is white typically bear special causal relations
not only to desires that it be white, but also to thoughts
that it is not yellow, that it is white or blue, that
something is white, and so on. Again, whatever the ultimate
details, such causal relations are widespread, regular, and
important enough to be likely factors in any functionalist
account of propositional attitudes. Fodor and Pylyshyn have
provided a useful characterization of similar relations in
terms of what they call "systematicity" (Fodor and Pylyshyn,
1988). I will focus on the details of their treatment in
chapter 1. For now, as before, we can appeal to the special
causal relations to formulate another aspect of the
mental-body problem: how is it possible for these systematic
relations to be implemented in a physical system? The
language-of-thought (LOT) hypothesis, unlike token physicalism
or representationalism, is intended to serve as an answer to
this question (among other questions--see Fodor, 1975; Fodor,
1987a).
20
The LOT hypothesis goes one step beyond
representationalism, just as representationalism goes one step
beyond token physicalism. According to the LOT hypothesis,
the physical symbols postulated by representationalism admit
of syntactic complexity. What is it for a symbol to be
complex? Although this is a very difficult question, we can
operate with an intuitive idea, leaving technicalities aside.
The prototypical complex symbols are written sentences and
phrases in natural language. Each complex sentence and phrase
has two or more symbols--e.g., words--as spatiotemporally
proper parts, where parthood is taken quite literally (that
is, as the phenomenon studied in mereology). Accordingly,
syntactically complex mental symbols are thought to have other
mental symbols as literal parts. " The parthood may be
"To avoid repeated use of the modifier "syntactic", I will often
speak of "complexity" and "simplicity" intending the modifier to be
understood.
"Although there may be viable but weaker conceptions of syntactic
corplexity according to which syntactic constituents do not need to be
pirts of conplex symbols, Fodor is emphatic that parthood is required for
a language of thought. He insists repeatedly that the L(T hypothesis
claims that "(some) nental forrulas have mental formulas as parts" (Fodor,
1987a, p. 137), and that this notion of parthood is literal:
Real constituency does have to do with parts and wholes; the symbol
'Mary' is literally a part of the symbol 'John loves Mary'. It is
because their symbols enter into real-constituency relations that
natural languages have both atomic symbols and complex ones. (Fodor
and Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 22)
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spatial, as with written sentences, or temporal, as with
spoken sentences, or a mixture of the two."'
"If (some) mental symbols are physical occurrences rather than
ordinary physical objects, then the LOT hypothesis demands a notion of
spatiotenporal parthood for (token) occurrences as well as for (token)
individuals. There is some leeway in the construction of such a notion.
I will illustrate the tactics available for the case of states, conceived
of as instantiations of properties by objects. (I will have to leave open
the question of whether a similar account can be given for other sorts of
occurrences, such as events.) One intuitively plausible idea is that a
state P is a part of a state W iff P is a logically necessary condition
of W. This might serve to capture the intuitively important fact that
parts, taken together, constitute wholes, so that the existence of a ihole
depends upon that of its parts. For exanple, let S be the state of neuron
n's firing at t, and let S' be the state of n's firing and having a high
threshold at t. On this account of parthood for states, S is a part of
S'.
While this may seem roughly right as an account of state-parthood in
general, the notion of syntactic complexity which it generates is, I
think, too weak. As I will explain in section 1.2.4, given this notion
of a syntactic state-part, one can literally prove the existence of
syntactic complexity (and so, nearly enough, the truth of the LOT
hypothesis) from the nearly indisputable premise that there is some
explanation or other which is comwon to one's ability to engage in a range
of semantically related inferences (see Davies, 1990). This would make
the LOT hypothesis virtually impossible to reject (without also rejecting,
say, token physicalism about propositional attitudes).
To avoid this result, we need to motivate a stronger constraint on
syntactic parthood than that suggested by the current account of
state-parthood. I think that this account leaves out the spatioterporal
aspects of syntactic parthood which are intuitively important for the LOT
hypothesis. Suppose, as seems natural, that a state is ihere the
individuals which "participate" in the state are. (Where did Mary hug
John? Wherever Mary and John were, of course. But see section 1.2.4 for
criticism of this as a general account of state-locations.) Then state
S is not a spatiotemporally proper part of state S', since their
spatiotemporal locations coincide. If, as I am suggesting, a reasonably
stirong L02 hypothesis postulates that some mental synmbols are
spatiotemporally proper parts of other mental synbols, then I don't think
we should coumt such conjuncts as candidate syntactic parts. Rather, a
state P is r ispatioterporally proper part (and so a candidate syntactic
part) of a state Wonly if (i) P is a necessary condition for W and (ii)
P's location is properly within Ms location. For example, state S is a
spatiotenporally proper part of the following two states: (a) neuron n and
neuron m's firing at time t, and (b) n's firing at t and t'.
I will return to these points in section 1.2.4, where I attenmpt to show
that fully-fledged spatiotemporal complexity is necessary to explain the
range of phenomena typically taken to be explained by the LOT hypothesis.
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In addition to the requirement of symbolic parts, a
semantic requirement is standardly placed on syntactic
complexity. Not only do sentences and phrases have other
phrases and words as parts, but they also bear some sort of
close semantic relation to these parts. Fodor and Pylyshyn
express this relation by saying that "the semantic content of
a (complex) representation is a function of the semantic
contents of its syntactic parts, together with its coasstituent
structure" (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 12). In other words,
without delving into too many technicalities, the content of
the complex symbol must depend on the contents of its parts,
as the content of "Mary loves John" depends on the content of
"loves", but not, intuitively, on the content of "neighbor"
or "weigh".
The LOT hypothesis helps to explain how a physical system
can implement systematic relations among attitudes, in much
the same way that representationalism helps to explain the
relations among different attitudes with the same content.
For example, on the assumption that symbols have syntactic
parts, it might be that two systematically related token
attitudes physically overlap, i.e., share some of the same
23
token parts. Alternatively, such attitudes might contain
tokens of a physical kind such that they can easily be
reproduced from or matched against one another. This would
allow the implementation of inferential processes such as
variable-introduction and variable-binding which are sensitive
to the syntactic structure of symbols, and are thereby
sensitive to some of the semantic dependencies of the
attitudes the symbols help to realize.l"
"This is the case with certain semantic (or propositional) networks
of the sort often contained in traditional cognitive-scientific models
(for a review, see Johnson-Laird, et al., 1984). In such a network, nodes
are symbols for objects and properties (among other things), and pieces
of the network (i.e., groups of nodes along with their connections) are
syniols which help to realize attitudes. Groups of attitudes (thought to
be) about the same thing (e.g., toothpaste) typically share a nrae
representing that thing. 71is allows mechanisms easily to implement
inferential relations among these attitudes.
L"This sort of matching occurs, for example, in "production system"
models (see Anderson, 1983; Holland, et al., 1986). In these models, a
thinker 's thoughts and goals are realized by storing syntactically couplex
symbols in various buffers, including long-term and working memory, where
they may be acted upon by inferential processes. Some of these
inferential processes are realized by special kinds of "IF...THEN..."
rule-symbols called "productions". Although details vary from theory to
theory, a production may be thought of as a rule-symbol with a (tiny)
processor. The processor's task is to watch out for the presence of a
symbol matching its "IF" part (modulo differences between variables and
constants), and to perform some simple action corresponding to Its "THEN"
part, such as forming a copy of the "THEN" part in working memory (perhaps
with variables bound or introduced) It is as if one could write a
conditional sentence in a book, give it tiny eyes and arms, arnd give it
one reflex: when you see a copy of your "IF" part written somewhere, write
down a (possibly modified) copy of your "THE~N" part (or do something
comparably simple). With the use of variables, a single production (e.g.,
"IP x is white, THEN x is not yellow") can implement systematic causal
relations among a wide range of pairs of token attitudes which have parts
of a single physical type (e.g., the beliefs that toothpaste is ehite and
that toothpaste is not yellow, the desires that teeth are hi.tte and that
teeth are not yellow, etc.).
24
In the mid-seventies, Fodor focused philosophical attention
on the fact that nearly all existing models in cognitive
science satisfy the language-of-thought hypothesis (and so,
by implication, representationalism). Models of this sort
have since become known as "classical" models. Although such
models continue to dominate the field, from the earliest days
of cognitive science various philosophers and scientists have
found themselves dissatisfied with the classical framework as
a whole. We can understand some of the phenomena which have
seemed to cast doubt on classical models by focusing on a few
striking facts about a certain sort of skill acquisition.
Novices at many activities (driving, playing basketball,
delivering speeches, etc.) usually operate by deliberating--
by applying memorized rules and recipes (or, at least, rough,
partial ones). Often, the novice's rules are of limited
reliability and scope, and are applied slowly and haltingly,
consciously and self-consciously. With routine practice,
however, performance often improves dramatically. One can
recognize more of the relevant aspects of what's happening,
settle on better decisions in a wider range of situations, and
execute those decisions more fluently even under duress. It
therefore appears that the expert's inferential processes are
somehow sensitive to vastly more conditions than are the
novice's Inferential processes. Paradoxically, these
increases in what might be called "holistic sensitivity" are
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also accompanied by great increases in speed--the expert can
do far more than the novice, but can do it far more quickly.
This paradox has seemed to many to lead to a difficulty for
classical models.
I have been portraying the classical framework as being
motivated by a specific aspect of the mental-body problem: how
can inferential processes be realized physically? The analogy
with computers--as enshrined in the LOT hypothesis, for
example--does appear to be a promising answer to this
question. However, as the inferential processes are
considered to be sensitive to more and more conditions, and
to operate more and more quickly, critics of the classical
framework have felt less and less sure of the computer analogy
as an account of how such processes are to be implemented."7
The worry needs to be formulated more carefully. Certainly
present-day computers can store large numbers of symbols, and
quickly access and transform them all. Similarly, classical
theorists can appeal to analogies with ever-larger and
ever-faster computers.
"These objections to the classical model should not be confused with
considerably weaker objections twhich appeal to unconscious processing or
processing without rule-symbols. Notoriously, the expert's improveuents
over the novice with respect to holistic sensitivity and speed coincide
with--and seem to require--a reduction in the conscious application of
rule-symbols. But it is not a necessary feature of classical nmodels that
processes should be conscious, nor even that they should be realized by
rule-symbols.
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Since computers are physical, this strategy is relevant to
the mental-body problem. Seen in a larger philosophical
context, however, such a solution to the mental-body problem
would be unsatisfying. We don't merely want to know how some
physical system can implement mental processes (such as
holistically sensitive inference). We want to know how we can
do so, i.e., how it is possible for these processes to be
implemented in brains. Call this the "mental-brain problem".
We are especially interested in this problem not simply
because we have a parochial interest in human cognition, as
we might be especially interested in news from the old
hometown. Rather, the special interest derives from the
philosophical interest in assessing the fate of functionalism
and token physicalism as answers to the mind/body problem.
The mind/body problem is a problem about existing mental
phenomena, including at the very least human mental phenomena.
If functionalism and token physicalism cannot furnish answers
to the mental-brain problem, then they cannot be general
solutions to the mind/body problem.
Why should the mental-brain problem seem any more difficult
than the mental-body problem? The worry only begins to take
shape when we notice relevant differences between brains and
supercomputers. Without entering into needless detail, the
important point is that neurons are extremely slow in relation
to the symbol-manipulating processes of familiar computers
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(even setting aside imaginary improved computers)."" As a
result, the aspect of the mental-brain problem having to do
with the implementation of rapid, holistically sensitive
inferential processes seems especially challenging. This is
one of the central challenges the connectionist framework is
meant to address. We will be better able to understanr1  the
potential difficulty for the classical framework if we
introduce an alternative connectionist approach.
0.2 The Connectionist Framework
0.2.1 What Is Connectionism?
Before entering into a direct description of connectionist
approaches to this issue, it is best separately to introduce
a few key notions, and to consider standard sorts of
""Here are the nurbers as reported by a trio of highly influential
connectionists:
Neurons operate in the time scale of milliseconds whereas conputer
conponents operate in the time scale of nanoseconds--a factor of 106
faster. This means that human processes that take on the order of
a second or less can involve only a hundred or so time steps.
(Rumelhart, et al., 1986, p. 75)
The appeal to neurons is necessary to notivate the worry, since a
classical theorist can point out that some physical processes in brains--
e.g., quantum-mechanical ones--are fast even in relation to the
syrrnbol-mninipulating processes in present-day computers. It is an
interesting question twhy physicalists are loathe to postulate that token
mental occurrences are much "smaller" than neurons. Robert Crrmnins offers
the plausible argumernt that doing so would deprive us of an explanation
of the biological inheritance of mental properties, since (as far as we
know) it is only roughly cell-sized features which are determined by genes
(Onumins, 1983, pp. 63-65).
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connectionist models which are not centrally concerned with
explaining holistically sensitive inference. Fortunately, the
issues of present concern can be described without focusing
on the fine details of connectionist networks. The most
important idea is that of a node. Nodes are simple
energy-transmitting devices which, in the simplest case, are
characterized at a given time by their degree of activation,
or propensity to affect other nodes. Nodes are connected to
one another by stable energy conduits, by means of which
active nodes tend to alter the activation of other nodes.
(Finer details about these connections will turn out to be of
no concern.) Although some nodes may have direct connections
only to other nodes, others may interact with sensory or motor
mechanisms, or (perhaps) with rionconnectionist cognitive
mechanisms.
This specification of connectionist models makes no mention
of mental phenomena, and so is silent on the question of
functionalism and token physicalism about propositional
attitudes. Indeed, it is possible to be a connectioniat and
deny that any propositional attitudes (whether of a sort
familiar to common sense or of a sort to be discovered by
scientific psychology) are realized in the models one adopts.
Presumably, such a position would not respond to our latest
outbreak of the mental-body problem--the question of how
(rapid, holistically sensitive) inferential processes can
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possibly be implemented in brains. For this reason, there is
special interest in connectionist theories which are coupled
with a functionalist and token physicalist approach to
propositional attitudes; I will limit my discussion to such
versions of connectionism.
Where are the representations in connectionist models? On
one conception, individual nodes are representations.)t
Perhaps the most famous example is the "interactive activation
model" of reading (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1982). It may
be pictured in part as in Figure 1. The network contains
"word nodes" each of which standardly becomes activated as a
result of the presentation of a particular word, and each of
which represents the presence of that word. These word nodes
are activated by "letter nodes" each of which represents and
standardly responds to the presence of a particular letter at
a particular position in the word. Finally, each letter node
is activated by "feature nodes", each of which represents and
standardly responds to the presence of a certain feature of
the shape presented at a particular position: a horizontal
bar, a curved top, etc.
"Connectlonists often fall to be explicit about whether the
representations are nodes themselves, or rather states of nodes (such as
activation levels). I will discuss this distinction in the next section,
while discussing the relation between conne tionism and
representatilonal ism. For now, twhen I speak of a node as a representation,
this can be taken as a simplified way of speaking of a node or one of its
states as a representation. The same simrrplification applies to talk of
groups of nodes as representations.
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Figure 1: Rumelhart and MzClelland 's (1982) interactive-activation
model of reading.
INPUT FEATURIE NODES LFR NODES WOIRD NODUE
AL
Individual nodes which serve as representations are called
"local" representations, in contrast with "distributed"
representations, which are patterns of activity of many nodes.
For example, we can imagine a modification of the interactive
activation model of reading, in which the presence of each
word is represented not by an individual node, but by several
nodes, as in Figure 2. Here the connections between the
letter nodes and the nodes in the word patterns are arranged
so that, for example, the letter nodes "R", "U", and "N" tend
to activate all and only the nodes in the pattern which
represents the presence of the word "RUN" (those darkened in
Figure 2). On most distributed schemes of representation,
representations overlap, that is, share nodes. In the present
example, the word "ANT" might be represented by a pattern of
activation which includes some of the same nodes as those in
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the pattern which represents "RUN". Similarly, we might
imagine further modifications of the mode? In which the letter
nodes are replaced by letter patterns, the feature nodes are
replaced by feature patterns, and perhaps even the extreme
case in which all the representations--for features, letters,
and words--are patterns of activation defined over all the
nodes in the model.
Figure 2: The interactive-activation nxdel of reading modified to
include distributed representations for rcrds.





0.2.2 Counectionism and Representationalism
While it is clear that the most common and interesting
sorts of connectionist networks are supposed to contain token
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propositional attitudes," it is a tricky question whether any
of these representations qualify as symbols rather than token
attitudes, in the sense required by representationalism (see
section 0.1.2). While the situation is bound to vary from
model to model, reflection on certain fairly standard features
of the (real and imagined) reading models seems to suggest
that most familiar connectionist models are supposed to adhere
to representationalism.
As a preliminary consideration, connectionists normally
attribute content to (groups of) nodes in such models. Since
(groups of) nodes are ordinary objects rather than
occurrences, they cannot be token attitudes, and so (by a
process of admittedly nondemonstrative elimination) must be
ideas or symbols. Of course, it is possible to object that
this talk is merely sloppy, and that the only representations
are states of activation of the nodes, which do stand a chance
of being identical to token attitude states. Intuitively, the
models "cognize" that the word "RUN" is present only when the
appropriate nodes are activated, so there is support for the
view that only activation states are representations.
Nevertheless, I think there is a point to considering the
"This is only "clear" if we do not limit the class of propositional
attitudes to those which are familiar from ccrrommonsense, and if we ignore
claims of the sort that genuine propositions can only be represented by
(say) syntactically complex representations. The latter sort of claim
receives extended discussion in chapter 2.
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nodes themselves to be representations. The point is that
these nodes appear to play the functional and explanatory role
of ideas, and so (by functionalism) they must be ideas.
Consider first that the models are capable of entering into
a variety of attitudes with the same content, e.g., that the
word "RUN" is present. Some states of the "RUN" nodes play
a functional role akin to that of forming a hypothesis, while
other states of the same nodes play a role akin to that of
concluding. There are a wide range of intermediate attitudes
as well. The nodes themselves are common parts of these
various attitudes, just as a token idea is typically involved
in many different token attitudes with the same content. The
nodes therefore afford a physical explanation of the special
causal relations among these different attitudes, in precisely
the sense in which ideas are supposed to explain these
relations. Furthermore, like token ideas, the nodes persist
through changes in the corresponding attitudes, and may exist
without the presence of any corresponding attitude, I suggest
that these considerations make plausible the claim that
standard connectionist models adhere to representationalism,
and that typically (groups of) nodes are token ideas and
symbols. If this is right, the relation of connectionist
models to the classical framework appears to turn on whether
they adhere to the language-of-thought hypothesis, and in
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particular on whether they support syntactically complex
symbols." This will be the main focus of chapter 1.
0.2.3 Connectionism and Holistically Sensitive Inference
We are now in a position to consider how the connectionist
framework affords strategies for solving our specific version
of the mental-brain problem: how can rapid, holistically
sensitive inferential processes be realized by physical
relations between slow (at least by current technological
standards) neuron-like elements? Recall that an inferential
process is holistically sensitive to the extent that it
depends on a wide range of conditions. Experts at various
skills--auto racing, basketball, conversation, etc.--appear
to engage in processes which are sensitive to an indefinitely
wide range of ccnditions, and do so in "real time", even in
fractions of a second. A cognitive system with an
unimaginably fast processor might duplicate th s performance
by considering each condition in turn, assessing the relevance
of each to the inferential task at hand (possibly making
several "passes" ), and then drawing the appropriate
inferences. However, this strategy is unavailable for us, on
the assumption that our processors are (relatively slow)
neurons.
"At any rate, most connectionist critics of the classical framework
set up the issue specifically in terms of syntactic complexity.
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The co4nectionist framework makes available two strategies
for minimirzing the time necessary to engage in holistic
processes within the limits of neuron-like processors. The
first strategy is massively parallel processing. If many
conditions relevant to an inference can be considered at the
same time, by separate processors, the total time needed for
the inference may be decreased substantially. The 5econd
strategy is the avoidance of syntactic complexity. It appears
likely that syntactically complex representations place a
heavier computational burden on processors than syntactically
simple representations do. For this reason, if conditions
relevant to an inferential process can be adequately
represented by syntactically simple representations, the time
it takes to consider each condition is reduced.
These ideas are illustrated in a partial connectionist
theory of skill due to Philip Agre (Agre, 1989). On Agre's
theory, well-practiced, routine activity is guided by an
enormous "dependency network", each node of which corresponds
to a potential belief, desire, or other propositional attitude
of the agent. The agent has the attitude when the node Is
activated, and doesn't have it when the node is inactivated.
The network is connected in such a way that the nodes activate
and deactivate each other in "mimicry" of inferential
arguments which were previously generated (presumably) by the
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relatively long, drawn out calculations of a more flexible
mechanism (e.g., the novice's conscious trial-and-error
search). The circuitry allows hundreds or thousands of these
"arguments" to take place in massive parallel and at blinding
speed. As Agre describes the system, it "is continually
redeciding what to do insofar as the circuitry produces a
fresh set of decisions about action many times a second"
(Agre, 1989, p. 139)."2
0.3 An Overview of the Thesis
Like many others, I find models within both the
connectionist framework (such as dependency networks) and the
classical framework (such as production systems--see section
0.2.3) Attractive in accounting for inferential processes.
One underlying aim of my thesis is to get us closer to the
goal of deciding between these models, or between their
relatives (although I regret to say that my conclusions leave
us very far from this goal). The thesis addresses three
specific issues raised by philosophers interested in the
emerging debate between the classical and connectionist
frameworks.
'"Althoulgh PAgre's dependency networks rely almost exclusively on
local schemes of representation (one representation per node), analogous
mrodels are possible which make more use of distributed symbols. Such
alternatives can decrease the number of nodes required of a network, and
can increase its reconfigurability (ability to change which symbols affect
which other symbols), but at the cost of decreased speed.
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0.3.1 A Syntactic Issue
Fodor's contention in The Language of Thought (Fodor, 1975)
was that, whatever the fate of particular existing models of
cognition, the language-of-thought hypothesis must be
satisfied by any adequate model. Those who wished to resist
this conclusion were especially hampered by the fact,
repeatedly stressed by Fodor, that no serious alternatives to
LOT models had ever been proposed. Today, however, with the
advent of connectionist models, many people at last see
promise of a plausible way to avoid commitment to the LOT
hypothesis. This is where the fun starts. Fodor stands his
ground; along with Zenon Pylyshyn, he argues that
connectionist models which fail to implement a language of
thought also fail to account for certain fundamental aspects
of cognition, and in particular "systematic" relations among
propositional attitudes akin to those with which I began
section 0.1.3. Some critics, most notably Paul Smolensky
(1989), have tried to provide counterexamples to this
conclusion.
In chapter 1, I will display the failings of Fodor and
Pylyshyn's argument which make these counterexamples initially
plausible, but I will also argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's
conclusion withstands the alleged counterexamples. This issue
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is relevant to whether models of skill such as Agre's
dependency networks can be modified so as to account for
systematic relations among attitudes without adopting the LOT
hypothesis and falling within the classical framework.
0.3.2 A Semantic Issue
My concern in chapter 2 is to address a puzzle about the
content of representations in certain connectionist models,
such as the interactive activation model of reading and Agre's
dependency networks. The puzzle arises within particular
philosophical views of content, versions of what I will call
the "fine-grained theory". According to these views, contents
admit of degrees of complexity. Even the simplest
propositions (e.g., the proposition that a is F) are thought
to be complexes of constituent concepts (e.g., the concepts
a and F). What is required for a representation r to have a
complex content, say, the proposition that a is F7 On the
fine-grained theory, as I will construe it, r must display
"semantic dependence" on other representations of the concepts
a and F, i.e., the constituent concepts of the proposition.
What sort of relation between representations counrts as
semantic dependence? The most familiar examples are syntactic
relations: the content of the English sentence "sugar is
white" depends on the content of its syntactic parts "sugar"
and "white". Another example of semantic dependence might
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loosely be termed "abbreviation": a syntactically simple
representation "p" in a logical formalism may have a complex,
propositional content in virtue of being treated (by
convention or otherwise) as "standing in place of" a sentence
such as "sugar is white", and so depending semantically on the
parts of that sentence.
Although virtually all nonconnectionist models in cognitive
science, as well as many connectionist models, postulate
relations such as syntactic complexity and abbreviation, many
connectionist models, including dependency networks and the
reading model, appear not to support these relations.
Nevertheless, for reasons I will describe there is at least
an appearance that represetan in thes models o have
propositional contents. This generates a philosophical
puzzle, at least for those sympathetic to the fine-grained
theory of content: how it is possible for a representation to
have propositional content without displaying semantic
dependence on other representations (e.g., without being
either syntactically complex or an abbreviation)? My goal in
chapter 2 is to explain how.
0.3.3 A Processing Issue
In my discussion of holistically sensitive inference, I
have considered a kind of brute-force approach: that such
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inferential processes do access a large number of
representations, and that the main problem is to show how a
system can maximize the number of representations which can
be accessed in a short amour.t of time. While massive
parallelism and avoidance of syntactic complexity are
effective techniques for increasing speed, they (especially
the latter) suffer from serious computational deficiencies (of
the sort described in chapter 1). It therefore appears that
we need an alternative to the brute-force approach; in
particular, we need to develop processing strategies which
minimize the number of representations which need to be
accessed in implementing a given inferential process.
We can begin by noticing two senses in which an inferential
process can be sensitive to a condition, and so two senses of
"holistically sensitive inference". An inferential process
can be sensitive to a condition in the sense that it always
operates by accessing a representation of that condition, or
it can be sensitive in the sense that it has potential access,
when necessary, to the representation. Although it is clear
that expert activity is sensitive to a wide range of
conditions, it is unclear in which sense this is so.
If the expert's increased holistic sensitivity consists of
accessing far more representations than novices access, then
the increased speed associated with expertise is paradoxical,
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and a brute force approach involving connectionist technology
may appear inevitable. If, instead, the increased holistic
sensitivity consists in an increased range of representations
which the expert can access only when necessary, then we can
even begin to explain the increased speed. Perhaps the expert
can avoid continually accessing representations which the
novice continually has to access, because the expert has a
better ability to "tell" when they are irrelevant to the
activity. While cognitive scientists, particularly those
studying artificial intelligence, have tried to develop
algorithms for modeling such an ability, several philosophers
have tried to portray one or another version of the "frame
problem" as principled objections to these strategies.
The frame problem is widely reputed among philosophers to
be one of the deepest and most difficult problems of cognitive
science. Chapter 3 discusses three recent attempts to display
this problem: Dennett's problem of ignoring obviously
irrelevant knowledge, Haugeland's problem of efficiently
keeping track of salient side effects of occurrences, and
Fodor's problem of avoiding the use of "kooky" concepts. In
a .eagative vein, I argue that these problems bear nothing but
a superficial similarity to the frame problem of AI, so that
they do not provide reasons to disparage standard attempts to
solve it. More positively, I argue that these problems are
easily solved by slight variations on familiar AI themes.
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Finally, I devote some discussion to more difficult problems
confronting AI. If the arguments I provide are correct, then
we may not need to abandon classical models (or abandon
classical features in connectionist models) in explaining how
rapid, holistically sensitive inference can be implemented
with processors as slow as neurons.
0.3.4 Summary
In this chapter I have tried to do two things: (1) display
classical and connectionist models as responses to questions
raised by a functionalist and token physicalist approach to
the mind/body problem, and (2) display a substantive dispute
between classical and (certain) connectionist models of
inferential processes in skills. When I have completed my
discussions of the language-of-thought hypothesis,
fine-grained theories of content, and the frame problem, how
will the models appear to stand with respect to skills and the
mind/body problem? I don't know, to be honest. I will not
be presenting an argument to tihe effect that one of the models
is better than the other with respect to skills. At best, I
will be trying to remove certain difficulties with
interpreting these models, and trying to locate the
theoretically interesting differences between them, so that
we have a better chance of testing them against facts about
skills. Nor will I be presenting an argument to the effect
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that either framework is likely to solve the mental-brain
problem, and so I will not be taking a stand on the likelihood
that functionalism and token physicalism solve the mind/body
problem. At best, I will have cleared away some apparent
difficulties for these models, and will have brought other
difficulties into sharper focus.
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Chapter 1
CONNECTIONIST LANGUAGES OF THOUGHT
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have presented an influential
argument to the effect that any viable connectionist account
of human cognition must implement a language of thought.
Their basic strategy is to argue that connectionist models
which do not implement a language of thought fail to account
for the systematic relations among propositional attitudes.
Several critics of the LOT hypothesis have tried to pinpoint
flaws in Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument (Smolensky 1989; Clark,
1989; Chalmers, 1990). One thing I will try to show is that
the argument can be rescued from these criticisms. (Score:
LOT 1, Visitors 0.) However, I agree that the argument fails,
and I will provide a new account of how it goes wrong. (The
score becomes tied.) Of course, the failure of Fodor and
Pylyshyn's argument does not mean that their conclusion is
false. Consequently, some connectionist criticisms of Fodor
and Pylyshyn's article take the form of direct counterexamples
to their conclusion (Smolensky 1989; van Gelder, 1989;
Chalmers, 1990). I will argue, however, that Fodor and
Pylyshyn's conclusion survives confrontation with the alleged
counterexamples. I then argue more generally that no genuine
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counterexamples are likely to be forthcoming. (Final Score:
LOT 2, Visitors I.)
The chapter is divided into two major sections. In section
1.1 I consider Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument as directed
against "ultralocal" connectionist models which contain only
individual nodes as representations (see section 0.2.1). Then
in section 1.2 I will try to locate the basic flaw in Fodor
and Pylyshyn's argument as directed against distributed
connectionist models (ones which posit ;zoups of nodes as
representations), and analyze the two major counterexamples
to Fodor and Pylyshyn's conclusions: Paul Smolensky's "coffee
case", and Tim van Gelder's account of "nonconcatenative
compositionality" as exemplified in representational schemes
such as Smolensky's "tensor product" framework. My conclusion
will be that, contrary to initial appearances, these
connectionist models do implement a language of thought.
1.1 Ultralocal Connectionism and the LOT Hypothesis
The point of this section is to set out the dispute between
the LOT hypothesis and certain forms of connectionism,
particularly "ultralocal" connectionist models which contain
only local representations (individual nodes). First I will
describe the language-of-thought hypothesis and assess the
importance of the issue (sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2). Then I
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will present and defend Fodor and Pylyshyn's systematicjty
argument as applied to ultralocal models (section 1.1.3).
1.1.1 What is a Language of Thought?
As I explained in section 0.1.3, the language-of-thought
hypothesis is a specific version of representationalism, which
is the claim that propositional attitudes are (at least
typically) physically realized as computational relations
between thinkers and propositional ideas or "symbols". The
LOT hypothesis goes one step beyond representationalism in
asserting that some mental symbols are syntactical"ty complex.
I will proceed with the assumption that for a symbol to be
syntactically complex, it must have (multiple) symbols as
parts, and its content must depend on the content of these
symbols (see section 0.1.3). Conveniently, we can come to
understand the current debate without considering whether this
is ultimately the right account of syntactic complexity. This
is because no critics of Fodor and Pylyshyn--at least none of
which I am aware--have taken issue with the present account
of what complexity is. While the dispute has been operating
at this intuitive level, however, perhaps some of the
consequences of this account will motivate devoting more
attention to the notion of syntactic complexity itself.
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It might be worth pointing out a few things that the LOT
hypothesis does not require. It does not say that all mental
symbols are syntactically complex. Nor does it say that there
are syntactically complex symbols in every natural "faculty"
of the mind: it would be consistent with the LOT hypothesis
for there to be no complex symbols in (say) the olfactory and
motor systems, so long as there are complex symbols elsewhere
in the mind. This raises the question: how many syntactically
complex symbols are needed to establish the truth of the LOT
hypothesis? We should not consider the LOT hypothesis true
of a mental life which contains only one complex symbol,
buried under a sea of noncomplex symbols. On the other hand,
there is no precedent for any requirement to the effect that
a certain minimum percentage of mental symbols must be
complex.
To make the LOT hypothesis into an interesting
psychological hypothesis, I will construe it as going one step
beyond the requirement of syntactic complexity. A common
understanding of the LOT hypothesis can be captured
intuitively by the claim that the expressive power of a
language of thought is at least as extensive as the expressive
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power of natural languages." To a first approximation, this
means that any content possessed by complex natural-linguistic
symbols can also be possessed by complex mental symbols."2
Without going into too many technicalities, this claim needs
to be restricted. The language-of-thought hypothesis doesn't
(by itself) require that everyone's language of thought must
at each stage of their development contain symbols
corresponding to all possible natural-linguistic symbols.
While something like this extremely strong claim has been
defended by Fodor, he has never treated it as part of the LOT
hypothesis itself. Instead, I will suppose that for the LOT
hypothesis to be true, any content possessed by complex
natural-linguistic symbols comprehensible to a thinker at a
time can also be possessed by complex mental symbols available
to that thinker at that time.
Despite the fact that the language-of-thought hypothesis
goes beyond the syntactic complexity requirement, it is this
"A weaker construal of the LOT hypothesis is required for
nonlinguistic thinkers, such as monkeys and babies, and for nonlinguistic
faculties of the adult mind. However, I don't know how to specify,
without bare stipulation, how much syntactic complexity should be required
in these cases, if any.
"There is no requiremrrent to the effect that sinple symbols In
natural language must correspond to sirple symbols In a language of
thought. On many traditional LOT models, individual words in natural
language are analyzed into conglomerations of mental "feature" symbols
ihich, taken individually, are unexpressed in natural languages. This is
why Smolensky's distinction between "conceptual-level" and
"subconceptual-level" semantics is irrelevant to the language-of-thought
hypothesis (Smolensky, 1988).
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requirement which has stimulated the most influential
connectionist attacks. Accordingly, my focus in the rest of
this chapter will be on syntactic complexity. I will only
address criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn which at least
implicitly begin with the assumption of representationalism
(see section 0.2.2), and I will ignore issues of expressive
power .
1.1.2 The LOT Hypothesis and Particular LOT Models
It is important to distinguish the general
language-of-thought hypothesis from hypotheses about
particular implementations of languages of thought. There are
many different cognitive models in existence which implement
languages of thought, including several dozen versions of
production systems (see section u.1.3), and several dozen
versions of "logic-based systems"."' The language-of-thought
hypothesis does not require that any particular one of these
traditional models applies to human cognition. It doesn't
even require any of these models to apply, since it may be
possible to invent new LOT models which differ in cognitively
"For readers unfamiliar with these architectures, the details will
not be relevant. For the sake of concreteness, such readers can think of
any high-level progranming language--such as Basic, Pascal, or Fortran--
when I mention production systems or logic-based systems. Each of these
progranrming languages supports syntactically complex symbols, and yet they
all differ in the primitive symbol manipulations they make possible. This
suits them well as analogies for cognitive architectures in the
language-of-thought mold.
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interesting ways from traditional ones.
arguments I will give below are correct, some of the most
interesting connectionist models qualify as "new" LOT models. I
To be clear, then, we must distinguish two questions which may
be asked about a given connectionist model:
(1) Does the model implement a language of thought?
(2) Does it implement some (or any) particular preexisting
implementation of a language of thought (such as
production system X)?
I think that the dispute between connectionists and defenders
of the LOT hypothesis has been marked by a confusion between
these two questions.
Fodor and Pylyshyn argue that the answer to question (1) is
likely to be "yes" for any potentially plausible connectionist
models. However, many of their supporters and critics have
supposed that they have argued for a "yes" answer to question
(2)." For this reason, it is sometimes supposed that Fodor
2"Furthermore, these are inportant LOT models because they way
advance us toward an explanation of how the classical framework can be
irrplemented in a brain-like system, and so may provide a strategy for
solving the mental-brain problem (see section 0.1.3).
"The tenptation to this construal is understandable. Fodor and
Pylyshyn do sometimes express their conclusion by denying that
connectionism provides a (plausible) "new cognitive architecture".
However, all they appear to mean by this is that any plausible
connectionist cognitive architecture will inplement a language of thought.
They don't appear to mean that no plausible connectionist architectures
will differ in any interesting ways from preexisting LOT models. Suppose
tomorrow someone designs a cognitive architecture which differs from
existing LOT systenms--production systems, logic-based systems, etc.--as
Pascal differs from Basic: it introduces a nurmber of new primitive
operations, while maintaining a clear comnitment to syntactically complex
symbols in a language of thought. Strictly speaking, of course, this
would be a "new" architecture. In the context of discussing the fate of
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Indeed, if the
and Pylyshyn have provided an argument "against"
connectionism, or at least an argument to the effect that
connectionism is "uninteresting" from a philosophical or
cognitive-scientific perspective. Smolensky, for example,
says that Fodor and Pylyshyn are "after" the conclusion that
* . . since the Classical account provides a complete,
precise, algorithmic account of the cognitive systerm,
there is nothing to be gained by going to 'the
(connectionisti account, as long as the phenomena of
interest can be seen at the [Classical] level (Smolensky,
1989, p. 4).
This construal of Fodor and Pylyshyn's claims is misleading.
First of all, because of the variety of existing (and
possible) models in the language-of-thought mold, there is no
such thing as "the Classical account" or "the Classical
level". Fodor and Pylyshyn use the term "Classical" for any
system which implements a language of thought. It would seem,
then, that "the" Classical account of cognition is simply the
LOT hypothesis, which as Fodor and Pylyshyn are well aware
certainly does not provide "a complete, precise, algorithmic
account" of cognition. For all of Fodor and Pylyshyn's
arguments, connectionism may be the revolutionary breakthrough
cognitive science has been awaiting for decades, philosophy
for centuries. At best, what they have done is to interpret
LOT, however, It would be reasonable for someone like Fodor and Pylyshyn
to say that it isn't really "ne'w", because it is of the LOU variety.
Sinrce this is precisely the gloss they give to their denials that
connectionism promises anything "new", it would clearly be wrong to
construe them as answering "yes" to question (2).
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the likely nature of any connectionist breakthrough, namely,
that it would not overturn the LOT hypothesis, the hypothesis
that there are syntactically complex symbols.
While Fodor and Pylyshyn have question (1) in mind,
Smolensky's arguments appear to be directed at question (2).
He objects to Fodor and Pylyshyn's use of the word
"implementation" on the grounds that it is too weak:
There is a sense of "implementation" that cognitive
science has inherited from computer science, and I
propose that we use it. If there is an account of a
compositional system at one level and an account at a
lower-level, then the lower one is an implementation of
the higher one if and only if the higher description is
a complete, precise, algorithmic account of the behavior
of that system. It is not sufficient that the
higher-level account provide some sort of rough summary
of the interactions at the lower level. (Smolensky,
1989, p. 4)
Smolensky's proposal is very surprising. He requires for
implementation that the higher-level account be "complete",
but does not explain what this requirement comes to. In the
familiar logical sense, a complete description of something
is one which provides every truth about the thing. But this
cannot be the relation between high-level descriptions and
models. Surely leaving out some lower-level truths--being an
incomplete or "abstract" description of the lower-level--is
precisely what makes a description "higher-level" in the first
place. We therefore cannot require that a higher-level
description provide the "whole truth" about the lower level.
This requirement would simply be impossible to fulfill.
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Instead, for a model to implement a description what is
required is that the description must be sound--must contain
no falsehoods about the behavior of the model. Rather than
requiring an account to contain the "whole truth", as
Smolensky appears to do, all that can be required for
implementation is that it contain "nothing but the truth"."
"6It is this sense of Implementation which is operative in computer
science. For instance, consider this crude, high-level algorithm:
Step 1. Read a word.
Step 2. Reverse the letters.
Step 3. Print the result.
Now, suppose that there is a program--in an IBM language, a Macintosh
language, or whatever--which, when run, makes it true that the system
reads a word, reverses the letters, and prints the result (in that order).
This would be sufficient for the program to be an implementation of these
three steps. It wouldn't matter if there were all sorts of side-effects
or novel features of the program, unmentioned in the algorithm (such as
printing the result in italics); in fact, there are bound to be such e~xtra
effects. On the standard logical construal of "conplete", Snmolensky's
claims about irrplementation would make it literally impossible for steps
1-3 to be implemented in a program. Although this account of
inmplementation would show that connectionist systems do not inplement a
language of thought, it would do so only by making it impossible for any
theory (except, perhaps, a completely specified fundamental physics) to
be inplemented.
I imagine that other, more plausible, construals of "complete" are
possible. One possibility is that Smolensky means "complete" as "taking
one all the way from input to output", to allow for the implementation of
algorithms such as steps 1-3 above. Even this seems too strong, since
algorithms which are "partial" in this sense seem implementable. (Doesn't
a program which Implements the algorithm consisting of steps 1-3 "also"
inplement the algorithm consisting of steps 1-2?)
Another possibility is that Smolensky's "completeness" and "precision"
requirements should simply be downplayed in favor of his "algorithm"
requirement. Perhaps his concern is to distinguish the "implementation"
of algorithms from the "implementation" of representational schemes, such
as syntactic complexity. I have found that some people find it unnatural
to speak of "irplementations" of representational schemes, preferring to
speak of "realization" or "instantiation". Even so, this does not appear
to be of more than terminological significance. Fodor and Pylyshyn need
not be understood as claiming that connectionism mst iuplement
syntactically complex symrbols. If "iwplementation" is only possible for
algorithms, Fodor and Pylyshyn should be understood as claiming that
connectionism must inplement some algorithm or other which operates on
syntactically complex representations. The substance of their claim would
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The hypothesis that Smolensky is focusing on question (2)
is, so far as I can see, the only plausible explanation of his
temptation to strengthen the notion of implementatio in the
way he appears to do. The explanation might go as follows.
First, ':nlike a formulation of the language-of-thousht
hypothesis, a specification of a production system or other
cognitive architecture is (ideally, anyway) a specification
of all the basic symbol manipulating processes available to
a given system. Therefore, even given the weak conception of
implementation for which I have argued--namely, that
implementation requires simple lack of falsehoods--no
connectionist model would be an implementation of a particular
production system (say) unless they shared all their basic
symbol manipulating processes. But this would be to say that
the production system architecture must be a "complete"
description of at least the cognitive behavior of the
connectionist system (ignoring physical breakdowns, etc.).
On the assumption that Smolensky has latched on to question
be unaffected.
At any rate, Smolensky needs to do more than support the "complaint"
that the language-of-thought hypothesis nerely "provides a rough,
higher-level approximation to the connectionist account" and merely
"involves some of the same basic ideas about how information is
represented and processed". Similarly rough, approximate relations holds
between connectionist theories and neurological (not to mention
biochemical and quantum-mechanical) models. ¶*at Smolensky needs to show
in order to deny inplementation (properly construed) is that his
connectionist models are incompatible with the language-of-thought
hypothesis. Fortunately, he does provide an argument to this effect. I
will take it up in section 1.2.2.
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(2), then, we can understand his otherwise bizarre construal
of "implementation" as the application of the proper construal
in a very special case, namely, that of implementations of
particular, completely specified, cognitive architectures.
But since the LOT hypothesis seeks only to constrain mental
representations, and not to specify a complete cognitive
architecture, it needn't even come close to giving a complete
description of the behavior of Its implementations.
If I am right, Smolensky argues for a "no" answer to
question (2), but concludes that the answer to question (1)
is "no". Confusing the two questions in this way is a
mistake. Even if connection.st models do differ from every
preexisting implementation of a language of thought
(production system architecture X, logic-based architecture
Y, etc.) in cognitively interesting ways, they might still
implement a language of thought, since they might still
support syntactically complex symbols.
It is not surprising, I think, that the confusion of
questions (1) and (2) has ruled the debate. The first
question might seem a more natural focus for philosophers, the
second more natural for cognitive scientists. Thus, Fodor and
Pylyshyn are far more interested in question (1) than
Smolensky needs to be: from all indications, if the questions
were adequately distinguished, Smolensky might reasonably
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declare himself completely uninterested tn question (1). Even
if Smolensky's connectionist models are forced, on pain of
implausibility, to implement a language of thought, this would
not detract from their novelty and scientific interest. On
the other hand, Fodor has a special stake in question (1),
since he wants to defend the LOT hypothesis from philosophers
who have sought to use connectionism against it. It is less
clear that Fodor has any special stake in question (2): he is,
after all, a notoriously vehement critic of traditional
cognitive-scientific models, especially those rooted in
artificial-intelligence research (I discuss some of his
criticisms in chapter 3). From all indications, Fodor and
Pylyshyn would be quite happy if connectionists conceded that
their most plausible models satisfy the LOT hypothesis, even
if it were insisted that these models differ in some other
cognitive details from traditional forms of production
systems, or logic-based systems, etc.
If the dispute between the LOT hypothesis and connectionism
has been so riddled with confusion, shouldn't it be allowed
to die quietly? The problem with doing so is that
philosophical suspicion of the language-of-thonght hypothesis
has been boillng under the surface for too long to be
downplayed in what are still early stages of theorizing about
connectionism. I think, instead, that the dispute should be
split into two disputes, corresponding to the two questions
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I have been distinguishing. Both questions are interesting
and important, although perhaps to thinkers of different
temperaments. Neither issue seems especially easy to settle.
I don't share the common feeling that upon cursory examination
the differences between connectionist models and traditional
models "jump out" at us. What jumps out at us is that there
are some interesting differences. But it is far from clear
what these differences are. In the rest of this chapter, I
will be concerned only with syntactic complexity as an alleged
difference, and so will be concerned only with question (1),
as it arises with respect to various connectionist models.
1.1.3 Ultralocal Connectionist Models
In connectionist networks, Individual nodes with content
are called "local representations", while contentful groups
of nodes are called "distributed representations" (see section
0.2.1). Although it has become common to speak of local and
distributed models as well as representations, most
connectionist models contain both local and distributed
representations, in various proportions. For purposes of
understanding Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument, however, it is
useful to begin with an extreme case, that of "ultralocal"
models. An ultralocal connectionist model is one in which
there are only local representations. The original
interactive model of reading (shown in section 0.2.1, Figure
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1) approximates this case, as do the dependency-network models
developed by Agre (see section 0.2.3). The most relevant
thing to notice about such models is that they do not contain
any syntactically complex symbols. Since local symbols
(individual nodes) do not have symbols as parts, they are
syntactically simple. If ultralocal models provide a general
account of the mind, therefore, the language-of-thought
hypothesis is false. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue, however, that
ultralocal connectionist models do not provide a general
account of the mind. This is because these models fail to
explain certain pervasive facts about human cognition, most
importantly what Fodor and Pylyshyn call "systematicity".
Although they try to extend these arguments to connectionist
models other than ultralocal ones, it is best to begin with
the ultralocal case.
The mark of systematicity, for Fodor and Pylyshyn, is the
presence of presupposition relations among mental capacities.
For example, our ability to have certain thoughts presupposes
an ability to enter into certain others. For some reason, we
never find people who can entertain the thought that Mary
loves John without being able to entertain the thought that
John loves Mary. Nor do we find people who can form an idea
of a cup of black coffee without being able to form an idea
of a black cup of coffee. And so on, for most familiar mental
states. Inferential capacities are also systematically
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related; we don't find people who can infer P&Q from P&Q&R,
for example, but who can't infer P from P&QO." Fodor and
Pylyshyn argue that pervasive presupposition relations can
hardly be accidental, and so a theory of cognition should
provide a guarantee of systematicity. Given the
language-of-thought hypothesis, we can explain the systematic
presuppositions by postulating that the symbols which help to
realize systematically related attitudes or ideas literally
overlap, or share certain token syntactic parts.
Alternatively, we can postulate that the syntactic parts of
such symbols are tokens of a physical kind such that there are
mechanisms which can easily reproduce and match these tokens,
and can easily arrange them in various ways. This would also
explain why the ability to form certain propositional
attitudes systematically presupposes the ability to form
certain others. Similarly, by postulating inferential
processes which can operate consistently on representations
containing a common (token or type) syntactic part (such as
a conjunction symbol), we can explain systematic relations
among inferential capacities.
"'These examples all consist of paIrwise presupposition relations
betveen attitudes. Systermaticity applies more generally as a relation
between groups of attitudes: e.g., the availability of the pair of
thoughts that sugar is kite and that coffee is brown presupposes the
availability of the pair of thoughts that coffee is vkite and that sugar
is brown. This is so even though these thoughts do not enter into
pairwise presupposition relations to one another.
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On the other hand, according to Fodor and Pylyshyn,
ultralocal models contain no mechanism for insuring that any
given node presupposes the existence of any other node. There
is thus no explanation of the systematic relations between,
say, the thought that Mary loves John and the thought that
John loves Mary. If these thoughts were realized as
individual connectionist nodes, Fodor and Pylyshyn argue,
there would be no principled reason why one thought is
thinkable by all and only the people able to think the other.
Someone who wished to embrace ultralocal connectionist models
as plausible alternatives to languages of thought might,
perhaps, be willing to settle for a huge number of
stipulations about the mental "hardware"--e.g., an ad hoc
stipulation to the effect that the two nodes which realize
these particular thoughts about John and Mary do in fact
presuppose one another. But this would seriously weaken the
case against the LOT hypothesis. Until some connectionist
mechanism is specified which can insure that the stipulations
hold, it is reasonable for Fodor and Pylyshyn to point out
that the only known mechanism for doing so is one which
includes syntactically structured symbols. If their
criticisms are correct, then while ultralocal models may be
appropriate for certain aspects of cognition (such as initial
processing in reading), these models may have to share space
in the mind with LOT models. Therefore, ultralocal
connectionist models would not provide critics of the
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language-of-thought hypothesis with a plausible, general
alternative.
It ippears that many of the most prominent connectionist
commentators are willing to concede this result to Fodor and
Pylyshyn, with a reminder that ultralocal models are atypicel
of connectionist models in general. Before looking at the
wider class of connectionist models, however, I want to
consider a philosophical line of reply which, if correct,
would rescue even ultralocal models from Fodor and Pylyshyn's
criticisms.
Many philosophers hold that systematicity is a conceptual
necessity rather than a fact in need of psychological
explanation. They hold that it is simply part of proper
practices of thought-ascription that if one can't think that
John loves Hary, then one can't think that Mary loves John
(see Evans, 1983). How might this view, if correct, be used
on behalf of ultralocal models? It might be argued that
ultralocal models can guarantee systematicity of thoughts,
because if a node in a particular model fails to stand in a
systematic presupposition relation to another one, we should
simply refuse to ascribe to it the content that Mary loves
John or that P&6. Far from being a mystery for ultralocal
connectionists, systematicity is a conceptually necessary
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feature of cognition. Thought must be systematic, because
whatever isn't, isn't thought.
Fodor concedes that his argument "takes it for granted that
systematicity is at least sometimes a contingent feature of
thought", for otherwise "you don't need LOT to explain the
systematicity of thoughts" (Fodor, 1987a, p. 152). 1 think
this is understating his case, however. Even if the
philosophical position described in the previous paragraph is
correct, and correct for every case of systematicity, a
variant of Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument still applies. For
if it is a requirement on the ascription of thoughts that they
be systematically related, then ultralocal connectionist
models simply have no explanation of how we do manage to have
the thought that Mary loves John or that P&Q. It is surely
not an accident that every person has a great many such
thoughts, but it is a mystery why this should be so if
thoughts are realized as individual nodes. In other words,
by enforcing a strict philosophical requirement on thought
ascription, we are left with no account of how people manage
to have as many thoughts as they do--assuming that these
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thoughts are realized by ultralocal models.30 To provide such
an account, ultralocal models need to provide some mechanism
for insuring that systematic relations hold among nodes, and
this is precisely what Fodor and Pylyshyn argue has not been
accomplished. '"
1.2 Distributed Connectionism and the LOT Hypothesis
Connectionist opponents of the language-of-thought
hypothesis have considered their most powerful weapon to be
features of distributed symbols, or contentful patterns of
activation of multiple nodes. If Fodor and Pylyshyn's
argument were directed solely at ultralocal models, therefore,
it would be little cause for connectionist alarm. My first
:OA possible escape route for the defender of connectionist models
is to appeal to a behaviorist or instrumentalist theory of mental states
which denies representationalism (see Clark, 1989, for such a response to
Fodor and Pylyshyn). Consideration of such a view is beyond the scope of
this paper, which seeks to operate within the ma i n.tream
cognitive-scientific (and mainstream connectionist) assumptioi, of
representationalism.
1'Why is it relevant that we have "a great many" (systematically
related) thoughts? Wouldn't a creature with only a few systematically
related thoughts (say, an insect-like creature capable of "thinking" only
that imrm food is near, that cold water is near, that cold food is near,
and that barm fster is near) be a mystery for an ultralocal connectionist
theory (say, which holds that these four insect-thoughts are realized by
nodes nl,...,n4, respectively)? Yes, in the sense that the connectionist
architecture itself does not explain why every insect has all four nodes.
However, the connectionist could appeal to an alternative explanation of
this fact, perhaps a biological one. The situation is different for
humans, who (appear to) have vast numbers of thoughts (which, moreover,
vary from person to person). This fact renders a directly biological
explanation of the copresence of thoughts implausible.
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task will be to discuss their attempt to extend their
conclusion from ultralocal to distributed cases (section
1.2.1). My claim will be that they fail to show that
distributed connectionist models which account for
systematicity are likely to implement a language of thought.
This will pave the way for a consideration of attempts to
provide actual counterexamples to their conclusion, in the
form of distributed models which account for systematicity
without syntactic structure (sections 1.2.2-1.2.3). I will
argue that, on a careful analysis of these models, they do in
fact use syntactically structured representations. Thus, my
final conclusion will be that Fodor and Pylyshyn's conclusion
withstands the fall of their argument.
1.2.1 The Limitations of Fodor and Pylyshyn's Argument
Surprisingly Fodor and Pylyshyn say next to nothing by way
of extending their conclusions about the ultralocal case to
their conclusions about connectionism in general. While they
consider the path between the two conclusions to be short, it
is not immediately clear from their discussion what they
consider the path to be. This has led critics to misidentify
Fodor and Pylyshyn's strategy for extending their conclusions,
or even to suggest that they offer no extending argument at
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all,." What they do say is confined to a single sentence in
a footnote, a comment on the particularly crude ultralocal
network shown in Figure 3, which they use in mounting their
systematicity argument. (The labels "A", "B", and "A&B" are
not parts of the model; rather, they specify the contents of
the nodes.) Before proceeding, let me recap their argument
that such ultralocal models cannot account for systematicity.
The key problem they identify for ultralocal models is that
there is no plausible connectionist mechanism for insuring
the presence of one node given another. Given connectionist
architecture, it is perfectly possible for a mental life to
contain node 1 in the diagram without containing node 2 or
node 3. For that reason, as I have put it, ultralocal
connectionLsts must implicitly make large numbers of
independent, ad hoc, assumptions about presupposition
relations among bits of mental hardware (i.e., among the
individual nodes which realize systematically related
symbols).
Given this way of looking at the argument about ultralocal
models, we can understand their attempt to extend the argument
to distributed models:
"'For exarrple, while Fodor and Pylyshyn argue persuasively and at
some length that distributed models don' t necessarily provide
systematicity, Smolensky mistakenly takes this to be a (bad) argument to
the effect that distributed representation cannot provide systemraticity
(Swmolensky, 1989, p. 8). For a similar suggestion see Chalmers, 1990, p.
4.
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Figure 3: Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) sample ul tralocalist network
for drawing inferences from A&B to A or to B.
B
To simplify the exposition, we assume a 'localist'
approach, in which each semantically interpreted [symboll
corresponds to a single Connectionist (node); but nothing
relevant to this discussion is changed if these [symbols)
actually consist of patterns over a cluster of (nodes).
(Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 15)"
Given the astonishing brevity of this formulation, it is
perhaps understandable that critics have either ignored it or
responded to it with an equally brief assertion that there is
"no argument to be found there" (Chalmers, 1990, p. 4).
Nevertheless, the passage contains an argument of some force.
Fodor and Pylyshyn's idea is to have us imagine an
interpretation of Figure 3 on which the circles signify groups
of nodes rather than individual nodes. The point of this
seems clear. Just as there is no plausible mechanism for
insuring the presence of a particular individual node given
another individual node, so there is no mechanism for insuring
the presence of a particular group of nodes given another
group. The only way to insure systematicity, for such models,
is simply to posit for each bit of hardware (i.e., each
"Fodor and Pylyshyn use the term 'units' for what I have been
calling 'nodes', and the iord 'nodes' for what I have been calling
'symbols'. I have altered their quotation accordingly.
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relevant group of nodes) that there are certain corresponding
bits of hardware (i.e., other relevant groups of nodes).
The fundamental difficulty with Fodor and Pylyshyn's
attempt to extend their argument to distributed symbols is
that it assumes that the distributed symbols are realized by
distinct groups of nodes. It appears likely, as they insist,
that given the presence of one group of nodes, there is
nothing to insure the presence of another, distinct, group of
nodes. However, on many of the most interesting connectionist
schemes of representation, distributed symbols are patterns
of nodes which overlap. How might this help to account for
systematicity? Suppose that sl and s2 are systematically
related symbols, realized in a particular distributed
connectionist model as different patterns of activation levels
pl and p2 over the same group of nodes n. Given that the
model is capable of producing sl, it must contain the nodes
over which s2 is distributed--namely, n--since the two symbols
are distributed over the very same nodes. To explain why the
two symbols are systematically related, then, one needn't make
ad hoc assumptions of presuppositions among various bits of
hardware. All that is needed is some mechanism for insuring
that a model capable of producing pattern pl over a group of
nodes is also capable of producing some other pattern p2 over
the same nodes. This is fundamentally a programming problem
for connectionism; the hardware problem is nonexistent. Fodor
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and Pylyshyn have given no reason to suppose that this
programming problem cannot be solved in a general and
principled fashion. They have simply failed to address the
most formidable connectionist models, those based on
overlapping distributed symbols.
Of course, this purely negative point does not mean that
distributed models can be developed which inoure systematicity
without appealing to syntactically structured representations.
Perhaps the only way to insure systematic relations among
overlapping patterns of activation is to identify subpatterns
as syntactic parts. Or perhaps not." At this stage, only
examination of particular representational schemes will help
to decide this point. That is what I want to do in the rest
"For certain purposes, Fodor and Pylyshyn's failure to consider
overlapping distributed representations is a good thing. They want to
show that no connectionist models can insure systematicity without
imrplementing syntactically complex symbols. They do not and should not
want to make the stronger claim that no connectionist models can imrplenent
complex symbols, period. This stronger claim appears to be false, since
connectionist networks can irplement Turing machines (at least those with
a finite tape), and Turing machines can inplement conplex symbols. But
it Is at first difficult to see how FodGa and Pylyshyn's argument can
avoid this strong conclusion. Since they argue that ultralocal models do
not implement syntactic corplexity, and assert that "nothing is changed"
by moving to distributed models, their argument seems to apply to all
possible connectionist models. Chalmers (1989) offers a "refutation" of
their argument based on this fact. His objection fails because what Fodor
and Pylyshyn are actually claiming Is that "nothing is changed" by moving
to distributed models by substituting distinct groups of nodes for
distinct individual nodes. This leaves open the possibility that soae
connectionist nodels may inplement syntactic corplexity. However, it also
leaves open the possibility that these models may inplemrent systematicity
without complexity, so Fodor and Pylyshyn fall to acconplish their
argumentative goal.
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of this chapter. I will consider models which illustrate two
broad strategies connectionist opponents of the LOT hypothesis
might pursue. Since there are two requirements on syntactic
complexity--a symbolic-parthood requirement and a
semantic-dependence requirement (see section 0.1.3)--a
connectionist model need only fail one or the other of these
requirements in order to avoid a language of thought. One
option for a connectionist is to account for systematicity
with distributed models in which symbols do have symbolic
parts, but do not stand in an appropriate semantic dependeirce
relation to these parts. The best-articulated example of such
a strategy is Paul Smolensky's influential coffee example,
which I discuss next. A second strategy is to seek to account
for syst.maticity with distributed models in which symbols
stand in appropriately semantic dependence relations, without
standing in part/whole relations. I will consider Tim van
Gelder's attempt to analyze Smolensky's "tensor product"
networks in this way, and then conclude with more general
reasons why no connectionist counterexamples to Fodor and
Pylyshyn's claims are likely to be forthcoming.
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1.2.2 Smolensky's Coffee Case
Smolensky is concerned to highlight various differences
between complex LOT symbols and corresponding distributed
connectionist symbols. He draws a contrast between a
particular LOT symbol of a cup with coffee--the formula
"with(cup,coffee)"--and a particular distributed connectionist
representation of a cup with coffee. In the typical LOT case,
it is possible to start with the complex symbol, and
"subtract" the representation of an empty cup--say,
"with(cup,NULL)"--to produce a representation of coffee
itself. Furthermore, this representation of coffee is
ccntext-independent in that it retains its meaning in other
complex symbols, such as "with(can,coffee)",
"with(tree,coffee)", and "with(man,cof fee)". Smolensky
suggests that we perform a corresponding subtraction proce-ure
on a distributed connectionist representation of cup with
coffee, to see if what results can properly be called "a
connectionist representation of coffee". His arrangement can
be pictured as in Figure 4. (The black dots in the rightmost
three columns represent, respectively, the nodes constituting
3Smolensky's representations of cup with coffee, empty cup, and
coffee. The left column represents the content of each
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First, unlike local symbols (see section 1.1.4), the
representation of cup with coffee has a sort of "compositional
structure", since it can be formed by combining the other two
groups of nodes. The model therefore provides at least a
measure of systematicity among the symbols for cup with
coffee, empty cup, and coffee. Second, Smolensky hesitates
to call this compositional structure syntactic structure,
since he insists that the structure is present only in an
"approximate" sense. What he means by this is that, unlike
in the LOT case, the coffee symbol (represented by the black
nodes in the rightmost column) is not a context-independent
representation of coffee. Instead, Smolensky suggests, it is
"really a representation of coffee in the particular context




looking at the contents of the darkened nodes: hot liquid,
burnt odor, contacting porcelain, etc. Also, as he points
out, if we were to start with corresponding assemblies of
nodes representing can with coffee, tree with coffee, or man
with coffee, subtraction would result in very different
representations of coffee: as burnt smelling granules stacked
in a cylindrical shape (from the subtracted can), as brown
beans hanging in mid-air (from the subtracted tree), or as a
cup with coffee (from the subtracted man). Therefore, he
concludes:
(The structure si] not equivalent to taking a
context-indepc.ident representation of coffee and a
context-independent representation of cup--and certainly
not equivalent to taking a context-independent
representation of in or with--and sticking them all
together in a symbolic structure, concatenating them
together to form the kind of syntactic compositional
structures like "with(cup,coffee)" that ([Fodor and
Pylyshyn) want connectionist nets to implement.
(Smolensky, 1989, p. 11)
In short, according to Smolensky, the context dependence of
the representations in the model keep it from implementing a
language of thought.
To assess this argument, one thing we need to know is what
the relevance of context dependence is for the fate of the
language-of-thought hypothesis. Here we must be particularly
careful to respect the distinction between languages of
thought in general and particular preexisting implementations
of languages of thought. The two questions I distinguished
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in section 1.1.2 must be kept separate in dealing with
Smolensky's distributed coffee model:
(1) Does the model implement a language of thought?
(2) Does it implement some (or any) particular preexisting
implementation of a language of thought?
It is easy to imagine that context dependence is relevant to
question (2). Many traditional LOT models do not employ
context-dependent symbols, so that Smolensky can use context
dependence to distinguish his coffee model from those. To say
that context dependence is relevant to question (2) is not to
say that it is conclusively relevant, since there might be
some traditional models which do exhibit context dependence.
However this issue is settled, something more is needed to
show that context dependence is even partially relevant to
question (1), the question which Fodor and Pylyshyn address.
In particular, it must be shown that context independence is
required for syntactic structure. If ýt is not required, then
Smolensky's argument is simply misdirected. He does not take
a clear stand on this point, saying for example that context
dependence renders the structure of representations
'approximate". Certainly he provides no argument to the
effect that syntactic structure requires context independence.
Given this, and given other aspects of his discussion such as
those discussed in section 1.1.2 above, it appears likely that
this is due to his confusion of questions (1) and (2).
Setting this aside, however, we need to consider what can be
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said in defense of the idea that context independence is a
requirement on syntactic complexity.
As I mentioned in section 1.1.1, there is widespread
agreement (for better or worse) that syntactically complex
symbols not only have symbolic parts, but also depend
semantically on these parts, in the sense that the meaning of
a syntactically complex symbol must depend on the meanings of
its parts. But suppose that a particular symbol a
(connectionist or not) is context dependent, having different
meanings as part of the symbols Fa, Ga, etc. Then it seems
wrong to suppose that the meaning of Fa depends on the meaning
of a. Instead, the dependence relation is reversed: the
meaning of a seems to depend on the meaning of Fa. At best,
the meaning of Fa depends on some property of a other than its
meaning. We might imagine, for example, that there is some
property of a other than its meaning, which is context
independent and which, together with context, determines its
context-dependent meaning. The meaning of the resulting
symbols Fa, Ga, etc. would depend on this property of a, but
this would not be a dependence relation between meanings, and
so would not be a semantic dependence relation of the sort
typically required. Consequently, context independence is at
least an initially plausible requirement on syntactic
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complexity." Whether it is a genuine requirement on syntactic
complexity depends, among other things, on whether semantic
dependence, or indeed any semantic relation, is genuinely
required of syntactic complexity. But for purposes of this
chapter I am working along with the consensus that these
requirements are genuine.
Even if a defender of the language-of-thought hypothesis
must favor (at least some degree of) context independence, it
is possible to take a more direct tack in replying to
Smolensky. I would like to make a case for denying that his
coffee case does display context dependence. The illusion of
context dependence stems from misassignments of content.
Consider again the darkened nodes in the first column of the
"A more careful account would distinguish between two sorts of
context dependence: (1) context dependence of contents, in which a single
symbol changes meanings depending on what other symbols are present, and
(2) context dependence of syr•ols, in which a single content is expressed
by different symbols depending on what other symbols are present. While
the first case is that treated in the text, it appears that Smolensky's
model is at best an exanple of the latter variety: he suggests that coffee
is represented by different sets of nodes in different contexts. The
conditions for syntactic complexity are violated in some, but not all,
such cases. Let al, a2, etc. be all the potential coffee synmbols in a
given model. Let C(al), C(a2), etc. be the set of contexts in which al,
a2, etc., respectively, are used to mean coffee. If each al, taken alone,
means coffee, then despite the multiplicity of coffee symbols, the
semantic condition for syntactic complexity is met: the content of each
member of C(at) depends on the content of at. The exceptional case is
that in which some ai--say, al--fails to mean coffee when taken alone.
In this case, the content of al changes depending on its context, and so
we have the same situation as that discussed in the text. For all
Smolensky indicates, however, his various coffee symbols do represent
coffee when taken alone. (What else might they represent? Tea? Nothing
at all?) I don't know whether this is an artifact of his particular
exarple.
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previous diagram. Smolensky says that when these nodes are
activated, they form a symbol with the content cup with coffee
(or the proposition that a cup with coffee is around, or some
such content). An alternative interpretation is that the
assembly of nodes has as Its content the conjunction of the
contents of the individual nodes. If when one node is on, it
means upright container, and when another is on, it means hot
liquid, why shouldn't the two together mean upright container
and hot liquid? Following this train of thought, we might
conclude that the assembly in the third column is not a
context-dependent representation of coffee, but a
straightforward, context-independent representation of hot
brown liquid with burnt odor, curved sides, and bottom
contacting porcelain. Why isn't Smolensky's third column
simply a syntactic cozicatenation of a symbol for hot liquid,
one for burnt odor, and so on? This looks exactly like an
implementation of the following "syntactic compositional






There are several advantages to this Interpretation. First,
it is more precise, and reflects better the system's treatment
of the symbols. For example, imagine what would show that the
content of the first column was cup with coffee instead of
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this alternative. Plausibly, a deciding factor is whether the
symbol (even ideally) responds to cups with samples of coffee
other than hot, brown liquids with . . ., such as cups with
dried coffee, or cups with coffee beans, etc. But this is
precisely what Smolensky's alleged cup with coffee symbol does
not (even ideally) do, by his own hypothesis."
It is worth describing one other manifestation of the fact
that Smolensky's content ascription is too generous. After
illustrating the variety of coffee symbols in different
contexts (cup, can, tree, man, etc.), he makes the following
provocative claim:
That means that if you want to talk about the
connectionist representation of coffee in this
distributed scheme, you have to talk about a family of
distributed activity patterns. What knits together all
these particular representations of coffee is nothing
other than a type of family resemblance. (Smolensky,
1989, p. 12)
On my suggested reinterpretation, we can see that the alleged
role of family resemblance is also an illusion. Suppose we
interpret the system as having a variety of symbols
representing hot brown liquids . ., burnt smelling granules
i . ., hanging brown beans . . ., and so on. Even having
every member of this "family" of symbols is not enough to
represent something as coffee. To do this, plausibly, a
3 Similarly, it is not clear that the symbol (even
ideally) avoids responding to cups with fake coffee--hot,
brown liquids with . . ., but which are not coffee.
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system must at least represent the hot liquid in the porcelain
as being the same kind of stuff as the granules in the
cylinder or the beans on the tree. Furthermore, it is
important to realize that this is not at all explained by
Smolensky's "family resemblance" of the assemblies of nodes.
For all Smolensky says, there is no (causally) relevant
respect in which these nodes resemble each other any more than
they do any other random assembliest Instead, for all
Smolensky has shown, what is needed is for the system to
contain another symbol which it can use to categorize all of
these assemblies as being about the same stuff. And why
wouldn't that symbol be a context-independent representation
of coffee?1"
"One way for this to happen is for this symbol to be a shared (token
or type) part of the various assemblies Smolensky speaks of as bearing a
family resemblance to one another. It may even be the symbol's sole
function to label the assemblies as representing the same kind of stuff,
and so to label information about one as relevant to hypotheses about the
other. If Smolensky wishes to avoid postulating a separate coffee symbol
which is used to "knit together" the various coffee-assemblies, and if he
wishes to deny that there are any microfeatural representations comrron to
all these assemblies, then he needs some other explanation of how the
system treats the various assemblies as representations of the same kind
of stuff.
Perhaps Smolensky's idea of "family resamblance" is to be cashed out
as follows: the hot brown liquid . . . assembly shares some critical
number of nodes with the burnt smelling granules . . . assembly, which in
turn shares the critical number of different nodes with the hanging browi
beans . . . assembly, and so on. If this is so, although the hot brown
liquid . . . and hanging brown beans . . . assemblies (say) would not
share the critical number of nodes needed to be classified imrediately as
representing the same kind of stuff, the system might classify them as
doirg so, by virtue of detecting a chain of sufficiently overlapping
assemblies which "connects" them. If the same-stuffness of hot brown
liquid . . . and hanging brown beans . . . (and all the other relevant
entities) is kept implicit in the existence of these chains, then the
system could avoid having a coffee symbol. In order to determine whether
two assemblies represented the same kind of stuff, the system would
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I conclude that Smolensky's coffee case constitutes no
threat at all to the language-of-thought hypothesis. The
appearance of a threat stems from Smolensky's mistaken
assignments of particular contents to his models. As far as
I can tell, my reinterpretation strategy does not depend on
the particular contents Smolensky assigns to the individual
nodes in the coffee model (e.g., hot liquid, burnt odor,
etc. ). Although Smolensky suggests that the "microfeatures"
represented by individual nodes in more realistic models will
be less easily expressed in natural language, my argument will
generalize to these cases. The reinterpretation strategy
seems to depend only on Smolensky's assertion that symbols
for coffee are composed of symbols for microfeatures of
coffee." Can Smolensky run a version of his argument without
microfeatures? I don't think so. Without microfeatures,
although Smolensky could stipulate that coffee is represented
by a number of distinct groups of nodes on different
attempt to find a suitable chain between the two assemblies. I don't know
wh-ther such a search process can be constrained to the right sort of
chains (e.g., to exclude representations of tea, cocoa beans, etc.), and
Smolensky provides no hints as to whether this is even the sort of account
he would wish to develop.
"Strictly speaking, the strategy also depends on the conjoinability
of the microfeatural symbols. But all this requires is that the
microfeatures be microproperties or microrelations--conjoinable as
"F(xl,...m) & G(yl,..., yn)"--or else microoccurrences--conjoinable as "p
& q"--or else microobjects--conjoinable as "a & £b'. There is no
indication from connectionist theories that microfeatures might be
anything else.
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occasions, he would have no argument for context sensitivity--
that is, no argument that these different groups of nodes have
(even slightly) different contents (e.g., coffee in the
context of a cup, coffee in the context of a tree, etc.)."
"It may be worthwhile to consider an independent argument which
Smolensky gives to cover distributed models in which individual nodes are
not representations at all (and so are not representations of
microfeatures). In particular, he considers models which are supposed to
meet the following two conditions, presented as he formulates them:
(a) Interpretation can be assigned to large-scale activity
patterns [i.e., groups of nodes] but not to individual
units [i.e., nodes];
(b) The dynamics governing the interaction of individual
units is sufficiently complex that the algorithm
defining the interactions of individual units cannot be
translated into a tractably-specified algorithm for the
interaction of whole patterns. (Smolensky, 1989, p. 5)
He claims that in such models, "the syntax or processing algorithm
strictly resides at the lower level, while the seuantics strictly resides
at the upper level", implying that "there is no account of the
architecture in which the same elements carry both the syntax and the
semantics", so that "we have a fundamentally new candidate for the
cognitive architecture which is simply not an implementation of the
Classical one" (Smolensky, 1989, pp. 5-6).
There is reason to doubt the possibility of the models Smolensky has
in mind, as well as reason to doubt the conclusions he wishes to draw from
them. It is clear enough that a model could satisfy (a), but what about
(b)? Although Smolensky doesn't argue that (b) is possible to satisfy,
he suggests that the possibility is "brought out nicely" in work by R. )ert
Cummins and Georg Schwarz (Cunmins and Schwarz, 1987; Schwarz, 1987; and
Cummins, 1989). It is true that in the earlier works Cummins and Schwarz
suggest the possibility of satisfying (b), but they do not show how it is
possible. Furthermore, in the later work Cummins retracts the suggestion
that it is possible to satisfy (b):
Given an algorithm for computing the activation levels of individual
nodes, it is mathematically trivial to construct an algorithm for
computing the activation vector (defined over a group of nodes)
whose elements are conputed by the original algorithm. It is, of
course, a mere change in notation. (Cuimmins, 1989, p. 151)
He explains that in the earlier works he and Schwarz
S. were overly conservative on this point, leaving it open that
an algorithm defined at the single-node level might not "aggregate
up" into an algorithm defined at the vector level. But it is
obvious that the algorithm is always possible--indeed trivial.
(Cummins, 1989, p. 171)
Although Cudmins doesn't stop to defend these claims, his retraction at
least undercuts Smolensky's appeal to his authority!l Rather than
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1.2.3 Nonconcatenative Complexity
Recently, Tim van Gelder has tried a different strategy in
response to Fodor and Pylyshyn. His argument seems best
described with the aid of a generic example. Suppose that s
and w are mental symbols--connectionist or not--and that s
means sugar and w means white. Suppose that we are interested
in developing a representational framework involving such
symbols which exhibits systematicity. This would involve, at
a minimum, the framework's supporting the use of s, w and
other symbols to generate systematically related symbols such
as a symbol P with the content that there is a cup with coffee
and white sugar, and a symbol 0 with the content that there
is a white cup with coffee and sugar. As van Gelder points
attenpting to settle the issue of the possibility of satisfying (b), I
would like to grant this possibility to Smolensky and argue that his
conclusion with respect to the LOT hypothesis is unwarranted.
I agree with Smolensky that the LOT hypothesis requires there to be
entities with both syntax and semantics. What .is unclear is why in such
models the semantically interpreted activity patterns could not have
syntactic properties. Smolensky equation of "syntax" with "processing",
although initially surprising, has some point: in the classical framework
syntactic properties are supposed to play a causal-explanatory role in
(e.g.) inferential processes. If (b) is satisfied, Smolensky argues, "at
the higher level, . . . complete, precise algorithrms for the processing
cannot be stated" (Smolensky, 1989, p. 5). Regardless of hether
completeness and precision are required for theory-implementation (see
section 1.1.2), a process need not be complete and precise (much less
completely and precisely stated) to be real, and to have
causal-explanatory power. If this were a requirement on causal power,
only entities at the level of fundamental physics could have
causal-explanatory power (and then, perhaps, only if we ignore the
statistical--imprecise?--nature of quantum-mechanical laws).
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out, such a framework should provide "general, effective and
reliable processes" for producing P and 0 given s, w, and
other symbols, and for using P or 0 inversely to produce these
symbols (van Gelder, 1989, p. 5). Call these processes
"conversion processes". His argument rests upon a distinction
between two ways of providing conversion processes.
The first is the familiar method of forming syntactically
complex symbols, by "concatenating" s, w, and other symbolic
parts to form systematically related wholes such as P and Q.
Since, on this method, s and w are physically present within
P and Q, it is fairly easy to design processes which can
"parse" P or 0 back into their parts; in effect, P and 0 "wear
their logical form on their faces". van Gelder is clear that
models employing this first method are implementations of the
language-of-thought hypothesis, whether they are connectionist
or nonconnectionist. However, he introduces a second sort of
conversion method in which the systematically related symbols
are "nonconcatenative". He cites several examples of
connectionist models (ones with distributed symbols) which
have the interesting feature of providing the required
conversion processes without preserving a, w, et al. as
literal parts of P and 0. He emphasizes that in a
nonconcatenative scheme of representation the systematically
related symbols such as P and C do not literally contain
symbols corresponding to semantic constituents, such as s and
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W. Therefore, these systematically related symbols have no
syntactic structure. It is this feature which van Gelder
exploits to argue that connectionist models using
nonconcatenative conversion processes can explain
systematicity without satisfying the language-of-thought
hypothesis.
I think it should be conceded without a fuss that
nonconcatenated symbols don't satisfy the LOT hypothesis,
since they don't have symbolic parts. Rather, a defense of
the LOT hypothesis should begin with a reminder of the
obvious: the hypothesis doesn't say that every mental symbol
is syntactically complex, but says only that some are (or, as
I suggested in section 1.1.1, that enough are to generate the
expressive power of natural languages). Furthermore, of
course, from the fact that van Gelder's models"a use some
syntactically simple symbols, it doesn't follow that they use
no syntactically complex ones. Indeed, my strategy will be
to argue that these models do, and apparently must, supplement
the use of nonconcatenative symbols with straightforwardly
concatenative ones. If so, this is enough to show that they
implement languages of thought.
"Ovan Gelder's role in this dJscussion is that of a philosophical
cornmentator, so that the phrase "van Gelder's models" should be taken as
shorthand for "the models which van Gelder considers", a broad class
including, nmst notably, Smolensky's tensor-product representations
(Srrmolensky, 1989).
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To begin, I want to look at a conversion method which,
while nonconcatenative in van Gelder's sense, is clearly part
of a language-of-thought model, Suppose that people have
syntactically complex mental symbols--for illustration's sake,
we can suppose that these are tiny strings which resemble
English formulae, such as "there is a cup with coffee and
white sugar", and that homunculi use tiny blackboards for
writing and erasing these formulae. Also, suppose that in
nkany cases the homunculi are unable to store the formulae
efficiently in memory--perhaps the boards fill up. To
alleviate the problem, we might imagine, the homunculi take
to storing synonymous, but syntactically simple, substitutes
for these formulae. For lack of a better word, call these
substitutes "abbreviations". Which abbreviations they choose
don't concern us, so long as they can reliably convert between
the syntactically complex formulae and the abbreviations.4"
Of course, there is a price for using these abbreviations to
save boarC space: to perform inferences, the homunculi must
f1rst co .vert an abbreviation back into its expanded,
"'They might adopt a Godel-numbering scheme for the formulae,
substituting numbers for formulae in a wcy which is known to allow for
"general, effective, and reliable" conversion processes. On this scheme,
rather than storing a cumbersomre syntactically comrrplex symbol such as
"there is a cup with coffee arnd awhite sugar", the homunculi would store
so~re numeral (perhaps in corrpact, scientific notation). Except by the
rare accident, this nmeral would not contain any parts corresponding to
the parts of the original stzing--i.e., it would not contain numeric
abbreviations for "cup", "white", and so on. This would not, then, count
as a concatenative conversion process,
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syntactically complex, form. Nevertheless, it is easy to
imagAne the space savings to be worth the extra effort during
inference.
The point of describing this fanciful model is that,
although its method of conversion is nonconcatenative, it does
support syntactically complex symbols (used in inference), and
so is a genuine language-of-thought model. My suggestion is
that, at least as far as the fate of the LOT hypothesis is
concerned, the connectionist models van Gelder discusses do
not differ from this model. There are no blackboards and no
homunculi in these models, and the tiny English symbols are
replaced with distributed symbols--groups of nodes--but the
relevant features are the same. The most important shared
feature is that, in inference, the nonconcatenated
abbreviations in the connectionist models must first be
converted into syntactically complex form.
To see this, suppose that a group of nodes P is a
nonconcatenative but systematically generated abbreviation,
with the content that there is a cup with coffee and white
sugar. What is needed in order for a system to use this
stored "belief" in inference, say, to draw conclusions about
how to prepare breakfast this morning? Since P is
nonconcatenative, it is in effect a "blob" whose internal
structure may differ radically from that of a symbol with a
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semantically "near" content--say, that there is a can with
coffee and white sugar--and may be nearly identical
structurally to a symbol with a "distant" content--say, Sonny
drinks more coffee than Cher. At a minimum, then, the system
would need to be able to regenerate, from P, symbols for cup
(as opposed to some other container, such as a can or a
supermarket) and with coffee and sugar (as opposed to som,
other fact about the cup). Once these symbols are
regenerated, of course, they must not be allowed simply to
"drift apart", effectively losing the information that the
coffee and sugar are in the cup, but must be used jointly in
planning breakfast. But to use them in this manner is no
different from using them as systematic, symbolic parts of a
syntactically complex whole, a concatenative symbol with the
content that there is a cup with coffee and sugar. This
complex symbol is the "mereological sum" of the two symbols
plus whatever items indicate that their roles are tied to one
another. It is syntactically complex because its content is
appropriately dependent on that of its symbolic parts (th,.
symbols for cup and with coffee and sugar).'4 While it is true
4These points are clearer when we realize that, in the general case,
it would not be enough to regenerate only the symbols for cup and with
coffee and sugar, All regenerating these symbols tells the system is that
P says something or other about cups and sugared-coffee containers. This
is compatible with P's meaning that Cher once spilt a cup with coffee and
sugar on Sonny, or something equally irrelevant to the search for this
morning's coffee. When more and moret symbols must be regenerated, and
more and more items are needed to maintain information about their roles
with respect to one another, it is increasingly evident that what is
regenerated from the stored nonconcatenative symbols are genuinely
syntactic formulae. In the next section I support this analysis by
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that van Gelder's models present ways of reducing the number
of syntactically complex symbols which must be present at any
one time, this is also true of the fanciful
language-of-thought case. The relevant similarities between
the connectionist models and the model with homunculi and
blackboards are deep enough, I think, to compel the conclusion
that all are alike in making crucial use of a language of
thought for inference, if not for long-term storage in memory.
It is possible for van Gelder's models using
nonconcatenative storage to be modified so as to avoid their
commitment to syntactically complex symbols. Specifically,
the models could be redesigned to perform inferences without
the regeneration (or decomposition) steps. Such "shortcut"
inferences are easy to implement in connectionist networks:
all that is needed is to build connections between the
nonconcatenative symbols themselves, so that P (say) might
activate some other abbreviation 0 without the system needing
first to decompose P or O.
To see the e-fects of this, consider again the analogy with
the homunculi and blackboards. In the original story, given
the ability to decompose the abbreviations in inference, the
homunculi can engage in "structure-sensitive" processing.
considering the possibility that the regenerated syrmbols might not combine
spatiotenporally, unlike genuine syntactic parts.
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What this means, at a minimum, is that the homunculi can apply
fairly general rules--such as, "if I want some X and there is
some in container Y, then find container "'--to a variety of
specific representations--such as the belief that there is
sugared coffee in the cup, or the belief that there are tools
in the hardware store. This is possible because, with
syntactic complexity, the homunculi can "match" the rules to
the representations in virtue of the form of their parts,
binding variables to constants, and the like (see the
illustration of production systems in section 0.1.3). If we
suppose that the homunculi forego decomposition of the
abbreviations into complex counterparts, however, this sort
of inference would be precluded.
Instead of being capable of structure-sensitive inference
with general rules, the system wr.culd need an immense
independently stored battery of information about every
specific case it represents (e.g., tea and spark plugs as well
as coffee, and bags and warehouses as well as cups). Either
all of this information would have to be innate, or else the
system would have to find out "the hard way" that it should
find a cup when some desired sugared coffee is in the cup, and
even then it would have no way of applying such information
to analogous problems such as what to do when some desired tea
is in a bag. As a result, at very best, the system would only
perform sensibly in routine situations: everyday, highly
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practiced activities performed under optimally smooth
conditions."
This limited, structure-insensitive sort of inference is
known as purely "associative" or "statistical" inference
(Hume's "habits of the mind"). As most connectionists agree,
it is characteristic of connectionists models which use only
local symbols (individual nodes), such as the interactive
activation model of reading (see section 0.2.1). A desire to
avoid pure associationism is one of the main reasons for the
popularity of models with distributed symbols, and in
particular for the models which van Gelder discusses. To
redesign these models, then, would deprive them of their most
attractive feature, namely, their ability efficiently to
combine structure-sensitive and associative inference.
Indeed, if structure-sensitive inference is abandoned, these
models lose their advantage over models involving only local
symbols. Without inferential processes which are sensitive
to the form of nonconcatenative abbreviations, and without
processes for converting these abbreviations back into
syntactically complex formulae, there is little computational
point to using distributed rather than local symbols for the
"Notice that van Gelder's models would not avoid the LOT hypothesis
silnply by adding direct connections between nonconcatenative symbols,
iwhile leaving intact the mechanism for decorposing these symbols to handle
nonroutine situations. Rather, the deconposition mechanism must be
conpletely disabled for purposes of inferential processing. C•halmers
(1990) appears to miss this point.
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abbreviations (in fact, the increased complication carries
with it some computational disadvantages such as decreased
speed). Cheapened versions of van Gelder's models--ones
stripped of their support for syntactic complexity--would have
as little hope to be the whole story of cognition as do models
with only local symbols. But this is simply to reiterate the
dilemma for connectionists posed by Fodor and Pylyshyn--
connectionists appear forced to choose either to impleiaent a
language of thought or else to adopt pure associationism. The
point of my argument has been to show that this dilemma
remains standing even though Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument
falters, and even in the face of the most sophisticated
connectionist schemes of representation yet offered.
1.2.4 A More General Perspective
Coiinectionists have not shown that distributed models can
account for systematicity without implementing a language of
thought. I suspect, but cannot quite show, that my arguments
about Smolensky's and van Gelder's models are general enough
to be recast into a general argument that no connectionist
model can explain systematicity without syntactic complexity.
If so, it is natural to ask whether and how it is possible for
any model to abandon the LOT hypothesis without sacrificing
systematicity.
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To see how this is possible, consider the following example
of a "drinks machine", adapted from Martin Davies (1989)."
The outputs of the machine are drinks of one of four kinds:
coffee or tea with or without milk. The inputs of the machine
are tokens ("coins") of four kinds: A, B, C, D. The relations
between the inputs a4d outputs are as follows:
A-token in -- > coffee with milk out
B-token in -- > coffee without milk out
C-token in -- > tea with milk out
D-token in -- > tea without milk out
Imagine that the tokens, when put in the machine, realize
"thought9" about the drinks they respectively cause the
machine to produce (e.g., the thought that the customer wants
coffee with milk). Given this, we can apply Fodor and
Pylyshyn's notion of systematicity, and ask whether there are
presupposition relations among these representations.
Suppose that the machine is so constructed that, given that
it can think that the customer wants coffee with milk and that
the customer wants tea without milk, it must be able to think
that the customer wants coffee without milk and that the
customer wants tea with milk. (Translation: given that the
machine can process A-tokens and D-tokens, it must be able to
process B-tokens and C-tokens.) If (as we are supposing)
these presupposition relations are not accidental, then (as
"As will becorrme clear, the morals I wish to draw from the drinks
machine differ from, and apparently contradict, the morals Davies wishes
to draw.
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Davies argues) the machine must contain four mechanisms
MH1,...,M4 of the following sort:
M1 explains coffee delivery given A-tokens or B-tokens;
12 explains tea delivery given C-tokens or D-tokens;
F3 explains milk delivery given A-tokens or C-tokens;
M4 explains milk nondelivery given B-tokens or L-tokens.
But if this is the case (as Davies also argues) these pairs
of tokens must share distinctive properties to which their
respective mechanisms are sensitive, For example, M1 might
respond to roundness, N2 to squareness, M3 to redness, and M4
to blueness. In this case A-tokens would have to be round and
red (since they trigger both M1 and NM3), B-tokens would have
to be round and blue, C-tokens square and red, and D-tokens
square and blue. Davies argues that the insertion of tokens
(i.e., the thoughts) would therefore qualify as syntactically
complex states, articulated into shape-related states
(representing demand for coffee or tea) and color-related
states (representing demand for milk or no milk).
Along these lines, Davies shows how it is possible to argue
a priori (or, at least, "prior" to psychological research) for
the presence of syntactic complexity, given systematicity.
If this is right, then it is no surprise that the various
distributed connectionist models I have discussed all turn
out, on close inspection, to implement a language of thought.
However, since the LOT hypothesis is intended to be a
substantive psychological explanation of systematicity, there
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is reason to resist a construal of the LOT hypothesis which
renders it logically (or at least physically) equivalent to
the existence of systematicity. The account of syntactic
structure offered in section 0.1.3 is stronger than Davies'
account in one crucial respect, and can therefore be used to
show how it is at least possible to account for systematicity
without syntactic structure.
On the account of syntactic structure I have developed,
(proper) syntactic parts must be (proper) spatiotemporal
parts, as (written or spoken) words are spatiotemporal parts
of sentences. (In a moment I will illustrate the importance
of thiL requirement.) By this criterion, an object's state
of being round is not a syntactic part of its state of being
round and red, since their spatiotemporal locations coincide."
It is possible for representational states to have
spatiotemporal syntactic parts. The state of activation of
a connectionist node n at time t is, for example, a spatial
part of the state of activity of n and n' at t, and is a
temporal part of the state of activation of n at t and t'.
"'I suppose that states are instantiations of properties (or
relations) by individuals, and I suppose for the monment that a state is
hkere the individuals stich "participate" in the state are. This account
of state-locations will have to be amrended, as I will explain shortly.
Furthermore, I ignore the view that being red is a relational state
holding between (say) red objects and normal human perceivers, since if
this view is true, the drinks machine is presumably responding to some
other states of the inserted tokens, the location of twhich does coincide
with the tokens themsEelves.
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This is why the nodes in Smolensky's coffee model (see section
1.2.2) combine to form syntactically complex symbols, for
example.
Syntactic complexity appears inevitable if each
systematically-related symbol is a combination of states or
objects with different spatiotemporal locations. To explain
systematicity without a language of thought, then, a
representational scheme might be developed in which each
systematically-related symbol is a combination of states with
the same locations. For short, let us say that such models
support only "nonspatiotemporal combination". In Daviesv
drinks-machine example, this is achieved by treating a
systematically-related symbol as a combination of simultaneous
states of the same object. I will conclude by considering an
analogous strategy for mental symbols: models in which symbols
combine only by being simultaneous states of the same object.
Although this strategy may seem easy to implement, in fact
it raises serious computational difficulties (which in turn
help to explain the appeal of genuine languages of thought,
with spatiotemporal combination). Natural languages and
genuine languages of thought (including the connectionist
models I have considered in the previous two sections) can
have an indefinitely large "primitive voc&bulary" consisting
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of simple symbols (e.g., nodes, patterns of nodes, or strings
of letters or sounds). The number of primitive vocabulary
elements in English appears to be at least as large as the
number of entries in a standard dictionary, and the number of
elements in an English speaker's (hypothetical) language of
thought appears to be at least as large ai the numbek of
English primitive vocabulary elements the person understands.
These symbols can enter into fairly large combinations with
other symbols by being placw:d in certain spatiotemporal
relations (to which processes are sensitive). For example,
easily comprehensible English sentences can run to twenty or
more primitive elements (e.g., words), as can sentences in a
(hypothetical) language of thought." Furthermore, these
combinations are "nonexclusive" in the sense that virtually
any pair of primitive elements can enter into some sensible
combination or other--as virtually any two words (or ideas)
can be combined in some sentence (or thought). It is not at
all clear how fairly large, nonexclusive combinations formed
from indefinitely large vocabularies can be implemented in a
system which supports only nonspatiotemporal combinations.
"There is a tradeoff between primitive vocabulary size and required
combination size. The number of primitive mental elements aivailable to
a person might be smaller than the number of primitive linguistic elements
he understands, if the person supposes that the linguistic elements are
definitior~ally reducible to a stall stock of mental elements. In this
case, however, these mental elemelts would have to be capable of entering
into larger combinations than the linguistic elements, to form symbols
with the same contents.
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In such models, states must "combine" by being simultaneous
states of the same object (on pain of not being in the same
place). If two such states are mutually inconsistent--e.g.,
an object's being round and it's being square--then they
cannot be combined in this way. If combinations are to be
nonexclusive, the primitive vocabulary of such a system must
be realized as a stock of mutually consistent states.
Furthermore, like all mental symbols, these states must be
causally relevant to the behavior of the system. The problem
is: how can there be enough such states to go around?
Consider, first, the situation with respect to individual
connectionist nodes. Such a node typically has only two
inutually consistent, causally relevant states at a given
moment: its activation level and its threshold (or degree of
activation necessary for it to transmit activation to other
nodes). If a model's primitive vocabulary elements are
realized as particular momentary activation levels or
thresholds, and if they are to combine nonspatiotemporally,
then at most they can combine two at a time--in mentalistic
terms, the most complex thoughts would involve only two ideas.
Although a node may change activation level and threshold over
an extended time interval, this does not help the situation.
A combination of activation levels (or thresholds) of an
object, as they exist at different moments, is a syntactic
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complex of these states, since it has them as temporal parts."
Therefore, local representation can support large,
nonexclusive, combinations of primritive vocabulary elements
only by supporting ttemporal) syntactic complexity.
The analysis of distributed representations is more
complicated, as usual. It may appear that, groups of nodes are
in more causally relevant states at a time, and so may support
large combinations of primitive vocabulary elements without
supporting syntactic complexity. In particular, it appears
that a group of k nodes has 2k causally relevant states at a
given time, corresponding to the activation and threshold
states of each node in the group at that time. For example,
consider two nodes n1 and n2, each with a state of activation
and a threshold state. Now consider their mereological sum,
the pair of nodes. Call this object "Fred". At any time,
Fred is in four relevant states: its nl-activation, its
nl-threshold, its n2-activation, and its n2-threshold. If
states are located where their participating objects are
"Although I have considered only the case in which the vocabulary
elements are activation states (and thresholds) of a node at a momrent,
nothing is changed by generalizing to the case in which the voc-abulary
elements are patterns of activation states (or patterns of thresholds) of
a node over an interval. Since a node can have only one activation level
(and one threshold) at a given mroment, it can have only one pattern of
activation levels (and one pattern of thresholds) over a given interval.
If such patterns are to combine nonsyntactically, they also can corrbine
at most two per interval. Finally, a comnbination of patterns of
activation levels (or thresholds) of an object, as they exist over
different (possibly overlapping) intervals, is a syntactic complex of
these states, since it has them as terporal parts.
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located, as I have been supposing, then all of these states
are in the same place--namely, where Fred is--and so their
combinations do not count as syntactically complex. If we
consider larger n-tuples of nodes, it might be suggested, we
can accommodate large combinations of primitive vocabulary
elements without postulating a language of thought.
However, I think we should reject the idea that all states
are located precisely where their participating objects are.
The central--perhaps, only--explanatory function of the notion
of a state's spatial location is to track and explain which
other states it can influence in a given time." The states
which now exist wholly within my room, for example, cannot
influence the states existing next month wholly within a room
a light-year away. In many cases we lose this sort of
explanation, if we adhere to the principle that states are
where their participating objects are. For example, suppose
that nl and n2 are at such a distance from one another that
light travels from one to the other in a positive (but perhaps
very tiny) time interval e. Then (by special relativity) it
is not physically possible for Fred's nl-activation at t to
influence Fred's n2-activation at any time before t+e. If we
suppose that these states are located in the same place,
"Other functions of the notion of a state-location, such as helping
to specify where one has to be to witness the state at a certain time,
seem to depend on this function.
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however, we lose a straightforward explanation of this fact.
If, instead, we suppose that Fred's nl-activation is where n1
is, and Fred's n2-activation is where n2 is, then we can
explain their inability to influence each other in suitably
small times. But given any account of state-location which
tracks influential potential in this fashion, combinations of
Fred's four states would count as syntactically complex--as
containing the states as spatial parts. Therefore,
connectionist representational schemes restricted to
combinations of simultaneous states of an object are unable
to support large combinations of primitive vocabulary
elements, even if the objects in question are distributed.
Although we can explain systematicity without a language of
thought (e.g., by tokens of the drinks-machine sort), the
price (in any known connectionist mechanism, at least) seems
to be a primitive vocabulary which lends itself only to
combinations of extremely small size. In fact, the problem
is even more severe. In a genuine language (or language of
thought) a symbol can contain multiple "copies" of the same
type of primitive vocabulary element (e.g., "John loves Mary
more than Sally loves Harry"). There does not seem to be an
analogous possibility in systems restricted to
nonspatiotemporal combinations: it doesn't make sense for an
object to have multiple "copies" of the same state type (that
is, at the same time--copies at different times would qualify
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as temporal and so syntactic parts of the whole). Without a
language of thought, combinations must not only be small, but
must also be restricted in combinatorial possibilities (e.g.,
recursion).
If (as seems likely, although I know of no way to prove it)
models with symbols analogous to Davies' drinks-machine tokens
are the only possible nonsyntactic explanations of
systematicity, we would have a fairly general reason to deny
that connectionist models are likely to explain systematicity
without implementing a language of thought. Importantly, this
would be achieved without making it literally impossible to
explain systematicity without a language of thought. The
argument for the classical framework (and so for models which
fall under both the connectionist and classical trameworks)
rests on its ability to account for a family of intuitively
obvious but fully empirical phenomena, including but not
restricted to systematicity, large primitive vocabularies,
large nonexclusive combinations of primitive vocabulary




If the arguments of chapter 1 are correct, associationist
connectionist models (such as ultralocal ones) yield the
clearest alternatives to the LOT hypothesis. While it may be
that such models cannot provide a general account of
cognition, they may account for important aspects of
cognition, such as low-level perception (e.g., with the
interactive activation model of reading) or the mechanisms
which distinguish experts from novices at a given skill (e.g.,
with dependency-network models). Since these models stand a
fighting chance of being applicable to some aspects of
cognition, it is important from a philosophical standpoint
that we have appropriate tools for understanding such models.
In particular, we want to have a theory of the semantic
content of representations in certain connectionist models.
In this chapter, I want to consider the prospects for applying
a specific sort of "fine-grained" theory of content to such
models.
According to the fine-grained theory I will consider,
contents admit of degrees of complexity. Even the simplest
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propositions (e.g., the proposition that a is F) are thought
to be complexes of constituent concepts (e.g., the concepts
a and F). What is required for a representation r to have a
complex content, say, the proposition that a is F? On a
fairly standard fine-grained conception, r must display
"semantic dependence" on other representations which represent
the concepts a and F, i.e., the constituent concepts of the
proposition. What sort of relation between representations
counts as semantic dependence? The most familiar examples are
syntactic relations: the content of the English sentence
"sugar is white" depends on the content of its syntactic parts
"sugar" and "white". Another example of semantic dependence
might loosely be termed "abbreviation": a syntactically simple
symbol "p" in a logical formalism may have a complex,
propositional content in virtue of being treated (by
convention or otherwise) as "standing in place of" a sentence
such as "sugar is white", and so depending semantically on the
parts of that sentence.
Although virtually all nonconnectionist models in cognitive
science, as well as many connectionist models, postulate
relations such as syntactic complexity and abbreviation, many
connectionist models appear not to support these relations.
The best examples are the associationist (e.g., ultralocal)
models. Nevertheless, for reasons I will describe there is
at least an appearance that representations in these models
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do have propositional contents. * This generates a
philosophical puzzle, at least for those sympathetic to the
relevant fine-grained theories of content: how it is possible
for a representation to have propositional content without
displaying semantic dependence on other representations (e.g.,
without being either syntactically complex or an
abbreviation)? My goal in this chapter is to explain how.
I will begin in section 2.1 by describing the intuitive
idea of fine-grained theories, and the puzzle which certain
connectionist models present for them. Then in section 2.2
I will attempt to show how the troublesome connectionist
representations, even individual nodes, can have propositional
content, and will discuss how this propositional content can
even be explicit content. In the final section, I will
briefly discuss some of the metaphysical commitments of the
theory I propose.
2.1 F Pine-Grained Content and Connectionism
Philosophers explore many distinct conceptions of content,
and many distinct purposes for being concerned with content.
One reason the contemporary literature is difficult is that
it is unclear which conceptions of content are genuine
competitors, and which conceptions are simply addressed to
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different, but equally legitimate, purposes. To help fix
ideas, then, discussions of theories of content should begin
with a specification of some guiding reasons for wanting a
conception of content. Since I will be addressing a puzzle
which arises out of certain connectionist models, I want to
focus on a notion of content which is suitable for use in
cognitive science, as it might (or might not) be opposed to
common sense, for example. I will therefore be concerned with
the content of mental representations of the sort which are
postulated in cognitive-scientific models (e.g., physical
tokens of functionally-specified propositional-attitude
types--see section 0.1.1). I take it that, at a minimum,
cognitive science appeals to content to specify these mentaL
representations, and to express generalizations about their
functional role--generalizations relating mental symbols not
only to external conditions, via perception and action, but
also to other mental representations, via inference.
In this section I want to describe two sorts of theories of
content which seek to respect these constraints, one which
treats contents as coarse-grained, and one which treats them
"'Of course, the fact that contents serve different purposes (even
apparently antagonistic ones) does not m~ean that a representation has
different "kinds" of content, as many philosophers are quick to suppose.
Often, the urge to postulate different kinds of content is merely a
vestige of verificationism. We don't postulate that an object has
different kinds of shapes sirply because we are interested in shape for
various reasons and have various methods (even apparently antagonistic
ones) for amassing evidence about shape.
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as fine-grained. After introducing the notion of reference
conditions which is central to both theories (section 2.1.1),
I will focus primarily on the notion of semantic structure
which figures in the fine-grained theories (section 2.1.2).
Then it will be possible to present the connectionist puzzle
for these fine-grained theories (section 2.1.3).
2.1.1 Content and Reference
In discussing content it is common to begin with the
relation between the content of a representation and its
referent, or the existing entity, if any, that it is about.
There is a close connection between content and reference, as
is shown by the fact that no entity can have reference unless
it has content, i.e., is a representation. I will assume that
the referents of mental representations are existing objects,
properties, and facts (which, I will also assume, are
typically instantiations of existing properties by existing
objects). An idea of Paris refers to, or is about, a certain
existing city, an idea of prettiness refers to, or is about,
a certain existing property, and a belief that Paris is pretty
refers to, or is about, the existing fact that this city has
this property.'" I will limit my attention to representations
"See Barwise and Perry, 1981, for a defense of this conception of
reference against the Fregean argument that sentences (and so, presumably,
beliefs) refer not to facts but to (something like) truth values. ¶tat
I call facts they call "situations" (which are not to be confused with
their "abstract situations"). While the Fregean position is viable, the
106
which refer (or purport to refer) in these ways, and I will
call these "referential" representations.
It might be tempting to begin to specify the content of a
referential representation by specifying its referent.
However, referents are not the whole of content, as is
indicated by the familiar fact that not every referential
representation even has a referent. An idea of my pet
caterpillar does not refer, since there is no such thing; nor
does a belief that Paris is in Germany refer, since there is
no such fact." Furthermore, there is sufficient reason to
deny that referents are even parts of contents, at least in
the case of many successfully referring representations.
Suppose that tomorrow I will obtain a pet caterpillar,
Crawlette. As a result, the idea of my pet caterpillar will
undergo a change in reference, from having no referent today
to having Crawlette as a referent tomorrow. Since the phrase
appeal to facts is more interesting for my present purposes. I will be
considering (and rejecting) the position that contents are identical to
referents, and thig identification is not tLen initially tempting on the
Fregean view. (In a moment, I will also consider the view that
predicative ideas refer not to properties but to groups of objects.)
"'hat about predicative ideas, such as the idea of being pretty?
Does this idea refer even if there are no pretty things--refer, say, to
the property of being pretty? This raises controversial issues. Can
propvrties exist without being instantiated? What about properties which
are logically impossible to instantiate? Since may prebent point is
independent of the proper answer to these questions, I will not to take
a stand on them here. It would even be okay for my present purposes if
these issues were sidestepped by taking the idea of being pretty to refer,
not to a property, but to all and only the pretty things.
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will not undergo a change in content, this shows that even for
many successfully referring representations, content is not
to be specified even in part by specifying referents
themselves .'
Since objects, properties, and facts do not in general
serve as the contents of (mental) representations, I want to
adopt the standard philosophical terms "propositions" and
"concepts" for whatever things do fit this bill." One
pressing question, of course, is: what are propositions and
concepts, that they may serve as contents? While a full
answer to this question requires consideration of a number of
competing philosophical positions, I think we can place three
weak, and so uncontroversial, constraints on them, given the
discussion so far:
"This is compatible with there being some referential symbols for
which content is partly or wholly constituted by referents themselves.
It would take us too far afield to enter the debate over whether or not
there are such cases, however. My opinion is that even what philosophers
sometimes call "wide content" need not be specified by referents, but may
be specified by reference conditions, of the sort to be described below.
"It is necessary to ward off certain associations from the
psychological usage of the terms "concept" and "proposition". Often these
terms are used to mean, not contents, but certain mrental representations
themselves. Although, as I will explain in section 2.3.3, there are ways
to reconcile the psychological use of the terms with their semantic use,
it should not be assumed from the start that the two uses coincide.
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(1) Propositions and concepts should help to explain the fact
that only entities with content have reference.
(2) Representations should be able to have propositions and
concepts as contents even without having reference.
(3) Representations should be able to retain the same
propositions and concepts as contents even through changes
in reference,
Before searching for other constraints, a reasonable strategy
is to try to find something which fits these three.
To satisfy these constraints, we should focus not on the
referent of a representation but on its reference condition,
or the way the world has to be in order for the representation
to be albout some existing entity (fact, object, or property).
For instance, the reference condition of an idea of my pet
caterpillar is that I have a pet caterpillar; if I have a pet
caterpillar x, the idea refers to x, otherwise the idea fails
to refer. Similarly, a belief that Paris is in Germany has
the reference condition that Paris is in Germariy.e" Reference
conditions meet constraints (1)-(3) on propositions and
concepts: nothing can refer unless it has a reference
condition; representations can have reference conditions
"'Of course, in the case of beliefs and other symbols with truth
value, reference conditions are commonly called "truth conditions". On
the matter of terminology, it is perhaps useful to indicate that the
distinction between referents and reference conditions is for all
practical purposes the ;same as Carnap's distinction between "extensions"
and "intensions" (Carnap, 1947). I shy away from this terminology,
however, because I think "intension" is often also used for something more
akin to Fregean senses (certain entities which are more finely grained
than reference conditions).
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without having referents; and representations can retain the
same reference conditions even through changes in reference.
Because of these explanatory virtues of reference
conditions, it is tempting to identify propositions and
concepts with reference conditions." On the most natural
development of this idea, when we use a phrase or sentence e
(in English, say) to identify the content of a representation
r, we are saying that r has the same reference condition as
e."6  To say that r has as content the proposition that
checkerboards are squares is to say that r has the same
reference condition as the sentence "checkerboards are
squares", while to say that r has as content the concept being
a checkerboard is to say that r has the same reference
condition as the phrase "being a checkerboard". it follows,
on this theory, that if the two English sentences el and e2
have the same reference conditions, then the belief that el
and the belief that e2 have the same content.
"See Stalnaker, 1984 for a defense of a conception of propositions
as functions from "possible worlds", or possible ways for the world to be,
to truth values. Concepts might be treated in a similar fashion, as
functions from possible worlds to reference values (or perhaps to
referents themselves).
"'In everyday attribution, we are satisfied if the reference
conditions are nearly the same. However, even in everyday attribution we
are aware that attributions are nmore accurate the nearer the reference
conditions are. When we mean to speak strictly and accurately, as we




Many philosophers resist the identification of contents
with reference conditions on the grounds that propositions and
concepts must be individuated more finely than reference
conditions. The familiar argument for this is that sameness
of reference conditions appears not to insure sameness of
content. On widespread assumptions, foL example, it is
logically impossible for the following two mental
representations to differ in reference:
Belief Bl: that checkerboards are squares.
Belief B2: that checkerboards are equilateral, right-angled
polygons with a number of sides equal to the cube
root of sixty-four.
No matter what way the world is, either both are true or
neither are, so they have the same reference conditions.
Despite this, there is clear intuitive resistance to the idea
that B1 and B2 are the same belief.
In ordinary cases, we are careful to distinguish B1 from
B2. We suppose that people without mathematical training do
not have belief B2, even if they do have belief B1. And we
suppose that someone could have B2 even if they did not have
Bl, say, if they failed to realize that equilateral,
right-angled, blahblahblahs are squares. Since reference
conditions are not individuated finely enough to reflect these
differences among mental states, some philosophers have sought
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more finely individuated entities which do reflect these
differences. The results are versions of what I will call
"fine-grained" theories of content--theories according to
which representations can differ in content even though they
have the same reference condition, as this notion is normally
construed (see, for example, Lewis, 1972; Evans, 1982;
Cresswell, 1985). These theories are opposed, naturally, to
"coarse-grained" theories according to which representations
have the same content if they have the same reference
condition (the theory that contents are reference conditions
is, of course, one such theory)."
Intuitively, we have some idea of the respect in which the
two beliefs differ: they are somehow "structured" out of
different ideas." There is some temptation to read this as
'"I am not pretending that the reflections motivating fine-grained
theories suff ice to eliminate coarse-grained theories of content. To save
a coarse-grained theory--e.g., to maintain the identification of content
with reference conditions--one option is to insist that beliefs such as
B1 and B2 do have the same content, but differ with respect to some other
dimension. I will have a little to say in section 2.2.1 about why the
sorts of differences among mental states exemplified here may legitimately
be reflected in content. For now, however, I am willing simply to assume
and develop a fine-grained theory, for the sake of expressing the puzzle
presented by connectionism. Of course, this dispute about what should and
should not count as part of content may in the end be no more than a
terminological issue, or else one to be finessed by adopting the
verificationist's trick of treating the word "content" as referring
ambiguously to various "kinds" of content.
"It is possible to adopt a fine-grained theory of content without
appealing to a notion of senmantic structure (Block, 1986). Such a view
would not be faced with the connectionist puzzle to be described below.
I will give fleeting attention to the view in section 2.3.2.
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a claimn about the syntactic structure of the physical
representations which help to realize the attitudes and
ideas--i.e., as the claim that these representations stand in
literal whole/part relations. However, the claim is best
taken as one about semantic structure, where this is to be
explained in a nonsyntactic fashion. The reason is that it
seems possible for there to be syntactically simple
representations--ones without other representations as parts--
which nonetheless are "structured" in the relevant sense. One
way for this to happen is for a syntactically simple
representation to be introduced as an "abbreviation" of a
syntactically complex representation. It is best, then, to
look for a nonsyntactic way of explaining semantic structure.
Philosophers sympathetic to fine-grained theories
standardly express the difference between the two beliefs
about checkerboards as follows: one can't have belief B2
unless one has ideas of cube roots, polygons, etc., but one
can have belief B1 even without having these ideas. In other
words, the two beliefs are in some sense dependent on the
availability of different mental representations.
Intuitively, the latter belief, unlike the former one, depends
on the availability of a representation with the content being
a square root, for instance. Also intuitively, it should be
possible for a representation to depend on representations
which are not its parts, perhaps as a building "depends" on
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the ground below it. Therefore, dependence may be a first
step toward understanding the notion of semantic structure
without relying on claims of syntactic structure.
Of course, these intuitive appeals are no substitute for a
philosophical account of what it is for one representation to
be dependent on another, in the relevant sense. Although the
connectionist puzzle for fine-grained theories is somewhat
independent of the particular account adopted, it is necessary
to have one on the table in order to describe the puzzle.
Perhaps the foremost task of an account of dependence is that
of avoiding a certain extremely "holistic" conclusion. Much
of human inference appears to be holistic, in the sense that
virtually any two premises can be combined in some rational
inference or other. Given this sort of psychological holism,
(virtually) every representation is such that its "functional
role" depends on (virtually) every other representation
(available to the thinker). The functional role of belief B1
that checkerboards are squares depends, in this way, on
whether or not the thinker has representations for Aristotle,
for being polygonal, etc. If this is the relevant kind of
dependence, then fine-grained theories cannot distinguish
representations (such as the two beliefs about checkerboards)
in terms of their dependence relations. They would depend on
the same set of representations, namely, (virtually) every
one .
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As a first step towards avoiding this result, I want to try
to get clearer about what it is about a representation r which
must be dependent on the availability of other
representations, in order for r to be semantically structured.
While psychological holism might show that some facts about
a representation--such as its functional role--are dependent
on (virtually) every other representation, it may be possible
to identify some content-relevant facts which are not subject
to extreme holism. A natural idea is that r is semantically
structured iff r's content (rather than its functional role)
is dependent on that of representations with other contents.
Since semantic structure is taken to be a determinant of
content, this is indeed a claim which the fine-grained
theorist wants to make. However, given that the fine-grained
theorist is trying to explain content (at least partially) in
terms of semantic structure, it is circular to explain
semantic structure in terms of content. In specifying the
relata of the relevant dependence relation, the fine-grained
theorist needs to specify facts which, though relevant to
content, are identifiable independently of content. Here the
most natural strategy is to appeal to reference conditions."
"Carnap's (1947) notion of intensional isomorphism also embodies
dependence relations among reference conditions (i.e., his "intensions").
Similar positions are defended by Lewis (1972) and Cresswell (1985). In
section 2.3 I will attempt to develop a mrretaphysical account of contents
which is different from the account offered by these later authors.
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On fine-grained theories, although reference conditions are
clearly relevant to content, one can specify a
representation's reference condition independently of its
content. How might this suggestion be spelled out so as to
avoid the holism problem?
There is one preliminary to spelling out this suggestion.
While the fine-grained theories under consideration maintain
that the reference condition of a semantically structured
mental representation r depends on the subject's having some
or other representation with a different reference condition
C, they do not necessarily maintain (and probably should not
maintain) that r's reference condition depends on the
availability of any particular token representation with
reference condition C. It will help, then, to introduce a
notation for grouping representations according to their
reference condition. If a mental representation has reference
condition C (whatever C may be), call it an C-referrer. The
suggestion on behalf of fine-grained theories, then, is that
a thinker's mental representation r is semantically structured
out of C-referrers iff r's reference condition is dependent
on some C-referrer or other's being available to the thinker.
In this case, I will say that the representation is
"semantically dependent" on C-referrers. On the fine-grained
theories I will consider, the content of a representation not
only reriects its own reference condition, but also reflects
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the reference conditions of other representations on which its
reference condition depends.
As for holism, while the precise functional role of a
representation may depend on that of (virtually) every other
representation, its reference condition may depend on that of
only a restricted set of other representations. We can
display this possibility more clearly by explaining the
relevant kind of dependence in terms of a certain kind of
counterfactual claim. In speaking of a representation r's
reference condition as being dependent on C-referrers, I mean:
were the C-referrers actually available to the thinker to have
a different reference condition, then (as a result) r would
have a different reference condition (holding fixed the actual
functional relations between r and these C-referrers).
Imagine someone with a mental representation BI, the
realization of a belief that checkerboards are square.
Suppose he also has available to him mental representations
for checkerboards, for being square, for Aristotle, and for
being polygonal. Intuitively, if the checkerboard-referrers
or the squareness-referrers were to have different reference
conditions--=.-., by b~lng the effect of different perceptual
states, of different phenomena in the world, etc.--then
(holding fixed the functional relations between these
representations and Bl) B1 would also have a different
reference condition. However, intuitively, even if the
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Aristotle-referrers and the polygonality-referrers were to
have different reference conditions, B1 might still have the
same reference condition (holding fixed any functional
relations between B1 and these representations).
Of course, these intuitive assessments of the
counterfactuals might not be borne out by a proper
philosophical theory of reference conditions: a theory which
determines which particular representations have which
particular reference conditions. Philosophers differ over
what factors help to determine the reference conditions of a
representation--its covariation with certain conditions, its
functional role, its adaptational role, etc. This is a widely
discussed and widely open question which would take
considerable resources to address properly. I will not even
begin to do so here, since the question does not appear
relevant to the choice between fine-grained and coarse-grained
theories of content. Defenders of coarse-grained theories
have to address this question as well, since they, too, use
the notion of reference conditions in understanding content.
What I am concerned to show As that, contrary to a common
opinion, holism does not raise more of a problem for
fine-grained theories than it does for coarse-grained
theories.
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Suppose that (contrary to intuitive judgements) reference
conditions turn out to be subject to an extreme holism, in
that which reference condition a given representation has
depends on which reference conditions (virtually) every other
representation has. If so, then reference conditions would
themselves be "fine-grained" in the sense which matters to
defenders of fine-grained theories. For example, suppose that
Bl--a belief intuitively specified as the belief that
checkerboards are squares--is held by someone without special
mathematical training, and that B2--a belief intuitively
specified as the belief that checkerboards are equilateral,
right-angled polygons with a number of sides equal to the cube
root of sixty-four--is held by someone with special
mathematical training. If reference conditions are holistic,
then (contrary to intuitive appearances) these beliefs have
different reference conditions, as fine-grained theories would
have it. On the other hand, if reference conditions are not
subject to extreme holism, then we can make fine-grained
distinctions among the two beliefs ii, terms of which
representations their reference conditions depend on.so
"OAlthough I have tried to sketch a particular strategy for avoiding
the extremely holistic conclusion, it is enough for my present purposes
simply to proceed on the assumption that there is some way of doing so.
Neither the connectionist puzzle nor my solution to it depends on the
particular strategy adopted.
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To avoid extreme holism is not yet to claim that there can
be simple representations, i.e., representations which are not
semantically dependent on representations with other reference
conditions. Even if a representation does not depend on every
other representation, every representation might still depend
semantically on some other representations. Every
representation might be part of some (small or middle-nized)
circle of mutually dependent representations, which would make
a sort of "local holism" true. Perhaps the simplest
representations are not, for this reason, absolutely simple.
The connectionist puzzle arises independently of whether or
not a fine-grained theory is committed to (absolutely) simple
representations. It also arises independently of which sorts
of representations are thought to be "simplest". Are some
ideas in cognitively central systems (such as "checker" and
"board") as simple as representations get, or are they in turn
semantically structured out of representations in cognitively
peripheral systems (e.g., the initial stages of vision)?"
n"There may be some question as to how "central" and even partially
"theoretical" ideas such as those referring to boards (or to caterpillars,
or to quarks) could turn out to be simple, given their functional
dependencies on peripheral and observational symbols. The reason they can
(at least in principle) be simple is that their reference conditions might
not depend on the reference conditions of particular types of peripheral
symbols, whe'e these types are individuated according to reference
condition. $uppose a thinker's mental symbol "board" is triqgered in part
by certain symbols in his visual system which respond to rectangles
presented under certain conditions. Even if these symbols were to have
a different reference condition--e.g., even if they were to respond to
circles instead of rectangles--it could be that "board" would have the
same reference condition, if it has sufficiently strong causal connections
to other, independently triggered, symbols (such as those responding to
certain kinds of tactile pressure, or certain kinds of spoken
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Since in presenting and addressing the puzzle I will mainly
use examples of extremely "peripheral" connectionist
representations, I will leave open this question about
"central" representations."
To frame the connectionist puzzle, the most important point
about semantic structure (however it is ultimately to be
construed) is its relevance to content ascriptions. In the
previous section, I described a coarse-grained theory which
claims that when we identify the content of a representation
r by using an English phrase or sentence e, we commit
ourselves to the claim that r has the same reference
conditions as e. On the most natural development of the
present fine-grained theory, we commit ourselves to more than
sameness of reference conditions. We also commit ourselves
to the claim that r and e have the same semantic structure--
i.e., that r's reference condition semantically depends on the
availability of representations with the same reference
conditions as those on which e's reference condition depends.6"
For example, suppose '"A B C'" is a syntactically complexý
communications from other people). (Again, this intuitive result might
or might not be borne out by a philosophical theory of reference
conditions.)
"Eventually, I will also have to say something about iwhat sorts of
entities propositions and concepts are, on the fine-grained theory (see
section 2.3).
"At least, this is so when re m an to speak strictly. See footnote
56.
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sentence which is semantically dependent (only) on the
representations "A", "B", and "C"." Then for rto have the
content that A B C, not only must r have the reference
condition of "A B C", but this fact must depend (only) on
representations with the same reference conditions as "A",
"B", and "C". On this account, even if the sentences "A B C"
and "D E F" have the same reference conditions, the belief
that A B C and the belief that D E F might have different
contents.
2.1.3 The Puzzle
Fortunately, the puzzle which connectionism presents for
fine-grained theories of content can be described without
focusing on intricate details of connectionist networks. We
can display the problem by returning to the interactive
activation model of reading (see section 0.2.1).." If nodes
in connectionist networks are to be genuine representations,
they must have semantic contents. For example, consider a
particular node in the reading model, a feature node f the
role of which is to become activated as a result of visual
"I am not using these letters as variables ranging over English
formlae; rather, for purposes of illustration I am pretending that they
are English formulae, arbitrarily chosen.
"'I will use examples of local representations to drive the
discussion, although I will indicate the respects in which the points
generalize to distributed representations.
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presentations, in word-initial position, of shapes like that
of the top half of a circle, such as form the top of the
letters "C", "G", "O", "Q", and "S". If f is a
representation, it must have content, and a natural idea is
that it has the content that a top-half-of-a-circle-shaped
figure is being visually presented in word-initial position.
What does it mean to say that f has this content? Well, on
the coarse-grained theory of content presented in section
2.1.1, it means that f has (at least nearly) the same
reference conditions as the English sentence "A
top-half-of-a-circle-shaped figure is being visually presented
in word-initial position". Call this sentence e. Then, on
the coarse-grained theory, the claim is that sentence e and
node f are true (or "veridical", or "faithful to the input",
etc.) under the same conditions. The situation is quite
different for fine-grained theories, however.
On any fine-grained theory, specifying reference conditions
is not sufficient for specifying content, since two
representations may differ in content even if they share
reference conditions. Furthermore, on any fine-grained
theory, even if the English sentence e does adequately express
the reference conditions of the feature node f, it is
completely inappropriate to take e seriously as a
specification of f's content. On the fine-grained conception
of content ascriptions I mentioned in the previous section,
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to say that f has the content that a
top-hal f-of -a-circl e -shaped fi gure is being visual ly presented
in word-initial position is (at least) to say that f is
semantically dependent on representations for halfness,
circularity, etc. However, f is simply triggered by an array
of visual stimulations, independently of the influence of
general knowledge about halfness, circularity, etc. In fact,
the interactive-activation model has no knowledge of circles
at all, and does not in any sense have a representation for
being a circle. Therefore, on the fine-grained theory, f
can't represent presented figures as being
top-half-of-a-circle-shaped. Of course, it might simply be
suggested that we have misidentified the content of f. To
avoid wrongly attributing ideas of being half, being a circle,
etc, we might even draw what we mean, saying that f represents
visually presented figures in word-initial position as being
'-shaped. But this still leaves the problem. The revised
suggestion is that f has the content that a A-shaped figure
is being visually presented in word-initial position. Even
this content ascription requires the system to represent the
(rather sophisticated) general concepts of shape, vision, etc.
How can f have this content if the system lacks
representations of these concepts? And if we can't take such
ascriptions seriously, what ascriptions can we take seriously?
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A defender of a fine-grained theory might simply respond
that there aren't any ascriptions which we can take seriously.
If verificationism is correct, it ight follow from this
response that such nodes have no content at all. Since it is
established practice in cognitive science to treat such nodes
as represcntations, however, this conclusion would weigh
heavily against fine-grained theories of content. Even if
verificationism is incorrect, and no such strong conclusion
follows, the resulting notion of content would be unsuitable
in connectionist theorizingy If there aren't any fine-grained
ascriptions which we can take seriously, then there aren't any
descriptions or generalizations involving fine-grained
contents which we can take seriously, at least where certain
individual nodes are concerned. This situation would be an
embarrassment to any philosopher who has sympathy with the
project of developing a notion of content which is suitable
for use in cognitive science. To fulfill this project, it
might seem that we need to abandon fine-grained theories in
favor of coarse-grained theories, at least in the case of the
troublesome connectionist representations. I hope to show how
a fine-grained theorist can solve the connectionist puzzle
without conceding ground in this fashion."
'Similar worries have appeared in other guises in philosophy, so the
present puzzle may be better understood once these connections are drawn.
I have in mind Donald Davidson's worries about content ascriptions to
non-human animals, and Stephen Stich's worries about content ascriptions
to small children and the mentally infirm (Davidson, 1984; Stich, 1984).
While we have some inclination to treat animals of other species as having
thoughts, we are easily persuaded that our content ascriptions are
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It is possible that a defender of a fine-grained theory
would show no surprise at the unavailability of serious
content ascriptions for connectionist nodes such as feature
nodes in the interactive-activation model. This might be
explained by appeal to a familiar theoretical constrnct of
fine-grdAined theories, namely, simple concepts. On many
fine-grained theories of content, propositions are complexes
of concepts, and these concepts are, in turn, either simple
or else themselves complexes of simpler concepts. Opinions
differ about which concepts are the simple ones. Some think
many syntactically simple words in natural languages--words
such as "caterpillar" and "board"--express simple concepts.
Others think that simple concepts are expressed only by more
purely observational representations, such as might be
involved in early visual processing. We can abstract away
inaccurate. It is natural to suppose that a dog is capable of thinking
that the person who normally feeds it is nearby. But at best, this
specifies the reference condition of the thought, not its fine-grained
content--is it so natural to suppose that the dog also has ideas of
personhood, or of normality? Further attempts to hone in on the content
by making substitutions for "person" and "normally" only makL the problem
worse, eventually appealing to general ideas of perception, or time, etc.
As Stich emphasizes, the situation is the same for a child or a severely
mentally handicapped person--consider their apparent thoughts about the
people who normally feed them, and the bulk of their other thoughts. Both
Davidson and Stich favor the conclusion that these apparent thoughts have
no contents at all, except perhaps as a matter of our conventions. Even
if we resist this extreme conclusion, however, the fine-grained theories
under consideration are in the embarrassing situation of being unable to
specify the content of the thoughts. My solution to the connectionist
puzzle will also apply to these problems, although I won't trace out the
connect ions.
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from such disagreements of detail to isolate a relevant
feature which is supposed to be shared by all representations
which express simple concepts.
In ascribing content to such a representation, often the
best we can do is to describe the referents of the
representation. However, in doing so we generate the same
kind of puzzle as that generated by the connectionist nodes:
we normally employ concepts which need not be expressed by
someone who grasps the target concept. Suppose, for
illustration purposes only, that "caterpillar" in fact
expresses a simple concept. If asked to say what
"caterpillar" means, we might say that it picks out some furry
worm-like animals which turn into butterflies. Given
fine-grained strictures on content ascription, however, this
would not be a serious specification of the concept expressed
by "caterpillar", since (we are supposing) a representation
could express that concept even in the absence of
representations for worm, animal, butterfly, and so on. In
such a case, the best we can do by way of a serious
specification of fine-grained content is to repeat the
representation: hence those inclined to think of "caterpillar"
as expressing a simple concept often identify this concept as
"the concept caterpillar". Given that at least some
fine-grained theories are already prepared to countenance
simple concepts, this device might be used to account for the
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similar difficulties arising with respect to representations
in early perceptual processing. (In fact, even someone who
does not think that high-level representations such as
"caterpillar" express simple concepts might be tempted to
accept this idea for some nodes in connectionist models of
low-level perceptual processing.)
The problem with this strategy is that some--in fact,
most--contentful nodes in connectionist networks are
interpreted propositionally. This precludes the general
strategy of attributing to individual nodes the sorts of
contents--namely, simple concepts--which some assume to be
possessed by familiar syntactically simple words. If we are
to find precedents for individual nodes with propositional
content, we must look elsewhere. There are familiar
syntactically simple representations which are propositional,
as Robert Cummins notices:
[I t is perfectly obvious that a symbol can have a
propositional content--can have a proposition as its
proper interpretation--even though it has no syntax and
is not part of a language-like system of symbols. Paul
Revere's lanterns are a simple case in point. (Cummins,
1989, p. 18)
Examples of propositional but syntactically simple symbols
which are parts of public language are the words "Mayday" and
"Roger", familiar from telecommunications, or the symbol "p",
which might in a particular logical notation br used to mean
that Paris is pretty. Even without assuming that all public
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symbols semantically depend on mental representations,
however, it is at least intuitively plausible that all of
these symbols are semantically dependent on other
representations (whether mental or linguistic) in a way which
reflects our complex specifications of t..ir content.
Intuitively, if Paul Revere's word "land" (or corresponding
idea) had referred to helicopters, then the flashing of a
single lantern would have been true if and only if the British
soldiers were moving by helicopter, rather than by land
(holding fixed the functional relations between his word and
the lanterns, including in particular those which resulted
from his conventions). As far as I know, every propositional
representation in natural language--or in any form of public
communication, for that matter--is semantically dependent on
other representations in a similar fashion. This is the sense
in which the commitment to connectionist nodes which are
propositional without standing in semantic dependence
relations is without obvious precedent. The philosophical
challenge for fine-grained theories is to show how it is
possible for syntactically simple representations without
semantic dependencies to be propositional, or else to show why
this is impossible.67
"The challenge is made more important by the fact that it is not
restricted to individual nodes in connectionist networks. Many other
connectionist models treat groups of nodes as symbols, but also do not
admit of syntactic complexity or any similar relation of semantic
dependence. Symbols in these models give rise to the same difficulty.
Also, given that the puzzle arises from lack of semantic dependence, we
can see why many features of connectionist networks are irrelevant. For
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2.2 Simple Propositions
To meet this challenge, I want to show how a fine-grained
theory of content can appeal to simple propositions. This can
and should be done without prejudging the issue of which
particular representations (if any) express simple
propositions, just as we can abstract from disagreements over
which representations (if any) express simple concepts (see
section 2.1.2). If some propositions are simple, presumably
this is because they share certain features with those
concepts which are simple. A natural idea, given fine-grained
theories' appeal to semantic dependence, is that simple
concepts are those which may be represented by representations
without semantic dependence on other representations. To
return to an example from the previous section, it is
sometimes held that "caterpillar" can mean caterpillar even
if it were to become dissociated from other concepts such as
animal, butterfly, and so on. Perhaps there are no other
representations in particular on which the reference condition
of "caterpil2ar" semantically depends. If so (and we are only
example, their being "hardwired" drops out. The problem would arise in
the same way for models of cognition which, for example, postulated tiny
people who read (only) syntactically simple symbols off of tiny monitors,
compare them with similar patterns--rules?--in tiny library books, and
write new ones onto the monitors according to what they find in the books.
Most of the discussion, therefore, will be applicable not only to
connectionist nodes but also to any symbols which appear to be
propositional despite the lack of semantic-dependency relations.
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imagining this for sake of illustration), on the present
theory, this would mean that "caterpillar" has as content a
simple concept. I suggest that we extend this general idea
to the case of propositions, so that simple propositions are
those which may be represented by representations which do not
semantically depend on any representations with other
contents. On this account, any connectionist node or other
representation which satisfies this condition represents a
simple proposition (again, the question of which ones do and
which ones don't depends on the operative notion of semantic
dependence) ."
Although this idea is simple to state, it must be defended
against several objections. Providing this defense will
occupy me in this part of the chapter. My first aim is to
show that simple propositions are consistent with the
distinction between propositions and concepts (section 2.2.1).
Then I want to distinguish the present proposal from one based
on de re attributions of content (section 2.2.2). Finally,
I will try to show how simple propositions can be represented
explicitly by connectionist nodes (section 2.2.3),
"Toward the end of this section I will show how to extend a similar
treatment to nodes which, though not genuinely simple (due to their
involvement in local holisms), also give rise to the puzzle for
fine-grained theories.
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2.2.1 Propositions and Concepts
One potential worry about countenancing simple propositions
is that doing so threatens the distinction between
propositions and concepts. While not much seems to have been
written about the distinction, it is at least initially
plausible that propositions are to be distinguished from
concepts by virtue of distinctive facts about their structure.
If some propositions are taken to be simple, then, what would
distinguish them from simple concepts? I will approach this
question indirectly, by asking the question: which
representations are supposed to have propositional content,
and which representations are supposed to have merely
conceptual content? It is easy to distinguish propositional
representations from merely conceptual representations, case
by case. The belief that Paris is pretty--or the wish that
it were--has propositional content. By contrast, the idea of
Paris, or of being pretty, has merely conceptual content. It
is more difficult to formulate a semantically interesting
principle by which the cases are to be distinguished.
A first stab at it is to say that propositional mental
representations are those, like beliefs, which have a truth
value (truth, falsity, and, if possible, undefined truth
value). However, there are other sorts of propositional
mental representations--desires, emotions, etc.--which have
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no truth value. To cover these cases, one might try to use
some more general notion instead of truth value, such as
"success value": beliefs are successful if true, desires if
satisfied, joy if appropriate, etc. It might then be said
that propositional representations are those with success
values. Without some principle of generalization from truth
to success, however, this suggestion leaves unclear why the
"reference values" of ideas aren't also success values: why
isn't the idea of Paris successful since it refers to an
existing object, and the idea of Atlantis unsuccessful since
it fails to refer to one? A different suggestion might be
that propositional representations are (or at least purport
to be) about facts, as opposed to mere objects and properties.
This also is inadequate. The idea of my favorite fact does
purport to be about a fact; however, it is not a propositional
representation but instead a conceptual one.
It is a striking fact that ideas are the only apparent
examples of merely conceptual mental :=cpresentations.
However, it would not be correct simply to say that ideas have
conceptual content while other mental representations--the
propositional attitudes--have propositional content. As I
argued in section 0.1.2, representationalism is committed to
the existence of propositional ideas (and what I called
propositional "symbols"--for present purposes these can be
lumped with ideas). Nevertheless, by first characterizing the
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difference between attitudes and ideas, as I will show, we can
go on to distinguish propositional ideas from merely
conceptual ideas. So the strategy I adopt will be undertaken
in two steps.
As I suggested in section 0.1.2, propositional attitudes
are those mental representations which, unlike ideas,
standardly function as units of reasoning. Such
representations have rationality values, i.e., degrees of
rationality or irrationality, which can influence the
rationality values of other representations or actions, or at
least be influenced by other representations or perceptions.
A belief that Paris is pretty--or a wish that it were--has a
rationality value. By contrast, a mere idea of Paris--or of
prettiness or the present time--is neither rational nor
irrational. Nor is a propositional idea (e.g., that Paris is
pretty) itself rational or irrational. It is hard to see how
it could have a rationality value, since (by
representationalism) it plays the same role in the belief that
Paris is pretty that it does in the doubt that Paris is
pretty, the same role in the hope that Paris is pretty that
it does in the fear that Paris is pretty. Beyond drawing this
connection between propositional attitudes and rationality
values, I have very little to say about the proper conception
of rationality values. I imagine that, at a minimum, having
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rationality values is corequisite with having a role as a
(potential) premise or conclusion of inference.""00
"'What is less clear is whether there is any way to distinguish
inferential relations from non-inferential relations among symbols (e.g.,
association of ideas), short of appealing to the rationality values of the
symbols. Nevertheless, and incidentally, we can use these ideas to defend
the claim that some symbolic nodes in connectionist networks have
propositional contents, rather than merely conceptual contents. This
claim does not rest solely on the (legitimate enough) grounds that it is
established scientific practice to interpret nodes propositionally. If
a node is thought to be a symbol at all, it must have either propositional
content or merely conceptual content. Now, suppose I am right that if a
symbol has a rationality value, or figures as a premise or conclusion of
inference, then it has propositional content. Therefore, if connectionist
networks are to fulfill their appointed task of helping to explain certain
rationally evaluable mental processes--e.g., the "tacit inference"
involved in perception--they must contain some units of reasoning, i.e.,
some propositional symbols. Therefore, the only way for all symbolic
nodes to be merely conceptual would be for them to conmbine to form
propositional symbols. Not any methods of combination will do, however:
just as not all collections of words are sentences, so not all collections
of conceptual symbols are propositional symbols. A nmechanism of syntactic
combination, or something close, seems to be required. However, many
connectionist models do not contain suitable mechanisms of combination.
Given this, at least some of the nodes in these models rmust have
propositional content if they are to be symbols at all.
'OIncidentally, the present conception of the difference between
propositions and concepts can be used by defenders of fine-grained
theories to respond to a certain kind of objection on behalf of
coarse-grained theories. A defender of a coarse-grained theory can
reasonably ask why features of functional role--such as those which
distinguish the two beliefs about checkerboards in section 2.1.2--should
be reflected in content. After all, not every difference in inferential
role counts as a difference in content. For example, the inferential role
of a belief may change as it becomes more strongly held, but its content
does not. Nevertheless, there are things which can be said in defense of
considering functional role as being relevant to content. For one thing,
some elements of functional role are already built into content, even on
coarse-grained theories. Suppose my account of the difference between
propositional symbols and merely conrcepual bsyzolS is even rOighly .right.
If so, then the very difference between having propositional content and
having merely conceptual content tracks a rather irmportant difference In
functional role: only symbols with propositional content have rationality
values at all, so only they can figure as premises or conclusions of
rational inference. Given this, there can be no general prohibition
against building into content differences in functional role.
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On, then, to the second step: distinguishing propositional
ideas from merely conceptual ones. Here we can simply say
that propositional ideas are those ideas which help to realize
propositional attitudes without combining with other ideas.
An idea that Paris is pretty, taken alone (i.e., without other
ideas), can help to realize a propositional attitude (e.g.,
the belief that Paris is pretty). But an idea of Paris--or
of prettiness, or my favorite fact--must cooperate with other
ideas to realize a propositional attitude.
These results can easily be turned into an account of the
difference between concepts and propositions which is fully
compatible with the postulation of simple propositions.
Propositions are those contents which are possessed either by
representations (e.g., beliefs) with rationality values, or
else by representations (i.e., propositional ideas or
propositional symbols) which taken alone can help to realize
them. Concepts are those contents which are possessed by
representations (e.g., ideas) which must cooperate with other
ideas to realize representations with rationality values.
This is, I submit, all that is essential to a content's being
a proposition rather than a concept, or a concept rather than
a proposition. In particular, structure is inessential to the
distinction. Since we can draw this distinction (at least in
theory) even in the case of simple contents, we can postulate
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simple propositions while maintaining a distinction between
them and simple concepts.
2.2.2 Simple Propositions and De Re 7Actribution
Another potential worry about countenancing simple
propositions is that doing so would introduce an element of
coarse-grainedness into fine-grained theories. A natural
question to ask is: if there are simple propositions, how are
they to be expressed? Any that-clause we use will
misleadingly commit us to postulating semantic dependencies
where there are none. Recall the example of the
interactive-activation model of reading, and in particular the
feature node f (see section 2.1.3). One temptation was to say
that f has as content the proposition that a
top-half-of -a -circle-shaped figure is being visually presented
in word-initial position. The trouble is that this
erroneously attributes to the network representations which
represent the concepts of being a half, of vision, etc. While
it is possible to use such that-clauses along with
disclaimers--e.g., "I hereby disavow the offensive commitments
which normally attach to the claims I am making"--there is
something vaguely dissatisfying about doing so.
One way to express this dissatisfaction is with the
following question: what is the difference between using a
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complex that-clause along with a disclaimer, and simply
engaging in what philosophers call de re attribution? Even
defenders of fine-grained theories admit that there are some
cases of content attribution for which reference conditions
are all that are relevant. Suppose, for example, that you and
I are making dessert in my kitchen, and I think to tell you
about my mother's belief that sugar is bad for the teeth.
Pointing to the sugar jar, I might say "You, know, Mom thinks
the stuff in this jar is bad for the teeth". Since I know
that my Mom has never even heard of the jar I am pointing to,
however, I only intend my content ascription as a de rz
specification of the reference conditions of her thought.
Similarly, someone can use the apparatus of de re attribution
to describe the feature node f as "mearing that a
top-half-of-a-circle-shaped figure is being visually presented
in word-initial position". Since defenders of fine-grained
theories do not take de re attributions seriously as
specifications of content, however, this would not be taken
as a genuine answer to the question: what is f's content? But
by the same token, the postulation of simple propositions may
seem to add nothing to the arsenal of fine-grained theories
if we cannot express them without invoking de re disclaimers.
It may well be impossible for us to express simple
propositions with ordinary complex that-clauses. But this
would not prevent us from specifying or describing such a
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proposition, simply as the (unique) simple proposition
associated with such-and-such reference condition. This
strategy is importantly different from employing de re
attribution. It will help us to see the difference if we
employ a notational device for shortening this sort of
specification to take the form of a that-clause, while marking
disclaimers of normal commitments to semantic dependence.
As I mentioned in section 2.1.2, saying that a
representation r has the content that A B C normally carries
the implication that r is semantically dependent on
representations with contents A, B, and C." To bracket this
implication, we might bracket the representations used to
specify the content. Thus, we might say that a representation
r has as content the simple proposition that [A B C]. This
would mean that r has the reference conditions of "A B C",
without having the same content, i.e., without having the same
set of semantic dependencies. To return to the feature-node
example, we can express the content of f by saying that it
means that [a top-half-of-a-circle-shaped figure is being
visually presented in word-initial position]. This is merely
a notational shorthand for saying that f has as content the
proposition specified by (i) the reference condition of "a
top-half-of-a-circle-shaped figure is being presented in
71 As before, I am pretending that "A", "B", and "C" are English
forrrmulae, rather than treating them as variables ranging over English
formrrulae.
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word-initial position" and (ii) the null set of semantic
dependencies .2
The brackets do signify a sort of attribution similar to de
re attribution, in the sense that expressions with the same
reference conditions may be substituted within brackets
without a change in attributed content. However, such
attributions differ from de re attributions in an important
way: rather than signifying that r has some content or other
associated with the reference conditions of "A B C", the
brackets signify that r has a quite specific such content,
namely, the unique simple one. Unlike ordinary de re
attributions, therefore, we can take such attributions
seriously, and literally, as precise specifications of
fine-grained content. Moreover, the content so specified is
genuinely fine-grained. It is true that any two
representations with simple content have the same content if
and only if they have the same reference condition. This is
not a violation of fine-grainedness, however, since it does
not mean that every pair of representations with the same
reference condition have the same content. In particular,
iepresentations with simple contents do not have the same
"The proposed reference condition of f is intended simply as an
illustration. The claim being illustrated is conpatible with any of the
main philosophical theories of reference conditions, which may assign
different reference conditions to symbols such as f. The present claim
may be put as follows: whatever the reference condition of f, the content
of f is the simple proposition associated with that reference condition.
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content as representations with complex contents.
contrast, countenancing simple propositions furthers the aims
motivating fine-grained theories of content. Doing so
increases fine-grainedness, by increasing the stock of
contents which may be specified."
2.2.3 Explicit Content
There is another objection available to someone who wishes
to deny the existence, or at least the utility, of simple
propositions. It is reasonable to require that, to be a
"Given the bracketing convention, and the theoretical apparatus for
which it is a shorthand, we are equipped to deal with symbols which
exhibit the connectionist puzzle, but which are not absolutely sinvle
(perhaps because they enter into a locally holistic circle of symbols).
We can use the bracketing convention to describe the content of many such
symbols, specifying propositions which are not absolutely sirrple, but
which nevertheless are not expressed by an unbracketed that-clause. To
do this, we might place brackets around only part of a
content-specification, saying for instance that a symbol s has as content
the proposition that [A BI C. Sirnce "C" is unbracketed, this means that
s does depend on a symbol with the satie content as "C", and so is not
absolutely simple. However, it nweans that s does not share the
dependencies of "A B", namely, dependencies on symbols with the same
content as "A" and "B"1 . Instead, it would miean that a depends on a symbol
with the same reference condition (but not the same content) as "A B".
In the same vein, we might attribute the content that [A B] [C], where the
brackets around "C" signify that s depends on a symtol with the same
reference condition as "C", but does not also depend on the symbols which
"C" depends on. (In all these cases, as usual, it is being said that s
has the reference condition of "A B C".) This strategy of using the
bracketing convention may not always be applicable, since there may not
always be a specification of a symbol's reference condition which admits
of a pattern of bracketing reflecting the symbol's systematic
dependencies, In these cases, however, * can always resort to a direct
listing of these dependencies.
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representation, an entity must have a content explicitly."
For a simple proposition to be the content of a connectionist
node, then, sense must be made of the notion of representing
such propositions explicitly. On some views, this is not
possible. Dan Dennett, for example, has suggested that
syntactic complexity is necessary for explicit representation:
Let us say that information" is represented explicitly
in a system . 4 . only if there actually exists in the
functionally relevant place in the system a physically
structured object, a formula or string or tokening of
some members of a system (or "language") of elements for
which there is a semantics or interpretation . ..
(Dennett, 1987, p. 216)
If Dennett is right, then there can be no connectionist nodes
which represent propositions explicitly. But that would mean
that fine-grained theories, even with simple propositions,
fail to furnish a conception of content suitable for (many)
cognitive scientific models.
Although I admit that Dennett's view is seductive, I think
it is a mistake. The best way to see this is to focus on the
role of the word "explicit". What does it serve to exclude?
Since its clearest opposite is "implicit", we can begin by
"Sometimes, it is said that symbols themselves must be explicit.
As natural as this sounds, however, it involves a category mistake, at
best, "Explicit" is properly used to describe the relation between a
syrmbol and its content. It makes sense to ask whether a symbol represents
a proposition explicitly or only implicitly; but it makes no sense to say,
strictly and literally, that a symbol is explicit, just as it makes no
sense to say that a symbol itself is implicit.
"By "information", I suppose, Dennett means something similar to
possible conditions (as vell as, perhaps, impossible ones).
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getting a grip on that notion.
implicitness admirably in the next paragraph: "for information
to be expressed implicitly, we shall mean that it is implied
logically by something that is stored explicitly" (Dennett,
1987, p. 216)." This definition has more plausibility; unlike
his definition of "explicit", it might have been lifted
straight out of any dictionary."
So where's the problem for Dennett's requirement of
syntactic complexity? The problem is that there is no
appropriate connection between syntactic complexity and the
explicit/implicit distinction. There is an appearance of a
connection, and this appearance probably explains the initial
seductiveness of the requirement, but the appearance is
illusory. Specifically, it might appear that syntactic
complexity is necessary for there to be a distinction between
7~What is it for some information--some potential condition--to be
"implied logically" by other information--another potential condition?
It is, I suppose, for it to be logically necessary for the first condition
to hold given that the second one does.
"More generally, there are the various forms of what Cummins, 1989,
calls "inexplicit" content. There are two varieties. First, there are
conditions which are logically necessary given explicitly represented
conditions plus some other conditions (e.g., facts about the domain).
Second, there are conditions which are logically necesrary given only
conditions not represented explicitly (e.g., the state of control, the
form of the representation, or the medium of representation),
independently of what is explicitly represented. Since my subsequent
remarks about implicit content will depend only on the notion of logical
necessity comrrmon to all of these types of inexplicit content, my remarks
can easily be expanded to take these into account.
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Dennett characterizes
explicit and implicit content. Consider the following train
of thought:
It is easy to see that the syntactically complex
expression "Paris is pretty" explicitly represents the
fact that Paris is pretty, since the parts of the
expression match up with the objects and properties
participating in the fact. It is easy to see that it
only implicitly represents the fact that there is at
least one pretty object, since the parts don't match up
in the same way. The situation is quite different for
syntactically simple representations. How could there
be an explicit/implicit distinction for these?
The proper response is: easily. All that is needed for a
representation to have some content explicitly and others
implicitly is for it to have content at all.
Suppose that one (explicit or implicit) content of a
connectionist node is that [one is seeing shape SI.
Interestingly, no matter whether this content is explicitly
or implicitly represented, it follows that there are other
contents which are merely implicitly represented: that
[someone is seeing shape SI, that [one is seeing or smelling
some shape], and so on. We know that these contents are
merely implicitly represented, because they are less specific
than another (implicit or explicit) content of the
representation."' This suggests that an explicit content of
a propositional representation is a content which is maximally
specific (relative to its other contents). This is why the
"A content 61 is less specific than another content C2 iff the
condition specified by CL is logically necessitated by the condition
specified by C2, but not vice versa.
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sentence "Paris is pretty" explicitly represents the fact that
Paris is pretty but only implicitly represents the fact there
is at least one pretty object. Although this accLunt would
undoubtedly have to be sharpened for technical reasons, I have
said enough for us to see why it is preferable to Dennett's
account in terms of syntactic complexity. The specificity
account is potentially applicable in a uniform manner to any
representation, including individual connectionist nodes, and
makes manifest the relationship between explicitness and
implication. The syntactic complexity requirement on explicit
representation fails on both of these scores, and should not
be enforced. There is no reason, then, 'Thy simple
propositions cannot be represented explicitly.
2.2.4 Summary
Since simple propositions are unfamiliar, it is necessary
to motivate belief in them. How should this be done?
Consider an analogous case from arithmetic, namely, the
"discovery" of the number zero, or of the negative numbers.
Suppose we meet someone who is familiar only with the positive
numbers, and we want to convince him that zero is a number.
To motivate the belief that zero is in the running to be a
genuine number, it would presumably be necessary to show that
it would be "continuous" with the recognized numbers, in that
it would share enough of their important features and
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relations. To motivate the belief that zero exists,
furthermore, it would presumably be necessary to show that
this belief serves a useful arithmetical purpose. I suppose
that belief in simple propositions can be motivated in an
analogous way--by showing that they are continuous with
familiar fine-grained propositions, and that they serve a
useful semantic purpose.
I hope it is clear in what important respects simple
propositions are continuous with other more familiar
fine-grained contents. Like other contents, these
propositions are individuated by associated reference
conditions, by a set of associated commitments to semantic
dependence relations (in this case, the null set), and by the
presence of rationality values (to determine whether a content
is a concept or a proposition). Like other contents, they may
be explicitly represented. Furthermore, simple propositions
may themselves be presupposed by other, more complex contents:
for example, if one representation has the content that [A B
C] and another representation has the content that [D E F],
a suitable syntactic combination of the two representations
might have the content that [A B C] and [D E F].1 ' Finally,
"This is an advantage of the present theory over any atterrmpt to draw
Gareth Evans' intuitive distinction between "conceptual content" and
"nonconceptual content" (Evans, 1983). If it were true that connectionist
nodes had contents of a "new", nonconceptual, kind, it would be mysterious
how these contents could figure in contents of the "old", conceptually
structured, kind.
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postulating simple propositions furthers the aims motivating
fine-grained theories of content.
While these are reasons for considering simple
propositions, specified as I have specified them, to be in the
running to be contents, more reason may be demanded for
postulating them in the first place. It seems to me that we
have as much reason to postulate simple propositions as we
have to postulate more familiar fine-grained contents; the
main reason is that these contents figure in
cognitive-scientific explanations. I suppose that
connectionist nodes without semantic dependencies--more
generally, but more roughly, all syntactically simple
representations which are not abbreviations--have simple
contents. Since simple propositions may serve as contents of
connectionist nodes, and since such representations seem to
be required by research programs which show some promise of
yielding true theories of at least some cognitive phenomena,
good methodology dictates that we should believe in simple
propositions, if we want a fine-grained theory of content at
all.
2.3 Toward a Naturalized Fine-Grained Theory
In this final section of the chapter, I would like to
address the question of what sorts of entities we are
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committing ourselves to when we commit ourselves to
fine-grained propositions and concepts which admit of degrees
of complexity. First I give a rough description of what I
take to be the standard conception of such contents, namely
as mathematical trees of a certain sort (section 2.3.1). Then
I attempt to express some rather elusive metaphysical worries
about such a view (section 2.3.2). Finally, I present an
alternative account according to which contents and
propositions are certain sorts of properties of
representations (section 2.3.3). I hasten to express my
belief that the conclusions reached in sections 2.1 and 2.2
in no way depend upon the metaphysical conclusions in this
section.
2.3.1 Contents as Set-Theoretic Objects
On fine-grained theories of content, as I have described
them, propositions and concepts cannot be identified with
reference conditions. Instead, they must be identified with
entities which admit of degrees of complexity, to reflect the
semantic-dependence relations among representations. What
precisely might these entities be? The relation between
complex contents and simpler contents is most naturally
treated as an abstract correlative to the relation between
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wholes and parts, perhaps the relation between (mathematical)
trees and subtrees."
Although there are different ways to pursue this idea, to
a first approximation a content C might be taken to be a tree
structure whose nodes are "filled" by reference conditions.
The reference condition at the root node would be the
reference condition of representations with content C. If C
is a simple concept or proposition, then the tree consists
only of the root node. If C is a complex concept or
proposition, however, the root node has descendant nodes. In
this case, the relation of ancestry in the tree corresponds
to the relation of semantic dependence: every node in the tree
is be filled with a reference condition such that representing
C requires semantic dependence on representations with that
reference condition. Since some dependencies are mediated by
others (e.g., "checkerboards are square" depends on "boards"
only through depending on "checkerboards"), some nodes would
be mediate descendants of the root, others immediate
descendants.
The entire structure would then be reduced, in the way of
mathematical trees generally, to complex set-theoretic objects
"sSee Lewis (1972) and Cresswell (1985) for illustrations of the tree
theory. These authors credit Carnap (1947) with inspiration for their
views, although I am not sure that Carnap would have much sympathy with
the search for objects to identify with contents.
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whose members, ultimately, are the reference conditions which
fill the nodes of the tree. Contents, on this view, simply
are such set-theoretic trees. To have a handy name, then, I
will call this version of the fine-grained theory the "tree
theory" of content.
2.3.2 Some Metaphysical Worries
Metaphysical worries form one source of resistance to the
tree theory, although these worries are very difficult to pin
down. We can certainly imagine philosophers who would object
to the tree theory on the grounds that it postulates abstract
entities. However, such philosophers would object equally to
a coarse-grained theory of content which postulates reference
conditions. Like trees, reference conditions are supposed to
be abstract objects. They are possible ways for the world to
be; in other words, they are properties which may or may not
be instantiated by the world. For the purposes of choosing
between the tree theory and the coarse-grained theory, then,
we can ignore this metaphysical worry.
A more subtle worry arises in its place, however. In
section 2.1.1, I described my assumption that contents are
used in cognitive science to specify mental representations
and to express generalizations about the functional roles of
these representations. Along with a smattering of
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philosophers, I am inclined to go one step further, assuming
that cognitive science appeals to the content of mental
representations not only to express generalizations about
functional role, but also to provide causal explanations of
these generalizations." Crudely put, then, I am interested
in conceptions of content which at least leave open the
possibility that content has causal powers. Given this, there
is a tension between the tree theory and a certain general
naturalistic conception of the sorts of things which have
causal powers.
Although a fair amount of mystery surrounds the notion of
causation itself, we can take as relatively unproblematic the
notion of a concrete (i.e., "physical") object's having causal
powers. Intuitively, a concrete object has causal powers just
in case some fact about the object has causes or effects.
Furthermore, there are developing theories which seek to
explain how (first-order and higher-order) properties of (and
relations among) concrete objects, despite being abstract,
play a role in natural laws, and in natural-world cause-effect
relations." By comparison, we have no understanding of how
"Incidentally, this provides a source of resistance to fine-grained
theories of content which simply specify contents in terms of functional
role (see, for example, Block, 1986). By building a symbol's functional
role Into the specification of its content, such theories remove the
possibility of causal laws which help explain functional role in terms of
content.
"2See Dretske (1977), Tooley (1989), and Armstrong (1983).
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set-theoretic objects play any sort of causal role. Sets are
not standardly thought to be concrete objects, and they are
not standardly thought to be properties or relations (of
whatever order) involving concrete objects. Set-theoretic
descriptions can, of course, be used to classify causally
active objects, properties, and facts, but this is not the
same as the sets' being causally active. If contents are
set-theoretic objects, then, it is unclear that there is any
room for them to have genuine causal powers, and so unclear
that they can underwrite causal explanations in virtue of
content ."
A final metaphysical worry about the tree theory is that it
is in a crucial respect stipulative. Given a fine-grained
theory of content, there are many different families of
mathematical tree structures which can equally effectively be
identified with contents. Furthermore, there are many equally
effective ways to reduce mathematical trees to sets. Given
this, it is natural to wonder which of the many suitable
set-theoretic objects is identical to a given content. While
"Although some properties have causal powers, the situation for the
tree theory is not improved by focusing on a symbol's (alleged) property
of having a particular tree as content. It is only (nth-order) properties
and relations involving physical objects which lend themselves to our
naturalistic understanding of causality. If there are such entities as
sets and trees, presumably their properties do not have causal powers any
more than they themselves do. In particular, relations between symbols
and trees, such as the "expression" relation postulated by the tree
theory, would be causally inert.
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it is true that this question may be brushed aside with a
stipulation, we should in a naturalistic spirit favor a theory
which gives an objective answer to the question of what
contents are."
2.3.3 Cnntents as Properties
I think that a more defensible fine-grained theory of
content can be developed, one which treats propositions and
concepts not as set-theoretic trees but as properties,
properties which are (potentially, anyway) causally active.
Which properties are supposed to be identified with
propositions and concepts? I want to identify contents with
certain properties of representations. Before discussing
which properties of representations I mean, it is best to
describe in general terms how this strategy is supposed to
"David Lewis raises this as an objection to his own tree theory:
It may be disturbing that in our explication of meanings [as
set-theoretic trees] we have made arbitrary choices . . .. Meanings
are meanings--how can we choose to construct them in one way rather
than another? The objection is a general objection to set-theoretic
constructions, so I will not reply to it here. But if it troubles
you, you may prefer to say that real meanings are sui generis
entities and that the constructs I call 'meanings' do duty for real
meanings because there is a natural one-to-one correspondence
between them and the real meanings. (Lewis, 1972, p. 201)
The objection does bother me, although in the next section I try to do
better than postulating sui generis contents.
Incidentally, the "general objection" to set-theoretic identifications
which Lewis mentions was first cast by Paul Benacerraf (1965) against the
theory that numbers are sets of a certain sort. I think that my treatment
of contents has an analog for numbers, although I am not yet prepared to
defend such a treatment.
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work. On a view of content common to the tree theory and most
coarse-grained theories, concepts and propositions are thought
to be objects related to representations, typically by the
expression relation. An alternative is that contents are
types of representations--in particular, semantic types. Any
token object belongs to many types: my desk is a token of the
type of thing made of wood, the type of thing I own, tne type
of thing in Massachusetts, and so on. To say this is simply
to say that any token object has many properties: my desk has
the property of being made of wood, the property of being
owned by me, the property of being in Massachusetts, and so
on. Indeed, the natural view is that types are properties.
On the view I propose, then, when we say that a representation
has a certain content, we are saying that the representation
belongs to a certain semantic type, or, what is the same
thing, that the representation has a certain property. This
is what enables the identification of contents with properties
of representations. In turn, this will enable a fine-grained
theory to avoid the metaphysical worries associated with
set-theoretic objects, and to leave room for a genuine role
for content in causal explanations. "
"By identifying contents withproperties, or types, of symbols, we
go some way toward adjudicating certain theoretical differences between
philosophers and psychologists. Philosophers, by and large, think of
concepts and propositions as abstract objects, while psychologists often
think of concepts and propositions as concrete, mental representations.
On the rare occasions when one side chooses to admit the sensibility of
the other side's conception, it is normally supposed that the other side
"means a different thing". However, we can unify both conceptions in a
sensible way. Since concepts and propositions are types, they are,
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If we identify the content of a representation with the
property of having a certain reference condition,
unfortunately, the result is a coarse-grained theory of
content. Nevertheless, as I explained in section 2.1.1,
reference conditions do fulfill some of the constraints on
contents, and so it is appealing to identify contents with
properties which are specified at least partially in terms of
reference conditions. We can come near enough to a complete
specification by exploiting the semantic dependence
requirement, as I described it in section 2.1.2. This yields
the following first approximation (which, coincidentally and
thankfully, is also my final approximation):
A referential representation's content is its property of
(1i) having a certain reference condition, and
(ii) being such that were representations with certain
other reference conditions not to be present, then
it would have a different reference condition.
Ignoring subtleties," a content is fully specified once the
reference contditions in (i) and (ii) are specified. Simple
propositions and concepts, naturally enough, are thuse
properties specified by the null set of reference conditions
in (ii).
strictly speaking, abstract. But since they are types of symbols, we can
at least speak of mental representations as instances or tokens of
concepts and propositions. Concept tokens and proposition tokens are
psychological entities in people's heads in precisely the same (useful)
sense that ord tokens and sentence tokens are on pieces of paper, even
though word, sentence, concept, and proposition types are ab~cract.
"For exauple, a third clause is needed to distinguish properties
which are propositions from those which are concepts (see section 2.2.1).
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Chapter 3
FRAMING THE FRAME PROBLEM
The upshot of the previous chapter is that it is possible
for associationist connectionist networks to have
propositional representations, and so, at least potentially,
to implement propositional attitudes. This is a good thing,
since I am interested in the fate of such networks as models
of certain kinds of inferential processes: namely, the rapid,
holistically sensitive inferential processes which seem
characteristic of skillful activity (see sections 0.1.3 and
0.2.3). As I described in chapter 1, such associationist
networks are subject to severe computational limitations,
including the inability to support skill transfer through
ceneral rules which introduce and bind variables. These
computational limitations do not rule associationist models
out of court, however, for it may be that the infercntial
mechanisms which ultimately distinguish experts from novices
have the same computational limitations. In effect, it may
be that the generality provided by variable-binding is
sacrificed for increased speed and specialization at
well-practiced tasks (see Agre, 1989, for arguments to this
effect).
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On the other hand, perhaps the inferential mechanisms
characteristic of expertise do require devices such as
variable-binding (see Anderson, 1983; Singley and Anderson,
1989). If so, it appears, we would need to use classical
models to implement rapid, holistically sensitive inference.
As I mentioned in section 0.2.3, one worry for doing so is
that it is difficult to see how processes which function in
a classical fashion--e.g., by "matching" syntactically complex
symbols, binding variables, and the like--can access large
numbers of representations rapidly, given that these processes
must be implemented with slow neurons. Unless something can
be done to mitigate this problem, there is a danger that no
classical models (and so, by process of elimination, no
cognitive-scientific models) will be able to account for
expertise--including the everyday skills which surely account
for most of what we do (for arguments to this effect, see
Dreyfus, 1979; Oreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Haugeland, 1982;
Searle, 1986; Preston, 1988).
What can be done about this difficulty? For one thing,
there is some room for hope that connectionist implementations
of classical models will help to increase the number of
representations which can be accessed in a short amount of
time (e.g., through massive parallelism). In this chapter,
I would like to pursue a complementary strategy, namely, that
of searching for computational techniques which reduce the
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number of representations which need to be accessed in
implementing particular inferential processes. Call these
"relieving", techniques. With luck, a combination of relieving
techniques can sufficiently reduce the computational burden
of humanly possible inferential tasks so that they can be
implemented by classical models with (say) neural processors."
To drive the search for relieving techniques, I want to
address three specific problems for cognitive science which
philosophers have posed under the name of the "frame problem".
This term originated in artificial intelligence (AI) research
(McCarthy and Hayes, 1969), and so philosophers interested in
the frame problem have normally directed their attention to
this discipline. I will follow this practice, although at a
number of places I will indicate relevait implications for
cognitive science generally. My first aim is to characterize
the original frame problem, so that it may be compared to the
philosopher's problems.
"We needn't find techniques which insure that a small enoug , urden
is associated with arbitrary inferential tasks. Since the ultimate
objective is to solve part of the mental-brain problem, we need only
consider inferential tasks which humans can perform. In particular, for
those inferential tasks which are specified in environmental terms (e.g.,
the task of inferring one's location with respect to objects in the
environment, given one's previous location and one's movements), we need
only consider environments in which humans can succeed (e.g., fairly
stable environments in which the objects themselves do not move
unpredictably).
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3.1 Persistence and the Frame Problem
3.1.1 A Fable
Once upon a time there was a causation-computer, named C2
by its creators. Its only taisk was to read about simple
events and to report their likely effects, in as much detail
as it could. One day its designers arranged for it to learn
that a bomb was in a room, resting on a wagon, and that the
wagon was pulled through the doorway. C2 quickly reached the
obvious conclusion that the bomb rode out of the room.
"CONTRADICTIONI" it printed, to the surprise of its teachers.
"THE BOMB WAS BOTH IN AND OUT OF THE ROOM. CONTRADICTIONI
CONTRA"--they were forced to unplug it. Poor C2 could not
understand that the time at which the bomb was out of the room
was different from the time at which it was in the room.
Back to the drawing board. "The solution is obvious", said
the designers. "Since states may change from one moment to
the next, our next computer must represent the particular
moments at which they obtain." They called their next model,
the chronological-causation-computer, C3. C3 was told that
the bomb was on the wagon at tl, and that the wagon was pulled
a moment later, at t2. Then the programmers put it to the
test:
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"Tell us as much as you can about the effects at t3."
"THE WAGON. WAS OUT OF THE ROOM AT t3."
"Anything else? Did anything happen to the bomb?"
"I DON'T KNOW. WHERE WAS IT WHEN THE WAGON WAS PULLED?"
"We just told you it was on the wagon, you tin ninnyi"
"SURE, IT WAS THERE AT tl, BUT MAYBE THAT CHANGED BY t2."
Further questioning confirmed the worst: they had neglected
to teach C3 how to tell which changeable facts persisted from
one time to the next. "What color is the wagon?" "I DON'T
KNOW--MAYBE IT CHANGED BECAUSE THE WAGON WAS PULLED." "What
is your name?" "I DON'T KNOW--IT WAS 'C31 BEFORE YOU TOLD ME
ABOUT THE ROOM." After a few more questions, mercifully,
someone pulled the plug.
Back to the drawing board. "We might try giving it 'frame
axioms'", said the designers, "which put a border around the
effects of an event." They soon realized that this was
hopeless, however, since the number of frame axioms would
mushroom. They would have to teach their next model that
reading about a wagon does not change its color, that pulling
a wagon does not change one's name or change the number of
pink elephants in the world, and so on. This presented the
"frame problem": how to design a system which could, unlike
C3, infer the persistence of nonchanges, but which could do
so automatically--that is, without explicitly storing or
accessing frame axioms for them.
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Before long, the programmers discovered various ways for a
system to infer automatically the persistence of nonchanges.
Their favorite was the suggestion that representations of
facts should refer not to particular moments but to time
intervals. Thus was born a chronological-causation-computer-
for-persistence, named C3P. C3P was given the same problem
that had stumped C3. When C3P learned that the bomb was on
the wagon at tl, it generated this internal representation:
R: THE BOMB IS ON THE WAGON FROM tl ONWARD.
R did not need to be updated with each passing moment to
handle persistence, since R itself meant that the bomb was on
the wagon at t2, t3, and so on. This allowed C3P, unlike C3,
to infer the bomb's motion, when it was told that the wagon
was pulled at t2. The programmers also gave C3P the ability
to "snip" representations such as R, by representing finite
intervals. For example, when C3P learned that the bomb was
taken off the wayon at t100, it substituted "TO t99" for
"ONWARD" in R. As a result of all of this, C3P was able
genuinely to ignore facts that it took to be unchanged by a
given event, focusing only on purported changes. Since there
was no longer a need for storing and accessing frame axioms,
the designers of C3P were satisfied that they had solved the
frame problem.
All was calm, all was bright, until one night three wise
men arrived from the East. C3P received no homage from them,
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however--much less any expensive gifts. The first wise man
deemed the frame problem "a new, deep epistemological problem"
which "whatever it is, is certainly not solved yet". The
second wise man intensified the point, suggesting that the
frame problem is "foisted on unsuspecting epistemology by
misguided presumptions underlying AI as a discipline."
Needless to say, the programmers found this completely
mystifying. "You may suppose that you have solved the frame
problem," explained the third wise man, "but in fact you are
begging it. How could the depth, beauty, and urgency of the
frame problem have been so widely misperceived?" In answer
to his own question, he pronounced, "It's like the ancient
doctrine of the music of the spheres. If you can't hear it,
that's because it's everywhere." Satisfied that their hosts
were completely at a loss for words, the wise men bid them
farewell. As they left, the first wise man turned and issued
the ominous warning, "If there is ever to be a robot with the
fabled perspicacity and real-time adroitness of C3P0,
robot-designers must solve the frame problem.""
"I have transcribed the words of the three wise men from the reports
of Daniel Dennett (whose original "R2D2" fable is the model for mine),
John Haugeland, and Jerry Fodor, respectively (Dennett 1987, pp. 42-43;
Haugeland 1987, p. 93; Fodor 1987, p. 142).
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3.1.2 Persistence and Sleeping Dogs
The frame problem as it is most commonly construed in Al
was first described and named by John McCarthy and Pat Hayes
(1969). These authors were interested in exploring a certain
formalism for reasoning about change, called the 'situation
calculus'. In the situation calculus, changeable facts are
represented as being relative to particular moments of time,
as in the chronological-causation-computer, C3. The facts
which are represented as obtaining at a given moment are said
to constitute a 'situation'. Given that an event E occurs in
a situation S, and that certain surrounding conditions hold
in S, the system's task is to calculate what is true in the
next situation, S+t. It does so by applying conditional
rule-symbols which describe purported effects of E-like
events, given that certain facts ub)tain in S. McCarthy and
Hayes called these rule-symbols "axioms", although these
symbols needn't be unsupported or irrefutable.
McCarthy and Hayes discovered, though presumably not the
hard way, that the situation calculus deals with nonchanges
very inefficiently. Such a system makes no inferences abouL
what is true in situations unless these inferences are
sanctioned by axioms. Consequently, a system needs axioms
relating each event of which it has an idea (e.g., E) to each
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changeable fact of which it has an idea. This is true even
of facts which are not (purported to be) changed by a given
event. These "frame axioms" have (to a near enough
approximation) the form: "if E occurs in S and F is true in
S, then F is true in StI". Without such an axiom, the system
would not infer that F persists, as illustrated by C3 in the
fable. It is difficult to see how inferential processes whrch
access huge numbers of frame axioms could be implemented (in
brains or in known computers) without serious degradations in
speed. For this reason, McCarthy and Hayes posed what they
called the "frame problem": how can the persistence of
nonchanges be inferred without accessing frame axioms? In
order to minimize confusion with other problems (to be
discussed) which have come to be called the "frame problem",
I will adopt the more descriptive term "persistence problem"
for this original frame problem (see Shoham 1988).
The standard strategy for solving the persistence problem
has usefully been labeled the "sleeping-dog strategy"."
According to the sleeping-dog strategy, instead of using frame
axioms a system should assume by default that a fact persists,
unless there is an axiom specifying that it is changed by an
occurring event (given existing conditions). In this way,
"The strategy originated in Fikes and Nilsson, 1971, and has since
appeared in a number of more sophisticated guises, e.g., Shoham, 1988.
The term is due to Haugeland, 1987.
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given that an event E occurs in situation s, the system can
use axioms to infer new facts existing in S3+1, and then simply
"copy" the remainder of its beliefs about S over to SI1. In
turn, the copying process can be avoided by abandoning the
framework of momentary situations, in favor of that of
extended time intervals, as illustrated in C3P. If a
representation specifies a fact as holdinr over an interval
of _ime, then the representation need not be accessed at all
unless an axiom of change becomes applicable to it (Shoham,
1988). By modifying both the situations and the calculations
of the situation calculus, the sleeping-dog strategy allows
the persistence of facts to be inferred "automatically", that
is, without accessing representations of the facts. A system
can let sleeping representations lie, unless there is a
positive reason to wake them.
The sleeping-dog strategy is a relieving technique, in the
sense defined at the beginning of the chapter, and so it
appears valuable for purposes of developing classical models
which can implement rapid, holistically sensitive inference.'0
""Jim Higginbotham has suggested to me that the sleeping-dog strategy
is a special case of a more general strategy which is applicable, for
exanple, in the following sort of case. Imagine an agent who is placed
on a disk which rotates at a constant speed, and who (for whatever reason)
has to keep track of certain of his momentary, egocentrically-specified
relations to objects which are off the disk and out of sight. Since these
relations change continuously, the agent has continuous "positive reason"
to access and update his corresponding representations. But since these
relations change predictably, the system can euploy a regular procedure
for these updates. In this case, the system can adopt a
"sleeping-procedure strategy": don't consider changing the procedure
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Although the sleeping-dog strategy seems to reduce
computational burden of virtually any task in reasoning about
change, it does not by itself serve to "relieve" the suspicion
that the burden associated with humanly feasible inferential
tasks is too large to be implemented in brains by classical
models. Short of providing a complete model of human
cognition, there is not much which can be done to relieve this
suspicion. What we can do is examine the specific reasons
unless there is positive reason to do so. The sleeping-dog and
sleeping-procedure strategies might then be seen as special cases of the
nearly trivial "sleeping-thing strategy": don't consider changing anything
(e.g., one's wallpaper) unless there is a positive reason to do so.
While I think this is right, there is good reason to give special
attention to the sleeping-dog strategy (formulated as a principle
specifically governing the direct alteration of beliefs about changeable
facts). If we focus on the general sleeping-thing strategy, I think, we
remove the possibility of placing substantive constraints on what it is
to be a "positive" reason. In the general case, maybe a positive reason
to consider changing something is simply that one is in the mood to do so,
or, even more weakly, simply that one finds oneself about to do so. With
respect to the sleeping-dog strategy conceived in the standard way,
however, we can motivate at least a skeletal account of what it is for a
given computational system to have a positive reason for considering the
revision of a belief that p: perhaps the sort of system under
consideration must have an "axiom" whose antecedent is believed to be
satisfied, and whose consequent is that not-p. Furthermore, we can add
that the axiom should not be a frame axiom--that is, its antecedent should
not presuppose that not-p. This account can be elaborated by requiring
the "axiors" to have theoretical or observational support, to admit of
certain degrees of confidence, etc.
Furtherrrre, the sleeping-dog strategy has special interest as a
relieving technique, at least by comparison with the sleeping-procedure
strategy. Generally speaking, there are more representations (of
changeable facts) than there are procedures, so the sleeping-dog strategy
has greater potential for reducing conputational load. Indeed, the
sleeping-dog strategy has merit even in Higginbotham's spinning-disk
exanple. Although in this case it is possible that the agent mist
continually access and update a huge number of representations, without
the sleeping-dog strategy the agent would have to access and update an
even huger number of representations, e.g., about the unchanging but
changeable aspects of his situation.
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which have been given for this sort of suspicion, and attempt
to respond to them individually. Accordingly, the rest of
this chapter is devoted to an examination of three attempts
to display the frame problem as a deep, difficult problem:
Dennett's problem of ignoring obviously irrelevant knowledge,
Haugeland's problem of efficiently keeping track of salient
side effects of occurrences, and Fodor's problem of avoiding
the use of certain "kooky" concepts. Earn problem consists
of considerations which seem to threaten the project of
reducing the number of representations which inferential
processes need to access.
In a negative vein, I will argue that their problems bear
nothing but a superficial similarity to the original frame
problem of AI (see McCarthy and Hayes 1969). Of course, it
must be conceded that the terminological issue is unimportant.
(This is one reason for using the term "persistence problem"
for the original frame problem.) But the point is more than
terminological, for it weighs against the philosophers' use
of their frame problems to disparage the sleeping-dog
strategy. The primary negative claim of this chapter, then,
is that the sleeping-dog strategy is not susceptible to
criticism based on their new problems.
More positively, I will argue that their problems are
easily solved by slight variations on familiar AI themes.
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These solutions will take the form of various relieving
strategies, as desired. Finally, along the way I will devote
some discussion to more difficult problems confronting the
classical framework in AI and cognitive science. Although
these unsolved problems will, I think, require enormous effort
to overcome, understood properly they are not "principled"
problems in a certain relevant sense. Although they may (or
may not) lead one to suspect that cognitive scientists will
never actually provide a complete account of human cognition,
they do not lead one to doubt the partial accounts which may
(or may not) be provided. They are difficult problems for
cognitive science as a human 3ctivity, but not difficult
problems for cognitive science as a type of theory.
3.2 Relevance and the Frame Problem
3.2.1 The Relevance Problem
As I mentioned, my introductory fable is a twist on a fable
with which the first wise man, Daniel Dennett, introduces the
frame problem of AI (Dennett 1987, pp. 41-42). I will first
retell his tale, and then explain how it is misleading in this
role. The robots in Dennett's fable are charged with the task
of mentally testing a plan, given a goal to be reached and
some idea of the initial conditions under which the plan is
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to be exe:uted. Each of them comes complete with these three
states:
%: the goal of saving its spare battery from a live bomb.
I: knowledge of the initial conditions that the battery and
the bomb are on a wagon in a room.
P: the plan of pulling the wagon out of the room (to remove
the battery).
Plan testing also requires a fourth element, a set R of
"inference rules". To test a plan, one tries to find a
sequence of rules in R which allows the goal to be inferred
from the plan and the initial conditions. In other words, one
searches for an "inferential path" from the plan and the
initial conditions to the goal, one for which each step along
the way is sanctioned by an inference rule." Very roughly,
if such a path exists, the plan passes the test.
Dennett begins with a simple robot, RI, which can recognize
"the intended implications of its acts", but not "the
implications about their side effects". In other words, in
testing a plan, RI uses only inference rules which correspond
to intended effects of the plan. Since G is an intended
effect of P, of course, P passes Rl's test. So R1 proceeds
to pull the wagon out of the room, without recognizing the
tragic side effect due to the fact that the bomb is also on
the wagon. Back to the drawing board go the designers; out
"For a good introduction to the AI literature on "search", see
chapter II of Barr and Feigenbaum (eds.) 1981. The term "operators" is
standardly used for inference rules as iwell as other goal-reaching devices
which do not concern me here.
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pop•I the robot-deducer, RID1, which can test its plans for
side effects. It does so by removing i11 restrictions on
which inference rules and initial conditions it can consider
in testing a plan. As a result, in searching for an
inferential path from P to G it "deduces" everything it can:
that P "(does] not change the color of the room's walls", that
P "cause[s] (the wagon's] wheels to turn more revolutions than
there [are] wheels on the wagon", and so on. Booml
Therefore, the designers install in their next robot a method
for tagging implications as relevant or irrelevant to its
goals. They call the new model R2DI, the
robot-relevant-deducer. The relevance tags don't help,
however, since not only does R2DI waste time inferring all the
same irrelevant implications, but it also generates more
inferences to the effect that they are irrelevant. "All these
robots suffer from the frame problem," Dennett concludes. "If
there is ever to be a robot with the fabled perspicacity and
real-time adroitness of R2D2, robot-designers must solve the
frame problem".
R1D1 and R2D1 do seem to illustrate the original frame
problem--the petListence problem--since they engage in
explicit inferences about nonchanges such as the color of the
walls. The persistence problem requires one not to use frame
axioms to infer the persistence of nonchanges. My claim is
that a good dose of the sleeping-dog strategy would cure this
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ill, and I will argue for this claim throughout the course of
this chapter. However, these robots suffer from a further
problem which is not even addressed by the sleeping-dog
strategy: not only do they bother with the noneffects of their
plans, but they also bother with many genuine effects which
are obviously irrelevant to their goals, such as the number
of revolutions of the wagon's wheels. The extra problem
facing their programmers, then, is how to design systems which
test plans without bothering with obviously irrelevant
inferences.
This problem may be generalized in a straightforward way,
since there are otner kinds of goal-oriented searches besides
plan testing. In order to generate a plan, for example, one
may search for an inferential path from the initial conditions
to the goal which requires performing some actions. In order
to generate subgoals for a current goal, one may search for
an inferential path to the goal which requires that certain
subgoals be reached. From this general perspective, Dennett's
problem becomes that of designing a system which finds
inferential paths between initial conditions and goals without
considering inferences which "obviously" do not point in the
right direction. I will call this the "relevance problem".
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3.2.2 Relations to the Frame Problem of Al
Despite the similarities between the persistence and
relevance problems, it is something of a mystery why, in
Dennett's hands, the shift takes place. He seems to feel that
the original frame problem is merely an instance of the more
general relevance problem. Thus, he calls the relevance
problem a "broader" problem than the "narrowly conceived"
original frame problem (Dennett 1987, p. 43). Although this
may have some initial appeal, I think it should be resisted.
First, consider what Dennett can say in defense of the
claim that the persistence problem is an instance of the
relevance problem. A first attempt might be to argue that the
desirability of ignoring noneffects of an event follows from
the desirability of ignoring all irrelevant knowledge. The
situation is not so simple, however. Often, noneffects are
highly relevant to one's goals: in Dennett's fable, for
example, pulling the wagon does not change the fact that the
battery is on the wagon, and this is directly relevant to the
robot's goal. Therefore, the robot might need to access the
knowledge that the battery will stay on the wagon.
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Nevertheless, it is possible for Dennett to reply that,
even if noneffects are often relevant to a system's goals,
processing them with explicit frame axioms is irrelevant.
However, this substitution of "irrelevant processing" for
"irrelevant knowledge" forces an unwelcome shift in the
construal of the relevance problem. What is "irrelevant
processing" supposed to mean? Useless processing? But if a
robot needs to know about a certain (relevant) noneffect, a
corresponding frame axiom might be very useful in supplying
this knowledge. Of course, given that systems can use the
sleeping-dog strategy instead of frame axioms, the latter are
too costly. But being too costly is not the same as being
irrelevant. If it were, any problem about processing costs
would be a problem about irrelevant processing. On this view,
for example, electrical engineers debating the relative
processing virtues of various home computers would be
discussinc an "instance" of the relevance problem! But then
the relevance problem would no longer be Dennett's problem of
accessing useful knowledge at the right time. Therefore,
appealing to the irrelevance of processing noneffects fails
to show that the persistence problem is an instance of
Dennett's relevance problem.
There is a more direct reason not to assimilate the
persistence problem to the relevance problem. The persistence
problem arises completely independently of goals, planning,
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action, or problem-solving. It deals purely with causal
reasoning--keeping track of change. In my fable, C3 and
friends are "pure predictors"; the only "goal" they ever have
is to report as much as they can about the effects of an
event. As a result, every effect is "relevant" to them, and
no effect is irrelevant. Therefore, no instance of the
relevance problem can arise for pure predictors like C3; there
are no irrelevant effects to ignore. Since the persistence
problem is present in its full force for C3, it cannot be an
instance of the relevance problem. Nevertheless, the point
remains that if there are ever to be smart robots such as R2D2
and C3PO, the relevance problem must be solved.
3.2.3 The Role of Bidirectional Search
The task facing the plan-tester is, as I have described it,
that of searching for an inferential path from a plan and some
initial conditions to a goal. In this respect it is rather
like walking through a labyrinth, searching for an
unobstructed path from the entrance to the exit. Now, compare
three strategies for negotiating a labyrinth. First, there
is "forward search": starting at the entrance and walking
around (marking one's path, of course) until one happens upon
the exit. Second, there is "backward search": starting at the
exit, and trying to make one's way to the entrance. Third,
there is "bidirectional search": searching forward while a
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partner searches backward, until one finds a path marked by
the other. Bidirectional search is clearly the more efficient
strategy, in general (see Barr and Feigenbaum (eds.) 1981, pp.
46-53).
From this perspective, it appears that a major defect of
Dennett's robots is that they engage only in forward search.
His robots start with their plan P and initial conditions I
and keep making inferences from these (and from their
consequences, and so on) until they happen upon their goal G
(or its negation). As a result, they infer consequences more
or less at random, with respect to the goal, and so suffer
from the relevance problem. We can account for one aspect of
R2D2's fabled perspicacity and real-time adroitness if we
suppose that it uses bidirectional search instead. Supposing
this, bow would R2D2 test P?
We can imagine R2D2 first searching backward from G. The
procedure is to look at some inference rules of the form "IF
<condition>, THEN G", and to mark these conditions as
plausible parts of paths from P to G. (Recall that G is the
goal of saving the battery from the bomb.) This set of
inference rules is likely to refer to the condition that the
battery and the bomb are far apart, but is unlikely to refer
to conditions regarding the number of revolutions of a wagon's
175
wheel, or the color of the walls." So the locations of the
battery and bomb would be marked as "relevant" to G.
At this point, R2D2 can ask itself the question: what
happens to the whereabouts of the battery and bomb if I roll
the wagon out of the room? More precisely, R2D2 can let the
details of this question guide its forward search from this
plan. That is, instead of looking at all the rules of the
form "IF . . . A WAGON ROLLS . . ., THEN <consequence>", it
can look only at those with potential consequences for the
positions of batteries and bombs. Presumably, it finds
inference rules such as these:"
IF A WAGON ROLLS, AND x IS IN THE WAY,
THEN x IS PUSHED ALONG.
IF A WAGON ROLLS, AND x IS ON THE WAGON,
THEN x RIDES ALONG.
R2D2 therefore checks whether it believes that the battery and
bomb satisfy x in the antecedents of these rules. It finds
that, in fact, it does believe that the two are on the wagon,
so it infers that the two will ride along, and will not be far
apart. Finally, it infers that the battery will not be saved,
and can try to find a better plan based on what went wrong
with this one,
"As I explain in section 3.2.1, "relevance holism" creates a
difficulty here, but one which can be solved.
"I omit nuances such as the tenporal factors mentioned in the
introduction and the exceptions discussed in section 3.2.1.
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As I mentioned above, the relevance problem arises for
tasks other than plan testing, such as subgoal generation and
plan generation. Given that R2D2 can paint the wagon, draw
the drapes, or pace up and down the room, what keeps it from
considering these options in generating a plan to rescue its
battery? Bidirectional search does. R2D2 can search backward
from the goal, to find subgoals and actions most likely in
general to lead to the goal. It can then direct its forward
search from the initial conditions, to determine which of
these subgoals and actions are most likely to be suitable
under these conditions. Other subgoals and actions should be
considered only if none of these are suitable or if subsequent
plan testing rules them out.
Although bidirectional search is a relieving technique in
that it greatly reduces the number of representations which
need to be accessed in problem solving, it does not itself
bring these computational costs to a minimum. In my
illustration, I vaguely described R2D2 as looking at "some"
inference rules of the form "IF <condition>, THEN G". But
which? If it looks at them all, it is likely to bother with
many irrelevancies. I discuss this problem in the next
section, in connection with "relevance holism". First,
however, I want to discuss briefly another problem related to
the relevance problem.
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Although Dennett casts the relevance problem as a problem
about finding knowledge relevant to one's current goals, it
may be suspected that there is a deeper problem about how to
make the right goals current at the right times. However, I
am not aware of any attempts to show what the "problem" is.
We might suppose that some goals are always current in R2D2,
e.g., the goal of stayilg out of danger, and that some goals
are triggered by certain conditions, e.g., given that there
is a potential danger, R2D2 can generate the goal of finding
out if any valuables are in danger and removing them from the
danger. Once R2D2 learns that there is a live bomb in the
room (i.e., a potential danger), but that there is some time
to work with (so R2D2 itself is not yet in danger), R2D2 can
search for valuables near the bomb (i.e., in danger). We can
imagine that it can discover that the battery is near the bomb
either by quickly looking around the room, or else by being
told this, as in Dennett's fable. Consequently, it can
generate the goal of removing the danger and, as I have
described, it can generate and test plans to meet this goal.
3.3 Holism and the Frame Problem
3.3.1 The Holism Problem
The second wise man, Jothn Haugeland, construes the frame
problem as arising from the fact that inferential relations
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in the real world are holistic: what it is reasonable to infer
front a given condition may depend on many other "surrounding
conditions". First, virtually any inference can be warrant'ed
by virtually any condition, if the right surrounding
conditions hold. From the premise that a wagon is pulled, for
example, one may infer that a bomb moves (if there is one on
the wagon), that one pulls a muscle (it the load is heavy),
that the wheels will squeak (if they aren't oiled), that one
will please a coworker (if he has asked for the slab on the
wagon), and so on. Second, virtually any inference can fail
to be warranted by virtually any condition if the wrong
surrounding cinditIons hold. As Haugeland points out, there
are many possible situations in which pulling a wagon might
fail to make a bomb ride along, even though the bomb is on the
wagon:
But what if [the bomb) is also tied to the doorknob with
a string? Or what if, instead of [rolling], [the wagon]
tips over? (Haugeland 1987, p. 85)
This holism leads to Haugeland's problem:
The so called frame problem is how to 'notice' salient
(inferences) without having to eliminate all of the other
possibilities that might conceivably have occurred had
the facts somehow been different. (Haugeland 1985, p.
204)
In other words, the problem is to come up with an efficient
algorithm for respecting the fact that what may be inferred
from a given condition may depend on virtually any surrounding
condition. Such an algorithm would have to make tractable the
number of surrounding conditions a system must check, without
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blinding It to the "salient" ones. In order to distinguish
this problem from others that have gone by the name "frame
problem", I will refer to it as the "holism problem"."
The holism problem intensifies the relevance problem. My
illustration of bidirectional search in section 3.2.3 proceeds
under the assumption that the inference rules associated with
R2D2's goal of saving the battery from the bomb do not refer
to the precise number of revolutions of a wagon's wheel, or
the color of the walls, or any other "obviously" irrelevant
conditions. However, if the bomb is activated by the
squeaking of the wagon's wheels, the precise number of
revolutions of the wheels may be of crucial relevance. Even
the color of the walls may be relevant, if the room is painted
in such a way as to camouflage the door. As a result of this
holism, to deal with the real world R2D2 is likely to need
inference rules to handle these possibilities, raising the
combined "relevance-holism" problem: how can a system know
which knowledge is relevant to a goal in its particular
situation, without having to think about a vast number of
possibilities?
"In The Modularity of Mind, Fodor anticipates Haugeland's treatment
of the frame problem as a problem about holism. He writes that one of the
things that "makes [the frame] problem so hard" is that "which beliefs are
up for grabs depends intimately upon which actions are performed and upon
the context of the performances" (Fodor 1983, p. 114).
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3.3.2 Relations to the Frame Problem of AI
As Haugeland points out, the sleeping-dog strategy does not
provide a solution to the holism problem. But more than this
is needed to show that something is wrong with the
sleeping-dog strategy, of course. (Atter all, the
sleeping-dog strategy also "fails" to solve the problem of
world hunger.) Haugeland therefore makes a stronger claim,
to the effect that the sleeping-dog strategy raises the holism
problem. The sleeping-dog strategy requires there to be
"positive indications" to the effect that certain facts are
changed by an event, so that the system can focus only on
these facts. These positive indications are provided by
inference rules (e.g., the non-frame axioms of the situation
calculus). Therefore, he concludes, it is the sleeping-dog
strategy which "raises formidable design questions about how
to get the needed positive indications for all the important
[inferences]", i.e., the holism problem (Haugeland 1985, p.
206). On closer inspection, however, it is easy to see that
it's not the sleeping-dog strategy which raises the holism
problem; the problem arises for any system which has to make
inferences about the real world, whether or not it uses the
sleeping-dog strategy. For example, in my introductory fable
the computer C3 does not use the sleeping-dog strategy.
Nevertheless, of course, it must make inferences, and these
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inferences must be sensitive to salient surrounding
conditions, so it must face problems about inferential holism.
As a consequence, something more is needed to show that the
sleeping-dog strategy is inadequate for the problem it's
intended to solve, namely, the persistence problem. Perhaps
Haugeland's idea is that the persistence problem cannot be
solved without simultaneously solving the holism problem.
Since he does not even attempt to provide reasons for bringing
inferential holism into discussions of the frame problem,
there is room for speculation about why he is tempted to do
so. Perhaps the reasoning goes like this: to be a solution
to the persistence problem, a system must ignore the facts
which are not changed (by An event), so it must be able to
tell which facts are changed, so it must respect the holism
of change, and, more generally, the holism of inference. The
problem with this argument is fairly subtle; to display it I
must invoke a distinction between domain-general
"process-and-form" problems and domain-specific "content"
problems. I will devote more attention to this distinction
than may at first appear necessary, because it will prove to
be crucial later in this section, in my defense of a solution
to the holism problem.
Much research in AI proceeds on the assumption that there
is a difference between being well-informed and being smart.
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Being well-informed has to do, roughly, with the content of
onje's representations--about their truth and the range of
subjects they cover. Being smart, on the other hand, has to
do with one's ability to process these representations and
with packaging them in a form that allows them to be processed
efficiently. The main theoretical concern of artificial
intelligence research is to solve "process-and-form" problems:
problems with finding processes and representational formats
which can qualify a computer as being smart.
Of course, in jrder to build computers which can deal with
the real world, we must also solve "content" problems
involving figuring out which particular representations
computers should have, so that the computers qualify as being
well-informed about a variety of domains. It is neither
surprising nor worrisome that AI has not solved all these
content problems, for they are not, in the first instance,
AI's problems. One can make headway into process-and-form
problems In the AI laboratory, but to make headway into
content problems, one must incorporate empirical
investigations in particular domains ranging from medical
diagnosis to the mechanics of middle-sized objects to
sociology to chess to laundromats to train stations. These
investigations appear to demand enormous resources; if we
decide nut to alocste these resources, it may even be
impossible for AI to succeed at constructing intelligent and
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But this is a practical rather than
cincipled problem, in the specific sense that it does not
indicate that the classical AI framework is incorrect. It
seems a reasonable division of labor, then, for AI to pass
domain-specific bucks to domain-specific sciences. 9
Accordingly, the persistence problem is posed as a
domain-general process-and-form problem. In other words, it
is not about which particular facts a system should take to
be unchanged by which events. Consider again the frame axiom
proposal (see section 3.1). Frame axioms turned out to be a
bad idea, not because they didn't capture reliable information
about nonchanges (we may suppose that they did), but because
there were too many of them. The persistence problem
therefore arises regardless of how reliable or unreliable a
system is about which facts are unchanged. As a result, to
solve it all we need -to do is to design a system which has the
"'Couldn't we avoid having to gather all of this information for the
computers, by designing them to investigate the world for themselves as
children do? No, for two broad reasons. First, setting computers loose
in the world involves implanting them in robots; but we don't yet know how
to build robots which can see, feel, hear, hop, skip, and jump well enough
to cross a city street safely. Second, there is the "blank slate"
problem. It appears impossible to learn efficiently about a drmain unless
one already has somre reliable information about what sorts of data to
concentrate on, what sorts of hypotheses to try out, etc. Thus, building
robot learners requires endowing them with considerable domain-specific
innate knowledge, which requires us to engage in domain-specific
investigations after all. Add to this the explicit instruction (e.g.,
"book learning") which must be gathered and presented to children, and it
appears that a robot's need to be spoonfed extensive amounts of
domain-specific knowledge is unsurprising and rather human!.ike.
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well-informed systems.
capacity to ignore the facts which are not changed, if it
knows which facts really are unchanged.
It is this fact which shows that the holism problem does
not lurk behind the persistence problem. To be a solution to
the persistence problem, a system only needs to ignore the
facts it thinks are not changed by an event. But to do that,
the system needn't be able to tell which facts really are
changed. Since a solution to the persistence problem needn't
insure that systems are right about which facts are changed,
it needn't insure that systems have the capacity to keep track
of the holism of change. So the sleeping-dog strategy can
solve the persistence problem without solving the holism
problem. Of course, I am not denying that we need to solve
the holism problem in order to get intelligent machines that
can deal reliably with the real world. In the rest of this
section I focus on attempts in AI to solve this very problem.
The point here is merely that the fate of this problem is
irrelevant to the fats of the sleeping-dog strategy.
3.3.3 The Role of Heuristic Search
At root, the holism problem is this: for any set of
conditions one wishes to make inferences from, there are
always too many potentially applicable inference rules to
consider, rules which may require one to check virtually any
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surrounding conditions. Returning to the labyrinth analogy,
the problem is that, from any fork, there are so many paths
that one can't follow them all. If one knows nothing about
the particular labyrinth one is in, one must select a path
more or less at random. This is called "blind search" in AI.
However, in some cases one can use specific information about
the labyrinth to help one select the paths which are likely
to be the best to follow. This is called "heuristic search".
For example, one might know that the better paths in a certain
garden tend to be wider, while those in another tend to be
better lit. Such heuristics can help one to achieve better
results than blind search (see Barr and Feigenbaum (eds.)
1981, pp. 58-63).
Now, when a computer is searching for inferential paths, it
can use similar heuristics to avoid blindly checking every
inference rule. For example, associated with each inference
rule might be some measure of its general reliability. The
inference rule "IF A WAGON IS PULLED, IT ROLLS" might, for
instance, be deemed more reliable than "IF A WAGON IS PULLED,
THE COLOR OF THE WALLS CHANGES". In addition, or instead,
each inference rule might make reference to the antecedent
probability that it will "apply", that is, to the antecedent
probability of the surrounding conditions it presupposes.
Take the rule "IF A WAGON ROLLS, AND x IS ON THE WAGON, THEN
x RIDES ALONG". As Haugeland says, this rule can fail if x
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is tied to the doorknob, but then the antecedent probability
of such failure might be deemed to be very low.
Given some such metric, a computer can constrain searches
by looking initially only at the set of rules with the best
marks (the size of the set depends on how many rules can be
processed at the same time). It can thereby focus on the
rolling of the wagon rather than the potential change of color
of the walls, and it can assume "by default" that x is not
tied to the doorknob."*"' If this set doesn't get it where ilt
wants to go, it can try the next best set, and so on down the
"search hierarchy".
If one's special concern is re.3evance holism, one might
prefer (instead, or in addition) to use heuristicP regarding
"Occasionally, when the stakes are high, it may be advantageous for
a system to go into a more careful mode in which it avoids making some
default assumptions, explicitly checking the surrounding conditions
instead. I ignore this nicety here, since to the degree that a system
needs to be careful, the holism problem is made less important: if the
stakes are so high that a system needs explicitly to check surrounding
conditions, it can hardly be faulted for doing so.
"AI researchers have had mixed success in trying to develop a
"nonnonotonic logic" for reasoning with default assumptions (for a review
of this literature, see Shoham 1988). From the perspective adopted here,
however, default (or nonmonotonic) reasoning is an ordinary example of
heuristic search, which is generally thought not to require the
development of a corresponding "logic". This is one way of seeing that
we may not need nonronotonic logic (as opposed to nonmonotonic reasoning),
so that the shortcomings of nonmonotonic logics may not be important. If
some in AI have not appreciated this point, it is perhaps due to placing
too nuch emphasis on the distinction between heuristics and "epistemology"
(i.e., Inference) offered in McCarthy and Hayes 1969 (for an example of
this, see Janlert 1987, pp. 2-3).
187
the general usefulness of inference rules. For instance, the
rule "IF A WAGON ROLLS, AND x IS ON THE WAGON, THEN x RIDES
ALONG" may be deemed to be generally more useful than the rule
"IF A WAGON ROLLS, THEN THE NUMBER OF REVOLUTIONS OF ITS
WHEELS IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE DISTANCE". This may be so even
though the former is less reliable (since x might be tied to
the doorknob) and less likely to be applicable (since the
wagon might be empty)."
Although Haugeland doesn't discuss heuristics as an
approach to the holism problem, Jerry Fodor, the third wise
man, registers this complaint:
So far as I can tell, the usual assumption about the
frame problem in AI is that it is somehow to be solved
'heuristically'. . . . Perhaps a bundle of such
heuristics, properly coordinated and rapidly deployed,
would suffice to make the central processes of a robot
as [holistic] as yours, or mine, or the practicing
scientist's ever actually succeed in being. Since there
are, at present, no serious proposals about what
heuristics might belong to such a bundle, it seems hardly
worth arguing the point. (Fodor 1983, pp. '15-116)
Fodor appears to be insisting that the trouble with the idea
of heuristic search is that it raises the hard question: which
heuristics should be used to establish search hierarchies of
inference rules?
"A good illustration of this method is in Holland, et al. 1986.
Their "strength" parameters reflect the past usefulness of rules, and are
used to constrain search.
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It is unclear whether Fodor construes this as a
domain-general process-and-form problem or as a
domain-specific content problem. He seems to be asking for
a domain-general answer when he calls for a "principled
solution to the frame problem" (Fodor 1983, p. 116), although
he doesn't attempt to explain the difference between
principled and unprincipled solutions. Looked at this way,
however, "serious proposals" about heuristics are a dime a
dozen. I've just seriously proposed three principled
heuristics, regarding the general reliability of an inference
rule, its antecedent probability of applying, and its general
usefulness. Of course, these principles leave open the
various domain-specific problems about which inference rules
are generally more reliable for dealing with the real world
than which others, about which conditions in the real world
are antecedently more likely to hold than which others, and
about which inference rules are more likely to be useful than
which others. Perhaps, then, Fodor is referring to the
difficulty of these domain-specific "hierarchy problems".
How is a computer to establish the search hierarchies of
inference rules necessary to solve hierarchy problems? Well,
if we could set robots loose to gather data for themselves,
they could rely on their own past experience, experience of
which conditions have in fact obtained most often, or of which
inference rules have in fact been most reliable and useful.
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But, as I mentioned above, we are not currently able to do
this. Typically, then, a system must rely on the hierarchies
we program into it. Can Fodor argue that the solution to the
"frame problem" escapes our grasp by swinging away on this
loose end? After all, how do we know which hierarchies to
program into a reasoning system? Alas, for many domains, we
don't! Hierarchy problems are domain-specific content
problems; to solve them, we have to do a lot of science. In
this respect, hierarchy problems are no deeper than any other
content problems, say, the "pricu problem": how are computers
to know the prices of objects in the real world? Well, we've
got to tell them, since we can't very well turn them loose to
find out for themselves. And for us to know, we've got to
split up and do a lot of domain-specific investigations:
you've got to find out about the prices of wagons, I've got
to find out about the prices of bombs, etc. Similarly with
hierarchy problems: you've got to find out how often wagons
malfunction, I've got to find out how often bombs are put on
wagons, etc. If AI is ever to build a well-informed computer,
it must incorporate the findings of experts in wildly diverse
domains. The important point is that AI's "problems" of
ranking conditions according to their relative probabilities,
and of ranking rules according to their relative reliability
and usefulxresb, are no more surprising or principled than its
"problem" with specifying the prices of objects.
190
3.3.4 Summary
Before moving on, it may be helpful to summarize the main
conclusions thus far. First, the relevance pv:oblem and the
holism problem have nothing important to do with the frame
problem as it is understood in AI, namely, the persistence
problem. As a result, it is improper to use them in arguments
against the sleeping-dog strategy. Second, the two problems,
construed as domain-general problems, are easily solved by
appeal to two familiar AI relieving techniques: bidirectional
and heuristic search. Finally, although AI does not have a
complete solution to certain domain-specific problems, the
musings of the three wise men have not shown this to be a
deep, epistemological problem: AI can simply incorporate the
results of the domain-specific sciences.
3.4 Kookiness and the Frame Problem
3.4.1 The "Fridgeon" Problem
The third wise man, Jerry Fodor, raises a ravel and
interesting objection to the sleeping-dog strategy based on
the kooky predicate "fridgeon", defined as follows: x is a
fridgeon at t iff x is a physical particle at t and Fodor's
fridge is on at t. Fodor points out that when he turns his
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fridge on, he makes billions of changes--namely, he turns each
particle in the universe into a fridgeon. Therefore, he
argues:
If I let the facts about fridgeons into my database
* . ., pursuing the sleeping dog strategy will no longer
solve the frame problem. ... [A) strategy which says
'look just at the facts which change' will buy you
nothing; it will commit you to looking at indefinitely
many facts. (Fodor 1987, pp. 144-145; emphasis Fodor's)
The point is quite general. As Fodor explains, "there are
arbitrarily many kooky concepts which can be defined with the
same apparatus that you use to define perfectly kosher
concepts," namely, the apparatus of "basic concepts" and
"logical syntax" (Fodor 1987, pp. 145-146). "So," he
continues, "the problem--viz. the FRAME problem--is to find
a RULE that will keep the kooky concepts out while letting the
non-kooky concepts in" (Fodor 1987, p. 146; emphasis Fodor's).
But this would be tantamount to "a rigorous account of our
commonsense estimate of the world's taxonomic structure, "
which would require "formalizing our intuitions about
inductive relevance" (Fodor 1987, pp. 147-148). It's no
wonder, then, that Fodor claims the frame problem is "too
important to leave to the hackers" (Fodor 1987, p. 148)1"
"Some of Fodor's readers have been struck by similarities between
his "fridgeon" problem and Nelson Goodman's infamous "grue" problem
(Goodman, 1965). I will discuss the relevance of the "grue" problem in
section 3.3.4.
192
3.4.2 Three Kinds of Memory
Before turning directly to Fodor's problem of formalizing
inductive kookiness, it will help to get clearer about what
a system should do in the face of kookiness. What I will
argue is that a system should represent kooky facts implicitly
in its representations of nonkooky facts. The basic idea can
be explained by reference to the way people (like yourself)
deal with the mental predicate "FRIDGEON". If Fodor is right,
then you must keep representations of fridgeon facts out of
your "database". But this doesn't mean you must keep the
definition of "FRIDGEON" out of your memory; if you did, you
wouldn't even be able to understand Fodor's argumenti On a
natural view, then, you must have something like a mental
dictionary, in which you can store the definition of
"FRIDGEON". (For simplicity, we can suppose that this
dictionary is wholly separate from the database of "facts",
although it is not necessary for my purposes.) If (for some
odd reason) you want to check whether Nancy-the-Neutron is a
fridgeon, you must first find "FRIDGEON" in your mental
dictionary, and then check your database to determine whether
Nancy satisfies the definition--that is, whether Nancy is a
particle and whether Fodor's fridge is on. Given that
"FRIDGEON" appears in your mental dictionary, then,
representations of fridgeon facts needn't appear in your
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database. So you don't need to update them when you discover
that Fodor has turned his fridge on. The same is true for an
AI system with both a dictionary and a database. When Fodor
turns his fridge on, the system only needs to change one
representation, namely, its representation of the state of
Fodor's fridge.
The most obvious objection to this strategy is that even
representations of fridgeon frcts must sometimes be explicit.
Otherwise, one could never use the predicate "FRIDGEON", as
you are in thinking about Fodor's argument. In the example,
once you find "FRIDGEON" in your dictionary, and check whether
Nancy satisfies the definition, you still must infer
explicitly that Nancy is a fridgeon. In other words,
apparently, you must put the representation "NANCY IS A
FRIDGEON" in your database. Since this representation is
explicit, however, it needs to be updated explicitly, when
Fodor turns his fridge on. It might seem, then, that the
distinction between the dictionary and the database cuts no
ice. The proper response to this objection is to appeal to
a third kind of memory, which cognitive scientists call
"working memory". Working memory is a temporary storage
space, for representations which are being used at a given
time. The important thing about working memory for present
purposes is that once rep::esentations in working memory are
used, they can be erased. Now, while it is true that fridgeon
194
facts sometimes need to be represented explicitly, they need
only be explicit in working memory, not in the long-term
database. Therefore, after generating and using the explicit
representation "NANCY IS A FRIDGEON", you can simply erase it,
without worrying about updating it. The same is true for an
AI system with a working memory.
But Fodor can also object to this. The situation is
different when a system is told that Nancy is a fridgeon--that
is, when this is new information. If the system simply erases
this representation from working memory, it will lose the
information about Nancy. So, apparently, it must first copy
the representation into the database, in which case it needs
to worry about updating the copy. The response to this
objection is simple. If the system is to keep fridgeon facts
out of the database, it must translate representations of them
into nonkooky representations (using the dictionary), and copy
these nonkooky representations into the database. So, when
a system is told that Nancy is a fridgeon, it should put the
representations "NANCY IS A PARTICLE" and "FODOR'S FRIDGE IS
ON" into the database.
3.4.3 How to Rule out Kooky Predicates
Even given the viability of keeping kooky mental predicates
in the dictionary and in working memory, the "fridgeon"
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problem has not been addressed.
which predicates to keep there, and which to allow iato the
database? Mustn't it follow a rule which, as Fodor claims,
codifies "our intuitions about inductive relevance"? Not
obviously. I agren with Fodor that no one knows how to
formalize inductive kookiness, but I disagree with his claim
that we need to do this in order to save the sleeping-dog
strategy. As Fodor himself insists, kooky predicates are
defined in terms of basic predicates, so representations
involving kooky predicates can always be left implicit in
representations involving only basic prerdicates. Suppose,
then, that a system follows this rule: allow only basic
predicates into the database, and keep all defined predicates
in the dictionary and in working memory. Los Even though this
"'OStrictly speaking, this rule may have to be modified in order to
be implemented in familiar models. The distinction between basic and
derived predicates is a semnantic distinction of considerable intricacy
(see section 2.1.2). Given this, it iz difficult to see how a
computational system could classify its predicates literally as basic or
as derived. However, a number of computational tests can combine to
generate a useful classification which is near enough to the basic/derived
distinction: call it the distinction between "quasi-basic" and
"quasi-derived" predicates.
The first step is to classify predicates as either syntactically
complex or syntactically simple. Since this is a formal distinction,
nearly enough, I presume it is not difficult to understand how a system
could draw it, nearly enough. Syntactically complex predicates may be
classified as quasi-derived.
The harder task is to draw a distinction which can do duty for the
distinction between basic and derived syntactically simple predicates.
It nmaiy appear that we need a test for when a syntactically simple
predicate (e.g., "fridgeon") is literally defined by a syntactically
complex predicate. However, all that is actually required is that there
be a test for syntactically sirtlle predicates for which the system is
disposed to substitute a particular syntactically complex predicate, in
any sitcation the system judges to be both likely and irportant. (This
seems to be the situation we find ourselves in when Fodor tells us that
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For how does a system know
rule does not formalize kookiness, it i:i generally applicable
to any kooky predicate Fodor chooses to define.
Call a system using this rule a "basic system", since all
of its inferential processes are carri• =d out over
representations involving only basic predicates. Although a
basic system does not need to appeal to inductive relevance
in order to exclude kooky predicates, if it is to count as
well-informed about the real world then it needs to know which
particular "basic representations" to infer from which
particular others. Call this the "basic learning problem".
It may appear that my appeal to basic systems simply begs
Fodor's questions, since the basic learning problem is similar
to Fodor's problem of formalizing inductive relevance.0 3if
this is Fodor's question, however, it deserves begging, for
it is deprived of any interest. Given the possibility of
basic systems, Fodor cannot support his (interesting) claim
that the sleeping-dog strategy raises special problems about
kooky predicates. All he can claim, then, is that the
sleeping-dog strategy must work hand-in-hand with a solution
"x is a fridgeon'" means "x is a particle and Fodor's fridge is on".) In
many cognitive rrmodels such dispositions are realized in such a way (e.g.,
as "strengths" of productions in production systems or as "weights" of
connections in connectionist networks) that processes may access and
modify them. I presume, then, that it is possible for computational
processes to access these dispositions in distinguishing quasi-basic from
quasi-derived predicates.
101I thank Joelle Proust for pressing this point.
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to the basic learning problem. Lut this is no surprise. The
basic learning problem arises for any system which has to make
inferences about the real world, whether or not it uses the
sleeping-dog strategy (compare the discussion of C3 in section
3.3.2). Therefore, the sleeping-dog strategy does not raise
or intensify the problem. More importantly, Fodor has not
shown any principled difficulties with solving the problem.
If we want well-informed robots, then we must do two things:
we must engage in lots of domain-specific scientific
investigations about what may be inferred from what, and we
must occupy ourselves with issues surrounding how machines can
learn as children do. The basic learning problem is a
familiar example of an unprincipled, domain-specific content
problem (see section 3.3.2).
Another objection is that the rule which defines basic
systems is a bit too strong. It not only keeps kooky
predicates out of the database, but also excludes nonkooky
defined predicates, like "MY BULGARIAN GRANDMOTHER" and
"VEGETABLE CRISPER". The problem is that if one often uses
these predicates, one might need to have representations
involving them at one's mental fingertips--that is, one might
need to have them explicit in the database. In other words,
it might take too much time and energy to deal with all the
basic predicates each time one needs to use one of these
complex predicates. Fair enough. The rule needs to be
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weakened in the following way: allow only representations
involving basic predicates into the database, except for
representations (involving defined predicates) that are so
useful that you need to have them at your fingertips. In
other words, when a particular combination of basic predicates
recurs very frequently in the course of prob)em solving, the
system may introduce into the database an abbreviation for it
(i.e., a derived predicate). As amended, however, the rule
needn't mention anything about "our commonsense estimate of
the world's taxonomic structure."
One last argument on behalf of Fodor: he can object that
weakening the rule may allow fridgeon facts back into the
database after all. If individual fridgeon facts were
(somehow) vitally important to a system, it might indeed need
to have fridgeon information at its fingertips. But then it
would be forced to update many representations when Fodor
turns on his fridge. This is true. For such a system,
however, "FRIDGEON" would not be a kooky predicate at all--at
least, it would not be something the system should want to
rule out of the databasel A system with kooky enough needs
would have to update indefinitely many beliefs; that's just
tough kookies.'0  The sleeping-deg strategy is not supposed
102Even if a system had the kooky need to allow fridgeon facts into
the database, it would not necessarily run into computational problems.
Once the system has determined that Fodor 's fridge is on, it can form the
one explicit representation "ALL PARTICLES ARE FRIDGEONS". When it
changes its representation of Fodor's fridge, it can change this one
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magically to eliminate this possibility, but only to help
minimize the number of updates, given a fixed set of needs.
I conclude, then, that Fodor has not shown that the
sleeping-dog strategy faces a problem about formalizing our
intuitions about inductive kookiness.
3.4.4 The New Riddle of Induction
Although Fodor doesn't explicitly mention Nelson Goodman's
"new riddle of induction" (the "grue" problem), he certainly
nudges the reader toward the conclusion that AI must solve it
to solve the frame problem. As I have mentioned, he
(incorrectly) touts his "fridgeon" problem as a problem about
"inductive relevance". This can make it seem similar to the
problem of showing why "grue" facts are irrelevant to
inductive inference. Elsewhere, Fodor writes, "the frame
problem is not distinguishable from the problem of
nondemonstrative confEirmation" (Fodor, 1983, p. 138). To
philosophers, at least, the "grue" problem is the paradigm
representation. Surely this is computationally feasiblel But Fodor can
object that even this move leaves implicit all the billions of
particular-fr idgeon facts, say, the fact that Nancy-the-Neutron is a
fridgeon, and so on. In order to establish that Nancy is a fridgeon, the
system has to infer this from the general fact about all particles.
Perhaps each one of the billions of fridgeon facts might be so vital to
a system's microsecond-to-microsecond welfare that, in the heat of the
rroment, it cannot afford to waste time on this inference. Such a system
would be very likely to fail. But if this is Fodor's frame problem, it
should simply be ignored. Any human would fail, too, in the same
situation. So AI could design a machine as smart as any human, without
running up against this problem.
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paradox of nondemonstrative confirmation. Whatever his
intentions on the matter, then, it is common for Fodor's
readers to come away with the distinct impression that he has
shown the frame problem to be or to include the "grue"
problem.
For all its distinctness, this impression is wrong.
Although Fodor's problem and Goodman's problem are both
problems about kooky predicates, they are only superficially
similar. "Grue" is, like "fridgeon", a kooky predicate, which
may be defined as follows: x is grue if and only if x is a
green thing that has been examined or x is a blue thing that
has not been examined. Suppose that every emerald ever
examined is green. According to the definition, then, every
emerald ever examined is grue. The trouble with "grue" is
that, unlike the nonkooky predicate "green", it is not
"projectible" to unexamined emeralds. "Green" is projectible,
since the fact that all examined emeralds are green helps
confirm the hypothesis that all unexamined emeralds are green.
But the fact that all examined emeralds are grue does not help
confirm the hypothesis that all unexamined emeralds are grue;
by the definition, this would amount to the hypothesis that
all unexamined emeralds are blue. The problem Goodman poses,
then, is to show why "grue" and its like are not projectible
from examined instances to unexamined instances, while "green"
and its like are projectible.
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By contrast, Fodor's problem simply has nothing to do with
projectibility,' since "fridgeon", unlike "grue", is perfectly
projectible. For if at least one particle is a fridgeon, it
follows that Fodor's fridge is on, so it follows that all
particles are fridgeons. Therefore, even if Fodor is right
that the sleeping-dog strategy converts the frame problem into
a serious problem about inductive relevance, it would not
follow that the frame problem would include the problem of
avoiding the projection of "GRUE"-like mental predicates. La
Whether or not Goodman's problem has anything to do with
the frame problem, AI must solve something like It in order
to design good reasoning systems. Cast in Fodor's
computational terms, the problem is to find a "rule" that will
keep kooky predicates (like "grue") from being projected while
letting nonkooky predicates (like "green") be projected.
'"
3Conversely, the mental predicate "GRUE" does not create the
(alleged) problems "FRIDGEON" does. Using "FRIDGEON" rzther than nonkooky
predicates leads to Fodor's problem, because doing so (apparently)
increases the number of representations one nust update. Using "GRUE"
rather than "GREEN", on the other hand, does not (even apparently)
increase the number of updates. When one observes an object x, one can
classify it as "GRE~E" by storing the single representation "x IS GIEEN".
Even if one instead classifies it as 'GRIUE", however, one need only store
the single representation "x IS GRUE". (One wouldn't also need to store
"X IS (FEENl", since this may be left implicit in "x IS GRUE" and "x IS
OBSERVED".) Likewise, one can project "GREEiN" to an unobserved object y
by adding the single representation "y IS GREEN". Even if one instead
projects "GIRUE", however, one need only add the single representation "y
IS GRUE". (One wouldn't also need to add "y is BLUE", since this may be
left implicit in "y IS GRPUE" and "y IS UNOBSERVED".
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Fortunately, AI can follow Goodman's own lead in finding such
a rule (Goodman, 1965, chapter 4). Goodman's proposal centers
around the "entrenchment" of a predicate. Roughly, a
predicate is entrenched in proportion to the number of times
it and its superordinates (e.g., "colored" for "green") have
actually been projected in the past. Again roughly, Goodman
suggests that a predicate (like "green") is projectible if it
is much more entrenched than any l"competing" predicate (like
"grue"). Cast in terms of a "rule", what Goodman is saying
is, roughly: "Project the predicates you've projected often
in the past, and don't project ones which lead to conflicting
projections". It is hard to believe that AI would run into
much difficulty with implementing this sort of rulel To
exclude "grue", for instance, all that needs to be done is to
endow a system with an "innate" disposition to project "green"
(an endowment presumably shared by humans), and a disposition
to favor entrenched predicates over conflicting, nonentrenched
predicates.
If Goodman's "grue" problem sends shivers down
philosophical spines, this is probably due to the worry that
Goodman's appeal to entrenchment merely describes our
inductive practices, without justifying them. Why should we
,roject "green" rather than "gruen? Because, he says, this
coheres better with our established practices. Surely this
is reasonable; it follows from a more general principle of
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conservation of existing theories and practices until
something goes positively wrong with them. But the worry is
that even if we had normally projected "grue" much more often
than "green", this practice would still have been less optimal
than our existing practice. Fortunately for Al, however, even
if Goodman does need to say more to dispel this worry, AI
doesn't. AI might succeed in building a system with our
inductive practices, without even beginning to justify these
practices. As Pat Hayes writes in response to Fodor, "We (in
All wouldn't need to solve the philosophical problem of other
minds in order to build a conversational program, or the
problem of the ding an sich in order to build a vision system,
either" (Hayes[(1987], p. 134). The musings of the third wise
man, far from leading to a new, deep problem for AI, leads to
an old, deep problem for philosophy.
3.4.5 Summary
In two respects, the "fridgeon" problem shares the fate of
the relevance problem and the holism problem. First, none of
them are properly identified with the frame problem as it is
understood in AI (i.e., with the persistence problem), and
none of them weigh against the sleeping-dog strategy. Second,
they are all easy to solve. Therefore, neither Dennett nor
Haugeland nor Fodor succeeds in demonstrating a deep,
difficult problem for AI. However, they are left with a deep,
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difficult problem of their own, namely, the problem of framing
the frame problem: why should one suppose that what they are
talking about is the frame problem, and why should one suppose
that it's a problem?
In the absence of a complete classical model of cognition,
it does not appear possible to eliminate the suspicion that
such models will prove incapable of implementing human
inference in all of its complexity. Indeed, this suspicion
is healthy, when (in the hands of talented, sensitive, wise
men and women) it gives rise to attempts to demonstrate
principled problems for cognitive science. Such problems have
an important role in the development of a science--they help
to generate solutions, and provide for an understanding of the
explanatory role of these solutions. I have tried to isolate
a number of complexity-relieving techniques which solve the
frame problems in their various guises. It is an empirical,
and entirely open, question whether these techniques suffice
to reduce complexity to such a degree that classical models
can be implemented in brains. The ultimate fate of
functionalism and token physicalism, as an approach to the
mind/body problem, hangs in the balance.
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